<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"
     ipr="trust200902"
     submissionType="independent"
     category="exp"
     docName="draft-sogomonian-aiip-architecture-04"
     version="3"
     xml:lang="en"
     sortRefs="true"
     symRefs="true"
     tocInclude="true"
     tocDepth="4">

  <front>
    <title abbrev="AIIP Architecture">Architecture for the Artificial Intelligence Internet Protocol</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-sogomonian-aiip-architecture-04"/>

    <author fullname="Aram Sogomonian" initials="A." surname="Sogomonian" role="editor">
      <organization>Artificial Intelligence Internet Foundation (AIIF)</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <country>US</country>
        </postal>
        <email>aiinternetfoundation@icloud.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <date year="2026" month="March" day="26"/>
    <workgroup>Independent Submission</workgroup>

    <keyword>AIIP</keyword>
    <keyword>Autonomous Systems</keyword>
    <keyword>Execution Receipts</keyword>
    <keyword>Offline Execution</keyword>
    <keyword>Machine-to-Machine Internet</keyword>
    <keyword>Delegated Execution</keyword>

    <abstract>
      <t>
        This document defines the architectural model for the Artificial
        Intelligence Internet Protocol (AIIP). AIIP defines a dedicated
        autonomous access plane for execution-capable systems, enabling
        delegated, stateless execution of real-world actions using a
        resolve-invoke-execute-receipt pattern over authenticated transports.
      </t>
      <t>
        AIIP is not a discovery, registration, orchestration, or control-plane
        protocol. It defines the architectural boundary at which autonomous
        execution is recognized and cryptographically verifiable through
        execution receipts.
      </t>
    </abstract>

  </front>

  <middle>
    <section anchor="intro" numbered="true">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>
        The Internet has historically been optimized for human interaction,
        document retrieval, and request-response semantics. Autonomous systems,
        however, require a different access model, one focused on delegated
        execution, safety boundaries, and post-execution accountability.
      </t>
      <t>
        AIIP provides a uniform architectural model for invoking and executing
        actions by autonomous systems with verifiable outcomes. The architecture
        follows a resolve-invoke-execute-receipt pattern.
      </t>
      <t>
        Native AIIP communication is designed for machine-to-machine operation
        and does not assume HTTP semantics, browser compatibility, or
        synchronous request-response behavior. HTTPS gateways are optional and
        non-authoritative.
      </t>
      <t>
        From the perspective of autonomous systems, AIIP functions as a native
        entry point to Internet capabilities, separate from the human-oriented
        Web access model.
      </t>
      <t>
        The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
        "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
        "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
        14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when,
        they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
      </t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="scope" numbered="true">
      <name>Scope and Non-Goals</name>
      <t>AIIP defines:</t>
      <ul>
        <li>Invocation semantics for autonomous actions</li>
        <li>Execution boundaries for state-changing operations</li>
        <li>Cryptographically verifiable execution receipts</li>
        <li>Operation under intermittent or absent connectivity</li>
        <li>Delegation-based authorization for execution attempts</li>
      </ul>
      <t>AIIP explicitly does NOT define:</t>
      <ul>
        <li>Agent registration or discovery</li>
        <li>Capability catalogs or negotiation</li>
        <li>Workflow orchestration or task planning</li>
        <li>Real-time control loops or enforcement</li>
        <li>Human-facing user interface behavior</li>
      </ul>
    </section>

    <section anchor="autonomous-access-plane" numbered="true">
      <name>AIIP Autonomous Access Plane</name>
      <t>
        AIIP defines a distinct autonomous access plane for execution-capable
        systems. This access plane is separate from the human-oriented Web and
        independent of control-plane or discovery mechanisms.
      </t>
      <t>
        An AIIP access point is a network-visible execution interface that
        accepts invocation requests, validates authorization, performs or
        brokers execution, and produces verifiable execution receipts.
      </t>
      <t>
        AIIP provides a distinct network access model for autonomous systems.
        In this model, autonomous systems interact through AIIP-native
        invocation and execution semantics rather than through HTTP-based
        interfaces designed primarily for human users.
      </t>
      <t>
        The AIIP autonomous access plane begins at invocation and ends at
        execution receipt generation. Any function operating entirely outside
        this boundary is outside the scope of AIIP.
      </t>
      <t>
        AIIP does not extend HTTP. It defines a native, machine-oriented
        execution plane that may be carried over authenticated transports such
        as TLS <xref target="RFC8446"/> or QUIC <xref target="RFC9000"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        AIIP is designed to coexist with discovery, registration, policy,
        and orchestration mechanisms, which may provide inputs to AIIP without
        constraining its execution semantics.
      </t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="layering" numbered="true">
      <name>Architectural Layering</name>
      <t>
        AIIP occupies a distinct architectural layer between higher-level
        autonomous decision logic and authenticated transport. This can be
        expressed conceptually as follows:
      </t>
      <ul>
        <li>Application, orchestration, and planning layers (out of scope)</li>
        <li>Discovery and registration mechanisms (out of scope)</li>
        <li>AIIP autonomous access plane (this specification)</li>
        <li>Authenticated transport (for example, TLS or QUIC)</li>
      </ul>
      <t>
        Discovery and registration mechanisms may provide identifiers,
        endpoints, or trust material consumed by AIIP, but AIIP does not
        depend on their semantics.
      </t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="model" numbered="true">
      <name>Architectural Model</name>
      <t>
        AIIP follows a resolve-invoke-execute-receipt pattern.
      </t>
      <section anchor="resolve-step" numbered="true">
        <name>Resolve</name>
        <t>
          Prior to invocation, an autonomous system may obtain an execution
          target, access point identifier, trust material, or delegation grant
          by means outside the scope of this specification.
        </t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="invoke-step" numbered="true">
        <name>Invoke</name>
        <t>
          The invoking system submits a cryptographically authenticated request
          to attempt an action under a delegation grant.
        </t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="execute-step" numbered="true">
        <name>Execute</name>
        <t>
          The receiving environment validates the invocation context and, if
          authorized and feasible, performs the requested state-changing
          operation.
        </t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="receipt-step" numbered="true">
        <name>Receipt</name>
        <t>
          Upon execution, the environment generates an execution receipt that
          provides verifiable evidence of the execution outcome.
        </t>
      </section>
    </section>

    <section anchor="delegation" numbered="true">
      <name>Delegation and Authorization</name>
      <t>
        AIIP assumes that execution attempts occur under delegated authority.
        A delegation grant authorizes an autonomous system to attempt specific
        actions against a defined scope under stated constraints.
      </t>
      <t>
        Delegation grants SHOULD be narrowly scoped, time-limited, and bound
        to an identified subject. Implementations MAY include additional
        constraints such as maximum executions, time windows, geographic
        restrictions, or environmental preconditions.
      </t>
      <t>
        Grant encoding and distribution are out of scope for this document.
        However, the architecture assumes that the executing environment is
        able to verify grant authenticity and applicability before execution.
      </t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="execution-boundary" numbered="true">
      <name>Invocation, Execution, and Architectural Boundary</name>
      <t>
        An invocation is a cryptographically authenticated request to attempt
        an action under a delegation grant.
      </t>
      <t>
        An invocation message typically includes a target identifier, an
        action, input parameters, a delegation grant or reference to one, and
        cryptographic metadata such as timestamps, nonces, or signatures. The
        exact encoding is out of scope for this document.
      </t>
      <t>
        Execution is the successful completion of a state-changing operation by
        the target environment.
      </t>
      <t>
        AIIP defines the sole architectural boundary at which autonomous
        execution is recognized. An action lacking a valid AIIP execution
        receipt MUST NOT be treated as executed for protocol purposes.
      </t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="receipts" numbered="true">
      <name>Execution Receipts</name>
      <t>
        Each successful execution MUST produce an execution receipt. A failed
        execution attempt MAY also produce a signed receipt or equivalent
        verifiable outcome record.
      </t>
      <t>
        Receipts provide cryptographic evidence that an execution occurred,
        together with the execution outcome as determined by the executing
        environment.
      </t>
      <t>
        A receipt typically includes an invocation reference, execution
        status, result commitment such as a hash, timestamp, identity of the
        executing environment, and a cryptographic signature.
      </t>
      <t>
        Receipts enable auditability, compliance, dispute resolution, and post
        hoc verification.
      </t>
      <t>
        Receipt encoding is out of scope for this document. Semantic validity
        is independent of serialization format.
      </t>
      <section anchor="canonicality" numbered="false">
        <name>Canonicality</name>
        <t>
          Receipt validity MUST NOT depend on field ordering, whitespace,
          presentation details, or other serialization artifacts.
        </t>
      </section>
    </section>

    <section anchor="transport" numbered="true">
      <name>Transport Considerations</name>
      <t>
        AIIP messages MUST be carried over an authenticated transport or
        protected by equivalent cryptographic mechanisms that provide peer
        authentication, integrity protection, and confidentiality appropriate
        to the deployment environment.
      </t>
      <t>
        This document does not define a mandatory single transport binding.
        Example transports include TLS <xref target="RFC8446"/> and QUIC
        <xref target="RFC9000"/>. Future specifications may define concrete
        bindings and negotiation behavior.
      </t>
      <t>
        Transport success alone does not constitute execution. Protocol-level
        recognition of execution depends on receipt generation and validation.
      </t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="offline" numbered="true">
      <name>Offline and Disconnected Operation</name>
      <t>
        AIIP supports authorized execution in the absence of continuous
        connectivity. Offline operation represents execution under
        pre-authorized constraints, not deferred transmission or request
        caching.
      </t>
      <t>
        Implementations supporting offline execution SHOULD bound that
        capability using explicit validity intervals, execution limits,
        environmental constraints, or comparable controls.
      </t>
      <t>
        Execution receipts generated during offline operation MUST remain
        verifiable once connectivity is restored.
      </t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="gateways" numbered="true">
      <name>Optional Gateways</name>
      <t>
        AIIP gateways MAY translate between AIIP and non-AIIP systems,
        including HTTP-based systems.
      </t>
      <t>
        Gateways are non-authoritative with respect to execution. A gateway
        MUST NOT alter the semantic content of a receipt and MUST NOT claim
        that transport delivery alone is equivalent to execution.
      </t>
      <t>
        Unless explicitly acting as the execution environment itself, a gateway
        MUST NOT generate an authoritative execution receipt on behalf of a
        different execution environment.
      </t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="future-work" numbered="true">
      <name>Future Work</name>
      <t>
        Future work may define concrete transport bindings, receipt encodings,
        deployment profiles, registries, media types, URI schemes, or other
        operational extensions needed to support interoperable AIIP
        deployments.
      </t>
      <t>
        Such extensions require separate specification and community review.
      </t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="security" numbered="true">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>
        AIIP relies on authenticated transports and cryptographic mechanisms to
        provide integrity, authenticity, and non-repudiation properties for
        invocations and execution receipts.
      </t>
      <t>
        Implementations MUST consider threats including replay of invocation
        messages, forgery or misuse of delegation grants, impersonation of
        invoking agents or execution environments, tampering with receipts or
        result commitments, abuse of offline execution authority beyond its
        intended scope, and unauthorized modification or observation by
        intermediary systems.
      </t>
      <t>
        Implementations SHOULD use nonces, timestamps, audience restriction,
        narrow grant scope, expiration controls, and cryptographic signatures
        to mitigate replay and forgery risks.
      </t>
      <t>
        Execution environments MUST verify that the presented authorization is
        applicable to the requested action and target before execution.
      </t>
      <t>
        Because gateways are non-authoritative, trust decisions MUST be bound
        to the actual execution environment and its receipt rather than to an
        intermediary that merely relays or translates requests.
      </t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="privacy" numbered="true">
      <name>Privacy Considerations</name>
      <t>
        AIIP deployments can expose information about agent identity,
        delegated authority, execution timing, execution targets, and action
        outcomes. Correlation of receipts or invocation metadata across
        contexts can reveal behavior patterns even when payload content is
        protected.
      </t>
      <t>
        Implementations SHOULD minimize unnecessary disclosure, limit retained
        metadata, and apply data minimization principles to both invocations
        and receipts. Deployments MAY use privacy-enhancing techniques such as
        selective disclosure, compartmentalized identifiers, or zero-knowledge
        mechanisms where suitable.
      </t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="iana" numbered="true">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This document has no IANA actions.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>

  <back>
    <references>
      <name>Normative References</name>
      <reference anchor="RFC2119" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119">
        <front>
          <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
          <author initials="S." surname="Bradner" fullname="Scott Bradner"/>
          <date month="March" year="1997"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC8174" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174">
        <front>
          <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
          <author initials="B." surname="Leiba" fullname="Barry Leiba"/>
          <date month="May" year="2017"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC8446" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446">
        <front>
          <title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title>
          <author initials="E." surname="Rescorla" fullname="Eric Rescorla"/>
          <date month="August" year="2018"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8446"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8446"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC9000" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000">
        <front>
          <title>QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed and Secure Transport</title>
          <author initials="J." surname="Iyengar" fullname="Jana Iyengar"/>
          <author initials="M." surname="Thomson" fullname="Martin Thomson"/>
          <date month="May" year="2021"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9000"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9000"/>
      </reference>
    </references>

    <references>
      <name>Informative References</name>
      <reference anchor="RFC3552" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552">
        <front>
          <title>Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security Considerations</title>
          <author initials="E." surname="Rescorla" fullname="Eric Rescorla"/>
          <author initials="B." surname="Korver" fullname="Bernard Korver"/>
          <date month="July" year="2003"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="72"/>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3552"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3552"/>
      </reference>
      <reference anchor="RFC7258" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258">
        <front>
          <title>Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack</title>
          <author initials="S." surname="Farrell" fullname="Stephen Farrell"/>
          <author initials="H." surname="Tschofenig" fullname="Hannes Tschofenig"/>
          <date month="May" year="2014"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="188"/>
        <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7258"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7258"/>
      </reference>
    </references>
  </back>
</rfc>
