/pub/history/military/a-weu/documents File: 1396defc.mar Document 1396 9th November 1993 An operational organisation for WEU: naval co-operation - Part One: Adriatic operations ------- REPORT (1) submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee (2) by Mr. Marten and Sir Keith Speed, Joint Rapporteurs TABLE OF CONTENTS ================= DRAFT RECOMMENDATION on an operational organisation for WEU: naval co-operation - Part One: Adriatic operations EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM submitted by Mr. Marten and Sir Keith Speed, Joint Rapporteurs I. Introduction II. Previous recommendations III. Sharp Guard (a) History (b) Mission (c) Nations contributing forces (d) Organisation (e) Fighter aircraft (f) Maritime patrol aircraft (g) NATO airborne early warning (h) Rules of engagement (i) Achievements IV. Political purpose and practical reality V. The question VI. Problem areas VII. Provisional conclusion ------- Draft Recommendation ==================== on an operational organisation for WEU: naval co-operation - Part One: Adriatic operations The Assembly, Considering that the meeting of the WEU Council on 22nd November 1993 and the NATO summit on 10th January 1994 provide excellent opportunities to establish WEU's position as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance; Conscious of the efforts made by WEU and NATO to ensure a coherent arrangement for naval and maritime air operations in the Adriatic; Welcoming the Atlantic Alliance's willingness to accommodate a WEU presence in the previously NATO-dedicated headquarters in Naples; Much appreciating NATO's readiness to make its infrastructure available to WEU, at least on an ad hoc basis; Regretting the WEU Council's failure to agree an appropriate budget for WEU's participation in operation Sharp Guard, RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL Actively prepare and promote WEU's position as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, and make this explicit at the forthcoming NATO summit meeting; Negotiate a formal agreement with the North Atlantic Council for WEU's use of NATO infrastructure as appropriate for specific operations; Urgently make available an adequate working budget for the WEU element on the staff of COMNAVSOUTH in Naples and for the WEU CONMARFOR at sea in the Adriatic; Review its lines of communication with those involved under the aegis of WEU in the command and control of specific operations, notably in the Adriatic area and restructure links between itself and such subsidiary bodies, giving clear mandates and specific terms of reference to all concerned; Ensure that the roles of the Planning Cell, of the WEU Military Delegates and the WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff in relation to those involved in operations on behalf of the WEU are clarified, redefining tasks and responsibilities as a matter of priority; Encourage member states to support Adriatic operations in all ways possible and publicise the achievements of operation Sharp Guard; Pay tribute to the thousands of men and women from WEU and other alliance nations taking part in operations in the Adriatic area who, both at sea and ashore, are carrying out an almost thankless task, often in trying and frustrating conditions and ensure that such breaches of the embargo as are continuing elsewhere receive additional attention so that the efforts of the sailors of the allied nations are rendered worthwhile; Explore, with the other member states of the WEU Forum of Consultation with maritime assets, the possibility of such assets being made available in support of operations in the Adriatic. ------- Explanatory Memorandum ====================== (submitted by Mr. Marten and Sir Keith Speed, Joint Rapporteurs) I. Introduction ---------------- In the course of their fact finding in preparation for the presentation of the report on "An operational organisation for WEU - naval co-operation", your Rapporteurs have discovered such ramifications to the subject, with many more fundamental principles at stake than were initially apparent, that they have decided to present the report in two parts rather than seek to postpone discussion to a future session. Certain aspects of the specific naval operations in the Adriatic require immediate attention and therefore this first part deals with the maritime task in hand. Part Two will deal with the wider issues involved and elaborate further on the structures and links required for the future conduct by WEU of naval operations in general. II. Previous recommendations ----------------------------- During the Assembly's plenary session, in June 1993, the following recommendations were unanimously adopted: "Recommendation 543 The Assembly, (i) Recalling Recommendations 506, 512, 519, 525, 530 and 531 and in particular the recommendations to: (a) Prepare a resolution to be tabled by WEU members of the United Nations Security Council to reinforce the present embargo at least to the level of that enforced against Iraq in 1990/91 and in particular to take account of the problem of cargo in transit and also of the complications of the Danube Convention and to publish evidence at an early stage of any significant breach of the embargo; (b) Fulfil its pledge for WEU member states to "offer expertise, technical assistance and equipment to the governments of Danube riparian states to prevent the use of the river Danube for the purpose of circumventing or breaking the sanctions imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757" and in particular respond to Romania's request for assistance; (c) In conjunction with the NATO authorities, rationalise naval and maritime air operations in the Adriatic area to form composite and cost-effective forces; (ii) Pleased that WEU has signed memoranda of understanding with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania on helping police the Danube and that such operations are already producing a deterrent effect on possible sanction breakers; (iii) Pleased that WEU and NATO have agreed a composite force for Adriatic operations (operation Sharp Guard) with a joint command in Naples; (iv) Pleased that all member countries are in one way or another fully supporting UN-mandated operations in the Adriatic, on the Danube, or in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia or Slovenia and considering such action already a symbol of European willingness to co-operate in the field of security; (v) Pleased that the Greek Government has more actively encouraged the application of UN-mandated sanctions; (vi) Considering that the memoranda of understanding signed with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania are a tangible sign of the good and practical relations prevailing in the WEU Forum of Consultation; (vii) Welcoming the recent contacts between WEU and both Russia and the Ukraine over the application of the UN embargo; (viii) Convinced that the Council should initiate a specific exercise programme so that forces now answerable to WEU may train together on a regular basis at all levels and further suggesting that the ideal starting point for such a programme would be the forthcoming Ardente 93 exercise in Italy; (ix) Congratulating the Council and the Presidency on their initiatives, RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 1. Inform the Assembly of the terms of the memoranda of understanding signed with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania and in particular make explicit any security guarantees given to any or all of these countries; 2. Ensure that the longer-term political implications of WEU's involvement in operations on the Danube and in the Adriatic are fully studied and appreciated; 3. Explore with the Greek authorities ways of helping them ensure complete and visible compliance with all UN sanctions even to the extent of asking member states to second customs and/or police officers to help with the task; 4. Encourage the Russian authorities to give practical expression to their offer to help ensure that all embargos are fully respected on the border between Serbia and Bosnia- Herzegovina; 5. Develop the liaison established with the Ukranian authorities with a view to signing a possible memorandum of understanding for WEU to provide technical assistance to the Ukraine so that UN sanctions may be seen to be fully respected; 6. Urge the UN to implement a compensation scheme to reimburse at least in part those countries such as Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, which have suffered considerable financial loss as a result of embargo enforcement; 7. Publish full details of the nationality, identity and characteristics of all vessels found breaking the embargo in the Adriatic and on the Danube in defiance of United Nations resolutions." The Council's reply to these recommendations reads as follows: "1. The Council will consider the possibilities of informing the Assembly of the terms of the memoranda of understanding. The memoranda of understanding contain no security guarantees. The Council would however reiterate the terms of the last subparagraph of paragraph 4 of the communique of the meeting of the WEU Forum of Consultation at Ministerial level, held in Rome on 20th May 1993: "Moreover, Ministers underlined the importance of containing the current conflict and agreed that, were any country to suffer from aggressive action as a consequence of their support for UN-mandated operations, this would be a matter of direct concern to the international community". 2. The Council is fully aware of the need to study and appreciate the "longer-term political implications of WEU's involvement in operations on the Danube and in the Adriatic". 3. The Council reiterates that the embargo is the responsibility of the United Nations Security Council. WEU's assistance to the Danube riparian states was sought by those countries. In this context, the Council is not planning "to explore with the Greek authorities ways of helping them ensure complete and visible compliance with all UN sanctions even to the extent of asking member states to second customs and/or police officers to help with the task". 4. The Council takes due note of the Assembly's proposal. Member states' governments have been unstinting in their encouragement, both within the UN Security Council and in their bilateral relations with the Government of the Russian Federation. 5. The Council attaches the utmost importance to compliance with United Nations sanctions. The main aim of the contacts established with Ukraine was to consider supplying equipment to help the Ukrainian authorities implement the embargo. There were no plans, however, to ask WEU to coordinate a technical assistance operation to this end. 6. This problem comes under the sole responsibility of the member states as members of the UN. 7. The Council notes the Assembly's wish that "full details of the nationality, identity and characteristics of all vessels found breaking the embargo in the Adriatic and on the Danube in defiance of United Nations' resolutions" be published. The embargo was imposed by the United Nations and it is they who are co-ordinating the economic sanctions imposed on 30th May and 16th November 1992. The Sanctions Committee holds all the information on violations. The Council possesses no more than fragmentary information regarding the embargo in the Adriatic. The Council is studying the possibilities of declassifying the data in its possession regarding the embargo in the Adriatic and on the Danube. In this event, such declassified data will be communicated to the Assembly." While the previous recommendations as such of course encompassed WEU initiatives both on the Danube and in the Adriatic and the present report deals in particular only with the Adriatic (the Danube operations being currently the subject of other fact-finding missions) your Rapporteurs wish to bring various particular aspects of the Council's reply to the notice of members. In general terms the Assembly may congratulate itself on continuing a tradition of providing political impulse to the WEU Council and there are signs in the Council's reply to Recommendation 543 (and, also encouragingly, in its reply to Recommendation 542 on United Nations operations - interaction with WEU) of the beginnings of a true dialogue. In particular your Rapporteurs hope that the Council will make up its mind before too long on "the possibilities of informing the Assembly of the terms of the memoranda of understanding" and on "the possibilities of declassifying the data in its possession regarding the embargo in the Adriatic". In passing it is worth mentioning that excellent progress is being made in terms of co-operation between WEU nations for a new generation of exercises, pioneered by the French-sponsored exercise Farfadet in June 1992. Ardente '94 sponsored by Italy (with major participation from France and Spain and, to a lesser degree, from Greece, the Netherlands, Turkey and the United Kingdom) was held during the week of 25th October in Tuscany. Like Farfadet, Ardente took as its theme the evacuation of nationals from a war-torn area, including the creation of a corridor for humanitarian relief - highly topical in another context also. Such exercises, held increasingly in the WEU context, are the shape of the future and your Rapporteurs are pleased that similar exercises are planned for 1994 (Transmontana under Spanish auspices and a command post exercise Purple Nova in the United Kingdom with full participation by the WEU Planning Cell) and in 1995 (in France). The naval aspects of these exercises will be emphasised in Part Two of the present report. III. Sharp Guard ----------------- Meanwhile naval operations continue in the Adriatic under the name of Sharp Guard and stemming from a WEU initiative taken in the wings of the 1992 Helsinki CSCE meeting. (a) History In July 1992, forces operating under WEU and NATO, working in strict co-ordination, began monitoring in the Adriatic sea the compliance of resolutions of the United Nations Security Council against the former Yugoslavia (operations Maritime Monitor and Sharp Vigilance). On 22nd November 1992 both operations were amplified in scope to include the enforcement of relevant UN resolutions (operations Maritime Guard and Sharp Fence). On 8th June 1993 the Councils of WEU and NATO, at a joint session, reviewed the embargo operations and approved a combined concept of operations for the implementation of UN Resolution 820, which strengthened the existing embargoes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). This concept included a single command and control arrangement for the combined operation Sharp Guard under the authority of the Councils of both organisations. The operation began on 15th June 1993. (b) Mission To conduct operations to monitor and enforce compliance with UN sanctions in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 713, 757, 787 and 820. Combined Task Force 440, in particular, prevents all unauthorised shipping from entering the territorial waters of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). (c) Nations contributing forces Nations contributing forces at present are: Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. Nineteen vessels are participating and some 12 000 sailors are at sea or on shore in the area. (d) Organisation The overall operational control is delegated to Admiral Carlo Alberto Vandini, Italian Navy, as Commander, Combined Task Force 440 (CCTF 440). He is assisted by Rear Admiral Gianfranco Coviello, Italian Navy, as Deputy CCTF 440. Admiral Vandini is the Commander of Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe. As CCTF 440, his staff has been complemented by a WEU staff element. Surface ships operate under two operational combined task groups (CTG) at sea to conduct operations in the Adriatic sea. A third task group has responsibility for ships conducting training or port visits. Operational responsibilities rotate among the task group commanders on approximately a monthly basis. At the time of writing, the two operational CTG commanders are a British Commodore and an Italian Captain. The third task group is commanded by a Canadian Commodore. Maritime patrol aircraft operate under operational command of CCTF 440 through the Commander of Combined Task Force 431, a US Rear Admiral. (e) Fighter aircraft Eight Italian Air Force Tornado aircraft are available to support operation Sharp Guard from their home base at Gioia del Colle. These aircraft can contribute to the defence of ships from attacks from surface ships. Other aircraft from allied forces operating in the area also contribute to this support. (f) Maritime patrol aircraft Continuous maritime air patrol support to the naval forces of CTF 440 is provided with assets from nine NATO nations: Canada (CP-140 "Aurora"), France (Atlantique), Germany (Atlantic), Italy (Atlantic), the Netherlands (P-3C), Portugal (P-3P), Spain (P- 3B), United Kingdom (Nimrod), United States (P-3C). The above aircraft operate from the airbases at Sigonella (Sicily) and Elmas (Sardinia), in Italy. (g) NATO airborne early warning Four E-3A and three E-3D from NATO's airborne early warning Force (NAEWF) are supporting operation Sharp Guard, as well as NATO operation Deny Flight, from their home base at Geilenkirchen, Germany, and forward operating bases at Aviano and Trapani, Italy, and Preveza, Greece. The E-3A aircraft are flown by multi-national crews provided by eleven NATO nations (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey and the United States). The NAEWF E-3D Component, comprised of aircraft from the United Kingdom's Number 8 Squadron are also participating in the mission. These aircraft operate from their home base at Royal Air Force Station Waddington, United Kingdom, as well as Aviano and Trapani, Italy. French E-3F aircraft operating from the French air base in Avord and Italian air base at Trapani under the auspices of the WEU are also participating. Worthy of note in this context is the readiness of both Austria and Hungary to give effective support to such operations. (h) Rules of engagement In their previous report, your Rapporteurs drew attention to the dangers of inadequate or varying rules of engagement. However, in spite of the fact that two participating nations have not adopted exactly the common WEU/NATO rules of engagement, the situation now appears satisfactory to the extent that ships of the nations concerned are unlikely to be deployed into sensitive areas. (i) Achievements During operation Sharp Guard, 6 157 merchant vessels have been challenged. Of them, 728 have been halted and inspected, or diverted to a port for inspection. As a result of the co-ordinated efforts of the forces which have operated under WEU and NATO, 1 032 merchant vessels were halted and boarded - or diverted to a port for inspection - from 22nd November 1992 to 15th June 1993, when operation Sharp Guard began. During the same period 12 367 merchant vessels were challenged. Therefore, an overall total of 18 524 ships have been challenged so far, with 1 760 inspected or diverted. Since the UN Security Council strengthened the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro with Resolution 820, in April 1993, no ship has been able to break the embargo. IV. Political purpose and practical reality -------------------------------------------- It might be surmised from the above that the composite arrangements described represent the achievement of a political aim, namely the bringing together of the Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and its European pillar (WEU), thus giving substance to intergovernmental declarations at Maastricht and on the Petersberg (3) . While such co-operation is certainly apparent between NATO and WEU, there are nevertheless various grey areas which must be elucidated and problems which must be resolved as a matter of urgency. In political terms the greatest imperative for such action is of course the forthcoming NATO summit scheduled for 10th January in Brussels. Even if this summit achieves little by way of the much-heralded "enlargement" of NATO it should at least lead to the consacration of WEU as the European pillar of NATO and lay the formal foundation for a new (and lasting) relationship between the two organisations. Such a development is necessary for two main reasons: (a) to outline the ground rules for co-operation so that those working within the organisations know what is expected of them and; (b) to present a united front in spite of the inevitable carping and often derogatory comments of those who find it difficult to accept NATO/WEU accommodation. For accommodation there has been, especially as the result of a very understanding approach by the senior commanders involved on the spot. Your Rapporteurs have been struck by the rearguard action of some of those in authority but obviously remote from the area: "we cannot possibly allow WEU ships to operate close to the Montenegrin coast because of the missile danger" (when, in fact, all ships are fully integrated into one or other of the key areas depending on an individual ship's capability rather than on whether it is "WEU CONMARFOR", "STANAVFORMED" or "STANAVFORLANT" and also on when the task group commanders rotate from area to area on a five week cycle - when the President of the Assembly visited the Adriatic in October he embarked in the STANAVFORMED ship which was the flagship for the WEU Commander) or "Admiral X is very competent to conduct the operation - not so certain about Admiral Y" (when the only difference between the two Admirals was that one had a NATO hat and the other did not - they even share the same nationality!). Fortunately, as time goes on, such comments are dying out in the face of the obvious complementarity and sheer professionalism of all concerned, in practical terms. Your Rapporteurs wish to pay special tribute to the individual efforts of the particular officers concerned with command of operations in zone, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) and Commander-in-Chief Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe (COMNAVSOUTH). Their patient pragmatism in working out command and control arrangments is admirable. In practical terms COMNAVSOUTH's staff has been reinforced by an Italian 2-star flag officer, a Spanish 1-star flag officer, two Captains, one French and one German, and an Italian Commander - the WEU "naval element". The senior Italian Captain at sea as one of the three Task Group Commanders (wearing a "WEU hat") has French and Spanish officers as planners on board his flag ship. The Italian navy has made available significant logistic support (both people and material) which has been greatly appreciated. In practical terms the WEU naval element has been absorbed into the COMNAVSOUTH process for decision making, planning, etc., etc., and there can be no quarrel with the result: an efficient, well-conducted embargo operation which to date has dealt with nearly 19 000 merchant marine vessels. V. The question ---------------- Your Rapporteurs have tried to put these operations into perspective. Do the ends justify the means? Not so much in terms of whether or not the embargo operation continues or is the best possible way to try and bring pressure on Serbia as rather, in parochial terms, whether or not WEU really needs to be present to help apply the said sanctions. Quite apart from the Assembly's own stance on the matter (calling for the application of stringent sanctions from the very beginning (4) ) we must examine the performance of the WEU Council which in its collective and consensual wisdom decided to take action in this way. And here lies the nub of this present report and its set of recommendations, for in your Rapporteurs' opinion, not enough has been done to give practical substance to the Council's political decisions. VI. Problem areas ------------------ While WEU is now in a totally different operational mode today compared with five or six years ago, we need to ensure that arrangements are both efficient and cost-effective. We must be certain that terms of reference are clear, for example, and a whole range of problem areas tackled as a matter of urgency. For instance: (a) all WEU member countries should be seen to be contributing both in practical and material terms to helping run operations which have been decided unanimously - although such is not presently the case in the Adriatic it may be that "Country X" is present on the Danube - greater publicity is necessary to bring such facts to the attention of the public at large; (b) costs must be shared on a more equitable footing. The present principle that those contributing the largest contingents should be expected also to make the largest financial contribution is simplistic in the extreme; (c) a formal agreement with NATO must be drawn up to deal with such matters as the use of infrastructures. NATO has made a large number of friendly gestures to WEU in current circumstances, but on a purely ad hoc basis. It must be made clear exactly who pays for what, for example, and the WEU element should be given its own budget to deal with daily necessities. But a fundamental matter of principal is at stake here, for if WEU so much as buys one item of kit to help ensure that current operations are effective is that not one step on the slippery slope towards duplication? The matter must be resolved sooner rather than later; (d) formal links have to be established between the WEU element in Naples, the WEU Council in Brussels, the Planning Cell, the Satellite Centre, but especially with the Chiefs of Defence Staff Committee and the WEU Military Delegates Committee. There is a pressing need to define relationships within the organisation as well as without; (e) practical as well as formal links are also vital: a travel budget obviously has to be decided to allow WEU personnel in Naples to visit the various relevant authorities concerned by Adriatic operations: communication equipment is also urgently required, as is a computer-assisted planning system. None of these items in themselves are expensive and indeed the whole cost has been estimated at less than that incurred by firing one "shot across the bows" at sea! VII. Provisional conclusion ---------------------------- This report will be considered by colleagues in committee at the beginning of November and, if accepted, debated in the Assembly's plenary session scheduled for the end of the month. Between these two rendezvous the WEU Ministerial Council will meet on 22nd November in Luxembourg. Your Rapporteurs trust that appropriate decisions on these practical matters will then be forthcoming and thus allow revised recommendations to be presented, as necessary, at the plenary session. WEU would then be in some strength in presenting a common European position for the NATO summit on 10th January 1994. (1) 1. Adopted in committee by 12 votes to 0 with 1 abstention. (2) 2. Members of the committee: Mr. Baumel (Chairman); MM. De Decker, de Puig (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Alloncle, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Borderas, Briane, Brito, Chevalier, Cox, De Carolis, Dees, Dumont, Fernandes Marques, Ferrarini, Hardy, Irmer, Jacquat, Kelchtermans, Leccisi, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, MM. van der Linden, Mannino, Marten, Lord Newall, MM. Pecchioli, Reis Leite, Scheer, Sir Dudley Smith, Sir Keith Speed, MM. Steiner, Lopez Valdivielso, Vazquez (Alternate: Cuco), Zierer. (3) 1. 10th December 1991 and 19th June 1992. (4) 2. Recommendation 512 adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1991.