OAuth 2.0 Agent Authorization Explicit Revocation

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

RFC 7009 defines the standard OAuth 2.0 token revocation flow, which operates at the granularity of individual tokens (access tokens or refresh tokens). This design works well in traditional client-server architectures but reveals significant limitations in emerging scenarios:¶

Agent Networks: Multiple agent proxies form delegation chains through authorization topology¶

Autonomous Systems: Agents can dynamically generate sub-agents and distribute permissions¶

Cross-Domain Collaboration: Agents migrate across different trust domains In these scenarios, revoking access for an upstream agent typically requires simultaneously revoking all its delegated sub-agents. RFC 7009 lacks mechanisms to support such cascade revocation.¶

Existing RFC 7009 exhibits the following core deficiencies:¶

Single Granularity: Supports only per-token revocation, cannot batch process by agent ID No Cascade Propagation: After upstream agent revocation, downstream sub-agent tokens remain valid Insufficient Response Information: 200 OK status does not provide revocation confirmation, execution results, or failure details No Audit Context: Cannot convey revocation reasons, operator identity, or other critical audit information No Event Notification: No standard mechanism to notify relevant parties (e.g., resource servers, downstream agents) of token status changes Missing Conditional Revocation: Does not support suspension, partial permission revocation, or other fine-grained policies¶

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 RFC2119 [RFC8174].¶

Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts described in the core OAuth 2.0 Framework [RFC6749] and [RFC7009].¶

3. Agent Revocation Endpoint

  POST /agent/revoke

POST /agent/revoke HTTP/1.1
Host: authorization-server.example.com
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIs...

{
  "agent_id": "urn:agent:root:12345",
  "reason": {
    "code": "SECURITY_INCIDENT",
    "description": "Agent exhibited anomalous behavior pattern"
  },
  "cascade_depth": -1,
  "context": {
    "operator": "urn:user:admin:security",
    "source_ip": "10.0.0.1",
    "request_id": "req-abc-123"
  },
  "revoke_all_tokens": true
}

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "status": "completed",
  "transaction_id": "tx-uuid-001",
  "timestamp": "2026-03-25T10:30:00Z",
  "summary": {
    "direct_agents_revoked": 1,
    "cascade_agents_revoked": 3,
    "tokens_revoked": 15,
    "events_emitted": 15,
    "failures": []
  },
  "affected_agents": [
    {"agent_id": "urn:agent:root:12345", "status": "revoked"},
    {"agent_id": "urn:agent:sub:child_1", "status": "revoked"},
    {"agent_id": "urn:agent:sub:child_2", "status": "revoked"},
    {"agent_id": "urn:agent:sub:child_3", "status": "revoked"}
  ],
  "audit_reference": "urn:audit:log:entry-98765"
}

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "status": "failed",
  "transaction_id": "tx-uuid-002",
  "timestamp": "2026-03-25T10:31:00Z",
  "error": {
    "code": "INVALID_AGENT_ID",
    "description": "The specified agent_id does not exist or has already been revoked."
  },
  "summary": {
    "direct_agents_revoked": 0,
    "cascade_agents_revoked": 0,
    "tokens_revoked": 0,
    "events_emitted": 0,
    "failures": [
      {
        "agent_id": "urn:agent:root:99999",
        "reason": "Agent not found"
      }
    ]
  },
  "audit_reference": "urn:audit:log:entry-98766"
}

4. Security Considerations

TBD¶

5. IANA Considerations

TBD¶

6. Acknowledgements

This document based on RFC7009¶

7. Informative References

[RFC2119]

Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

[RFC8174]

Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

[RFC7009]

Lodderstedt, T., Ed., Dronia, S., and M. Scurtescu, "OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation", RFC 7009, DOI 10.17487/RFC7009, August 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7009>.

[RFC6749]

Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749>.

Authors' Addresses