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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-sury-dnsop-parent-centric-resolver-01" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" updates="1034, 1035" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="Parent-Centric Resolver">Parent-Centric Delegation Handling in DNS Resolvers</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-sury-dnsop-parent-centric-resolver-01"/>
    <author initials="O." surname="Surý" fullname="Ondřej Surý">
      <organization>Internet Systems Consortium</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <country>Czechia</country>
        </postal>
        <email>ondrej@isc.org</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="C." surname="Vidal" fullname="Colin Vidal">
      <organization>Internet Systems Consortium</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <country>France</country>
        </postal>
        <email>colin@isc.org</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="E." surname="Hunt" fullname="Evan Hunt">
      <organization>Internet Systems Consortium</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <country>United States of America</country>
        </postal>
        <email>each@isc.org</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="March" day="16"/>
    <area>Operations and Management</area>
    <workgroup>DNSOP</workgroup>
    <keyword>DNS</keyword>
    <keyword>delegation</keyword>
    <keyword>resolver</keyword>
    <keyword>parent-centric</keyword>
    <keyword>DELEG</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 92?>

<t>This document specifies a parent-centric behavioral model for DNS
recursive resolvers, in which delegation decisions are always based on
the NS RRset (or DELEG RRset) received from the parent side of a zone
cut and are never overwritten by child-side NS data.</t>
      <t>The parent-centric model eliminates the "two sources of truth" problem
inherent in the current DNS delegation design, closes the Ghost Domain
and Phoenix Domain attack vectors, provides deterministic behavior in
the presence of parent/child NS mismatches, and enables resolvers to
safely accept sibling (out-of-bailiwick) glue by scoping delegation
information to individual zone cuts.  It also provides the behavioral
foundation required for deployment of the DELEG extensible delegation
mechanism.</t>
      <t>This document updates RFC 1034 and RFC 1035.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 110?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>The Domain Name System (DNS) <xref target="RFC1034"/> <xref target="RFC1035"/> uses NS (Name Server)
records to delegate authority over portions of the namespace from a parent
zone to a child zone.  A fundamental consequence of the current delegation
model is that NS records exist in two places: at the delegation point in
the parent zone (the "parent-side" NS RRset) and at the apex of the child
zone (the "child-side" or "apex" NS RRset).</t>
      <t>Historically, most recursive resolver implementations have followed a
"child-centric" approach: when a referral is received from a parent zone,
the resolver caches the parent-side NS RRset, but subsequently replaces it
with the child-side apex NS RRset if one is observed in a response from
the delegated zone.  This replacement is performed on the assumption that
the child zone's apex NS RRset is "more authoritative" than the parent's
delegation point NS RRset.</t>
      <t>This document specifies a "parent-centric" behavioral model for recursive
resolvers, in which delegation decisions are always based on the NS RRset
(or DELEG RRset) received from the parent side of a zone cut, and are
never overwritten by child-side NS data.  The parent-centric model
eliminates an entire class of inconsistency and security problems inherent
in the child-centric approach.  It also provides the behavioral foundation
needed for the deployment of extensible delegation mechanisms such as the
DELEG record <xref target="I-D.ietf-deleg"/>.</t>
      <t>This document does not prescribe any particular cache architecture,
data-structure layout, or lookup ordering for implementations.
Conforming implementations are free to use any internal organization --
including a single unified cache -- that achieves the required behavior.</t>
      <section anchor="terminology">
        <name>Terminology</name>
        <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
        <?line -18?>

<dl>
          <dt>Parent-side NS RRset:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The set of NS records present at a delegation point in the parent zone
and optional glue records (A + AAAA) <xref target="RFC9471"/> required for the
iterative clients to find the addresses of name servers that are
contained within a delegated zone.  These records are non-authoritative
in the parent zone and are included in referral responses.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Child-side NS RRset:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The set of NS records present at the apex of the delegated (child) zone.
These records are authoritative within the child zone.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Delegation information:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The data a resolver uses to determine which nameservers are responsible
for a zone cut: nameserver names, associated addresses from the glue records,
and (when DELEG <xref target="I-D.ietf-deleg"/> is supported) DELEG and DELEGPARAM
parameters. This information originates from referral responses received
from a parent zone's nameservers.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Child-centric resolver:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A resolver that replaces parent-side delegation information with
child-side apex NS data when available.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Parent-centric resolver:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A resolver that retains parent-side delegation information as the
authoritative source for delegation decisions and does not overwrite it
with child-side NS data.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Answer data:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Resource records cached by the resolver for the purpose of answering
client queries.  In the context of this document, the child-side NS
RRset is answer data: it is the authoritative answer to an NS query
at a zone apex.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Delegation data:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Information used internally by the resolver to determine which
nameservers to contact when resolving queries.  In the context of this
document, the parent-side NS RRset (and associated glue) is delegation
data.  Delegation data is never returned to clients as an answer.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="problem-statement">
      <name>Problem Statement</name>
      <section anchor="two-sources">
        <name>Two Sources of Truth</name>
        <t><xref target="RFC1034"/> Section 4.2.1 specifies that NS records appear both at the
delegation point in the parent zone and at the apex of the child zone.
Ideally these two NS RRsets are identical, but in practice they frequently
diverge.  When a zone administrator updates the nameserver set, it is
common for either the parent or the child NS RRset to be updated first,
creating a window (sometimes indefinitely long) during which the two
disagree.</t>
        <t>A child-centric resolver that replaces parent-side NS data with child-side
NS data effectively trusts the child zone to define its own delegation.
This creates several problems:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>A compromised or misconfigured child zone can redirect resolution by
publishing NS records pointing to servers not sanctioned by the parent.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>NS RRsets learned from the child side may include nameservers that are
not present at the delegation point, creating inconsistencies in the
resolver's view of the namespace.  Or NS RRsets learned from the child
side may not include nameserver that are present at the delegation point,
again creating inconsistencies in the resolver's view of the namespace.
It is up to the implementation whether the two distinct sets of NS RRsets
get merged or whether the child-side NS RRset replace the parent-side
delegation information.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The child-side NS RRset may have a different (often longer) TTL than the
parent-side delegation, causing the resolver to use stale delegation
information.  Alternative parent-side NS RRsets may have a different TTL
than the child-side NS RRset.  It is again up to the implementation
whether the parent-side NS RRset TTL is honored, the child-side NS RRset
TTL is honored or the smallest value of the two is chosen.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="ghost-domains">
        <name>Ghost Domain Attacks</name>
        <t>The Ghost Domain attack <xref target="GHOST-DOMAIN"/> demonstrated that a child-centric
resolver's willingness to replace cached delegation data with fresher
child-side NS records allows an attacker to keep a revoked domain name
resolvable indefinitely.  The attack works by exploiting the cache update
logic: even after the parent zone has removed the delegation, the attacker
can trigger queries that cause the resolver to contact the (still-running)
rogue nameserver, which returns a child-side NS RRset with a fresh TTL,
overwriting the stale (or absent) parent-side delegation data in the
cache.  Experiments showed that more than 70% of tested open resolvers
were still resolving a revoked domain a week after removal from the parent
zone at the time the research was published.</t>
        <t>The follow-up work on Phoenix Domain <xref target="PHOENIX-DOMAIN"/> showed that the
original Ghost Domain mitigations (TTL capping on NS replacement) were
insufficient.  The Phoenix Domain attack uncovered additional vulnerable
cache operations in the delegation process that allowed revoked domains
to remain resolvable for over a month on more than 25% of tested
resolvers at the time this research was published.  Critically, the
Phoenix Domain paper identifies the child-centric vs. parent-centric
distinction as a key architectural factor: parent-centric resolvers
that do not overwrite delegation data with child-side NS records are
immune to the T1 class of Phoenix Domain attacks, because the attacker
cannot inject fresh delegation data through child-zone responses.</t>
        <t>A parent-centric resolver as specified in this document eliminates the
Ghost Domain and Phoenix Domain T1 attack vectors entirely, because
delegation decisions are never influenced by child-side NS data.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="inconsistent-rpz-behavior">
        <name>Inconsistent RPZ Behavior</name>
        <t>Response Policy Zones (RPZ) <xref target="RFC7719"/> include NSDNAME and NSIP trigger
types that match against the nameservers of the zone containing the
answer.  When a child-centric resolver replaces the parent-side NS RRset
with the child-side NS RRset, the set of nameserver names and addresses
visible to RPZ policy evaluation changes unpredictably depending on
whether the child-side data has been cached yet.  This leads to
inconsistent policy enforcement: the same query may or may not trigger an
RPZ rule depending on the cache state.</t>
        <t>A parent-centric resolver provides a stable set of delegation information
for RPZ evaluation, because the delegation data used for resolution is
always the parent-side data received in referrals, regardless of what
child-side NS data may exist in the cache.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="impediment-to-deleg-deployment">
        <name>Impediment to DELEG Deployment</name>
        <t>The DELEG record <xref target="I-D.ietf-deleg"/> is an extensible delegation mechanism
that is authoritative on the parent side of a zone cut.  DELEG records can
carry server addresses, transport parameters, and other extensible
metadata directly in the delegation, eliminating the need for additional
queries to resolve nameserver addresses.  The companion DELEGPARAM record
provides an indirection mechanism for sharing delegation parameters across
multiple zones.</t>
        <t>A child-centric resolver cannot cleanly support DELEG, because:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>DELEG data is exclusively parent-side; there is no child-side equivalent.
A child-centric resolver that overwrites parent-side data with child-side
NS data would lose the DELEG information.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><xref target="I-D.ietf-deleg"/> Section 5.1.1 requires that when DELEG records exist
at a delegation point, a DELEG-aware resolver <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use the name servers
from those DELEG records and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> use NS records for the zone, even
if resolution using DELEG records has failed.  A parent-centric resolver
naturally enforces this rule because it never overwrites parent-side
delegation data with child-side NS data.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="strict-glue-problem">
        <name>Interaction with Strict Glue Checking</name>
        <t>Recent resolver releases have adopted strict (hardened) glue checking
<xref target="STRICT-GLUE"/>: glue records in referral responses are only accepted when
the NS target name is at or below the delegation point (in-domain glue).
Glue for out-of-domain, but in-the-bailiwick nameserver names -- "sibling
glue" -- is discarded, and those names must be resolved iteratively.</t>
        <t>For example, given the delegation from <tt>.org</tt>:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
example.org.          NS  ns1.example.org.
example.org.          NS  ns2.otherdomain.org.
ns1.example.org.      A   198.51.100.42
ns2.otherdomain.org.  A   203.0.113.53
]]></artwork>
        <t>strict glue checking accepts the A record for <tt>ns1.example.org</tt> (which is
below <tt>example.org</tt>) but discards the A record for <tt>ns2.otherdomain.org</tt>
(which is not).  The resolver must then iteratively resolve
<tt>ns2.otherdomain.org</tt>, following a separate delegation chain through the
<tt>otherdomain.org</tt> zone.</t>
        <t>This strict checking revealed a misconfiguration where a set of domains
used cyclic in-the-bailwick glue and relied on the relaxed acceptance
of the glue records for resolution.</t>
        <t>For example, give the delegation from <tt>.org</tt>:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
example.org.          NS  ns1.otherdomain.org.
example.org.          NS  ns2.otherdomain.org.
ns1.otherdomain.org.  A   198.51.100.42
ns2.otherdomain.org.  A   203.0.113.53

otherdomain.org.      NS  ns1.example.org.
otherdomain.org.      NS  ns2.example.org.
ns1.example.org.      A   198.51.100.42
ns2.example.org.      A   203.0.113.53
]]></artwork>
        <t>strict glue validation would throw away both set of glue records and make
both example.org and otherdomain.org would fail to resolve.</t>
        <section anchor="why-strict-glue-was-necessary">
          <name>Why Strict Glue Was Necessary</name>
          <t>In a child-centric resolver that stores all cached data in a shared
namespace, sibling glue is dangerous because it can contaminate unrelated
delegations.  If a referral for <tt>example.org</tt> includes a glue A record
for <tt>ns1.example.net</tt>, that record enters the shared cache and may be
used when resolving names under <tt>example.net</tt> -- even though the glue was
provided by the <tt>.org</tt> zone, which has no authority over <tt>example.net</tt>
addresses.  An attacker who controls a delegation in <tt>.org</tt> can exploit
this to inject forged address records for nameservers in <tt>.net</tt>,
effectively poisoning the resolution of unrelated zones.</t>
          <t>Strict glue checking prevents this cross-delegation contamination by
rejecting all sibling glue.  However, this strict policy causes
significant operational problems:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>When sibling glue is rejected, the resolver performs more iterative
lookups, each of which traverses additional delegation chains.  Any
parent/child NS mismatch along those chains can cause resolution
failures or inconsistent behavior.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>In pathological cases, the combination of strict glue rejection and
nested sibling delegations can produce resolution failures that
succeed on retry (after intermediate records have been cached), making
the problem intermittent and difficult to diagnose.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>The increased query volume puts additional load on authoritative servers
and increases resolution latency for end users.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </section>
        <section anchor="how-parent-centric-behavior-resolves-this">
          <name>How Parent-Centric Behavior Resolves This</name>
          <t>The parent-centric model eliminates the underlying security problem that
strict glue checking was designed to address, because delegation
information is self-contained per zone cut and is not shared across
delegations.</t>
          <t>When a parent-centric resolver accepts sibling glue for <tt>ns1.example.net</tt>
in a referral for <tt>example.org</tt>, that address is recorded as part of the
<tt>example.org</tt> delegation information.  It is used only when contacting
servers for <tt>example.org</tt> and is never used when resolving names under
<tt>example.net</tt> or any other zone.  The delegation information for
<tt>example.net</tt> is a separate entry, populated from referrals received from
the <tt>.net</tt> zone's parent, and is completely unaffected by glue received in
referrals for <tt>example.org</tt>.</t>
          <t>This scoping means that a parent-centric resolver can safely accept
sibling glue again without risk of cross-delegation contamination.
The operational problems caused by strict glue rejection -- increased
query volume, resolution failures due to nested out-of-bailiwick
delegations, and sensitivity to parent/child NS mismatches -- are avoided,
because the sibling glue is used directly from the delegation information
without requiring additional iterative resolution.</t>
          <t>Resolver implementations adopting the parent-centric model <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> therefore
accept sibling glue from referral responses, provided that the glue is
stored as part of the delegation information for the specific zone cut and
is not used for any other purpose.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="specification">
      <name>Specification</name>
      <section anchor="core-behavioral-requirement">
        <name>Core Behavioral Requirement</name>
        <t>A conforming resolver <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use delegation information received from parent
zones (via referral responses) as the basis for all delegation decisions.
Delegation information <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be overwritten, replaced, or supplemented
by child-side NS RRsets observed in authoritative responses from the
delegated zone.</t>
        <t>This requirement applies regardless of how the resolver organizes its
internal data structures.  Any particular cache architecture, data-structure
choice, or lookup strategy is an implementation detail and out-of-the-scope
for this document.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="processing-referrals">
        <name>Processing Referrals</name>
        <t>When a resolver receives a referral (a response with no answer, containing
NS records in the authority section and optional glue in the additional
section), it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> process the delegation as follows:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>Extract the zone cut name from the owner name of the NS RRset in the
authority section.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Record the delegation information: the nameserver names from the NS
RRset, and any A/AAAA glue records present in the additional section
for those nameserver names.  Because delegation information in the
parent-centric model is scoped to the individual zone cut and is not
shared across delegations, both in-domain glue and sibling glue can
be safely accepted; see <xref target="strict-glue-problem"/> for the security analysis.
The effective TTL of the delegation information <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be the minimum
of the NS RRset TTL and the accepted glue record TTLs.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Use this delegation information for subsequent resolution of names
under the zone cut, until it expires or is replaced by a newer referral
for the same zone cut.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>The resolver <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> use the referral NS RRset to respond to the ordinary
DNS clients.  The referral NS RRset is parent-side data and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be treated
as delegation information only.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="processing-auth">
        <name>Processing Authoritative Responses</name>
        <t>When a resolver receives an authoritative response (AA bit set) that
includes a child-side NS RRset (either in the answer section for an
NS-type query, or in the authority section as part of the response), the
resolver <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> cache the child-side NS RRset as answer data, subject to
normal cache admission policies.  This cached child-side NS RRset is used
to answer explicit NS queries from clients (<xref target="answering-ns-queries"/>) but
<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used to update, replace, or supplement the delegation
information used for delegation decisions.</t>
        <t>The child-side NS RRset is authoritative data from the child zone and is
the correct answer to an NS query.  The parent-side NS RRset received in
referrals is non-authoritative delegation information and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be
returned as the answer to an NS query.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="answering-ns-queries">
        <name>Answering Explicit NS Queries</name>
        <t>When a recursive resolver receives a query  for the NS RRset at
a zone name (QTYPE=NS, QNAME=&lt;zone apex&gt;), it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> resolve
and return the child-side (authoritative) NS RRset, not the parent-side
delegation data.  This is a fundamental distinction of the parent-centric
model: parent-side NS data drives delegation decisions internally, but
the child-side NS data is the authoritative answer to NS queries.</t>
        <t>The resolver processes this query through normal recursive resolution:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>Using its delegation information, the resolver contacts an
authoritative server for the queried zone.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The authoritative server returns the apex NS RRset with the AA
(Authoritative Answer) flag set.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The resolver caches this child-side NS RRset as answer data and
returns it to the client.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>The response to the client <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> accurately reflect the properties of the
child-side NS data:</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>AA flag:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The child-side NS RRset is authoritative data from the child zone.
When a resolver that is also configured as an authoritative server for
the queried zone returns this data, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> set the AA flag.  When a
purely recursive resolver returns a cached child-side NS RRset, it
<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> set the AA flag to indicate that the data originates from the
authoritative child zone, distinguishing the response from a referral
(which would contain parent-side NS data without the AA flag).
This is consistent with the principle that the answer to an NS query
at a zone apex is authoritative data, regardless of how the resolver
obtained it.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>AD flag:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>If the child-side NS RRset has been DNSSEC-validated, the resolver
<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> set the AD (Authenticated Data) flag in the response, subject
to the normal AD flag rules (<xref target="RFC4035"/> Section 3.2.3 and
<xref target="RFC6840"/> Section 5.8).  DNSSEC validation of the child-side NS
RRset provides the client with cryptographic assurance that the
nameserver set is authentic, a property that parent-side delegation
NS data (which is unsigned glue) can never provide.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>The resolver <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> return the parent-side delegation NS data as the
answer to an NS query under any circumstances.  The parent-side data
is non-authoritative and would provide the client with incorrect
information about the zone's published nameserver set.</t>
        <t>Note that the child-side NS RRset returned to the client may differ from
the parent-side NS RRset used for delegation.  This is expected and
correct: the two serve different purposes.  The child-side NS is the
zone's own statement of its nameservers (answer data), while the
parent-side NS is the parent's statement of which servers are delegated
(delegation data).</t>
        <section anchor="interaction-with-minimal-responses">
          <name>Interaction with Minimal Responses</name>
          <t>When QNAME minimization <xref target="RFC9156"/> is enabled (as <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> for cached
responses in <xref target="impact-on-responses"/>), the resolver omits the NS RRset from
the authority section of non-NS-type responses.  This has no effect on
explicit NS queries: when the client queries for NS records specifically,
the full child-side NS RRset is returned in the answer section regardless
of the minimal responses setting.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="ns-queries-when-child-side-ns-is-not-cached">
          <name>NS Queries When Child-Side NS Is Not Cached</name>
          <t>If the resolver receives an NS query for a zone name and does not have
the child-side NS RRset cached, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> resolve the query through normal
recursion (contacting the zone's authoritative servers) rather than
returning the parent-side delegation data from its delegation information.
The parent-side data is not a valid answer to an NS query.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="best-zone-cut-selection">
        <name>Best Zone Cut Selection</name>
        <t>When a resolver needs to determine the closest enclosing zone cut for a
query name (the "best zone cut"), it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> select among the following
sources in this order of preference:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
            <t>Locally configured zones: forward zones, stub zones, static-stub
zones, and other policy-configured delegations.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Delegation information learned from referrals, as described in
<xref target="processing-referrals"/>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Root hints, if no other delegation information is available.</t>
          </li>
        </ol>
        <t>When both a locally configured zone and referral-learned delegation
information exist for overlapping names, the more specific (closer to the
query name) delegation is preferred, with the exception that static-stub
zones always take precedence over referral-learned delegations at the same
name.</t>
        <t>Child-side NS RRsets cached from authoritative responses
(<xref target="processing-auth"/>) <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be considered when selecting the best zone
cut.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="ttl-and-expiration">
        <name>TTL and Expiration</name>
        <t>Delegation information learned from referrals is subject to TTL-based
expiration.  The TTL is computed as described in <xref target="processing-referrals"/>.
Expired delegation information <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used for delegation decisions;
the resolver <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> fall back to the next available delegation source (a
less specific referral-learned delegation, a locally configured zone, or
root hints).</t>
        <t>Implementations <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> apply neither a minimum TTL floor or a maximum
TTL ceiling to delegation information that differs from the floor applied
to cached answer data, as the two serve different purposes and have
different operational characteristics.  The implementations <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> have a
seperate configuration options to apply the limits to the TTL received
for the delegation information.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="delegation-information-replacement">
        <name>Delegation Information Replacement</name>
        <t>When a resolver receives a new referral for a zone cut for which it
already holds unexpired delegation information, the new referral replaces
the existing delegation information.  This ensures that the resolver
tracks changes in the parent zone's delegation.</t>
        <t>A resolver <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> merge delegation information from multiple referrals
for the same zone cut.  Each referral provides a complete delegation, and
the most recently received delegation supersedes any previous one.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="deleg-integration">
        <name>DELEG Integration</name>
        <t>When a resolver supports the DELEG record <xref target="I-D.ietf-deleg"/>, delegation
information for a zone cut may include DELEG parameters (server addresses,
server names, DELEGPARAM references, transport parameters) in addition to
or instead of NS-based delegation data.</t>
        <t>A conforming resolver that receives a referral containing DELEG records
at a zone cut <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use the DELEG-based delegation information to populate
its delegation information (per <xref target="I-D.ietf-deleg"/> Section 5.1.3 and
Section 5.1.4) and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> use NS records for that zone, even if
DELEG-based resolution fails (per <xref target="I-D.ietf-deleg"/> Section 5.1.1).</t>
        <t>The parent-centric model naturally accommodates DELEG because:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>DELEG data is exclusively parent-side and arrives in referrals, which is
exactly the data the parent-centric resolver trusts.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>DELEG records can carry server addresses directly (via server-ipv4 and
server-ipv6 parameters), eliminating the need for glue records and the
associated trust questions.  DELEGPARAM records can provide an additional
layer of indirection for shared delegation configurations.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>DELEG records are signed on the parent side, enabling DNSSEC validation
of delegation parameters -- a capability fundamentally impossible with
unsigned parent-side NS records.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="interaction-with-other-mechanisms">
      <name>Interaction with Other Mechanisms</name>
      <section anchor="qname-minimization">
        <name>QNAME Minimization</name>
        <t>QNAME minimization <xref target="RFC9156"/> relies on knowing the current best zone cut
in order to construct minimized queries.  A parent-centric resolver
provides more reliable zone cut information for QNAME minimization because
the delegation data used for zone cut determination is never polluted by
child-side NS data that might indicate a different (and potentially
incorrect) zone boundary.</t>
        <t>When resuming QNAME minimization after receiving a referral, the resolver
uses the updated delegation information as the basis for subsequent
minimized queries.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="dnssec-validation">
        <name>DNSSEC Validation</name>
        <t>Parent-side NS records are not signed (they are glue), so delegation
information learned from NS-based referrals is not directly
DNSSEC-validated.  This is consistent with current practice: even
child-centric resolvers use unsigned referral NS data to locate
authoritative servers.</t>
        <t>The DNSSEC chain of trust for a delegated zone is established through DS
records, which are authoritative on the parent side and are validated
normally.  The parent-centric model does not change DS record processing.</t>
        <t>When DELEG records are deployed (<xref target="deleg-integration"/>), the delegation
parameters are signed on the parent side and can be validated as part of
the delegation.  This provides a cryptographic binding between the
delegation parameters and the parent zone's DNSSEC chain -- a significant
security improvement over the current unsigned NS-based delegation model.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="delegation-limits">
        <name>Delegation Limits</name>
        <t>Resolvers typically impose a limit on the number of nameservers or
addresses they will process from a single delegation, to prevent excessive
resource consumption from very large delegations.  The parent-centric
model preserves this limit.  Implementations <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> make this limit
configurable with a reasonable default (e.g., 26).  Q?: is 2 * 13 good number?</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="operational-considerations">
      <name>Operational Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="compatibility-with-existing-infrastructure">
        <name>Compatibility with Existing Infrastructure</name>
        <t>The parent-centric model is fully compatible with the existing DNS
infrastructure.  No changes are required to authoritative servers,
registries, registrars, or stub resolvers.  The change is entirely within
the recursive resolver's internal processing.</t>
        <t>This approach has been deployed in production by multiple resolver
implementations, including Nominum Vantio and Google Public DNS, without
causing widespread operational issues.</t>
        <t>More implementations here???</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="impact-on-responses">
        <name>Impact on Responses to Recursive Clients</name>
        <t>A child-centric resolver that has both parent-side and child-side NS data
may include the child-side NS in the authority section of responses to
recursive clients (when minimal responses option is disabled).  A
parent-centric resolver that does not use child-side NS data for
delegation has no reason to look up the child-side NS RRset during
resolution; therefore, the child-side NS may not be readily available for
inclusion in the authority section.</t>
        <t>Implementations adopting the parent-centric model <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> treat recursive
responses served from the cache as if minimal response option is enabled,
omitting the NS RRset from the authority section.  This is consistent with
modern best practice, reduces response size, and avoids the need to
perform additional lookups solely for populating the authority section.</t>
        <t>This only affects responses served from the cache by a recursive resolver.
Authoritative responses (where the server is authoritative for the queried
zone) are not affected by this change.</t>
        <t>TODO: I am actually not sure if this is a correct mechanism or not :shrug:.
Alternative proposal below, but since this only impact the partial forwarders,
I would say - it is a reasonable compromise to make...</t>
        <t>When a recursiver resolver receives a query with RD flag not set (RD=0)
for the NS RRset at a zone name (QTYPE=NS, QNAME=&lt;delegation point&gt;),
it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> resolve and return the parent-side (delegation) NS RRset, not the
child-side (authoritative) NS RRset.</t>
        <t>There might be downstream forwarding resolvers (e.g. DNS resolver using
this resolver for DNS resolution).  Returning child-side NS RRset is
generally not a problem when the downstream DNS resolver is configured
to do the forwarding for the whole DNS tree, but there might be
configurations where the forwarding is configured only for certain
parts of the DNS tree and the downstream DNS forwarder need to receive
the parent-side delegation information.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="zones-with-differing-parent-and-child-ns-sets">
        <name>Zones with Differing Parent and Child NS Sets</name>
        <t>Some zones intentionally maintain different NS RRsets at the parent and
child, for example to include "stealth" nameservers in the child-side NS
RRset that are not registered at the parent.  Under the parent-centric
model, these stealth nameservers will not be used for delegation decisions.
This is the intended and correct behavior: the parent zone is the
authority for delegation, and nameservers not listed in the parent's
delegation are not part of the delegation.  Also this behavior was already
breaking the existing DNS standards, the parent-side and child-side NS
RRset is supposed to be in sync.</t>
        <t>The child-side NS RRset remains available for answering explicit NS
queries (<xref target="answering-ns-queries"/>) and for any purpose other than
delegation decisions.  Clients that query for the NS RRset at a zone
apex will receive the child-side NS data (with the AA flag set),
which may include nameservers not present in the parent-side delegation.
This makes the difference between the two NS sets visible and auditable
by zone operators.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="transition-considerations">
        <name>Transition Considerations</name>
        <t>Resolver operators transitioning from a child-centric to a parent-centric
implementation should be aware of the following:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>After the transition, responses to queries with RD=1 may no longer
include NS records in the authority section for cached answers.
Monitoring systems that check for the presence of authority-section NS
records in recursive responses should be updated.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Zones that rely on child-side NS records to "override" the parent's
delegation (e.g., to work around stale delegation data at a registry)
will no longer benefit from this override.  Such zones should instead
update their parent-side delegation.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>RPZ rules that were tuned based on child-side NS data may need to be
reviewed, as the nameserver set visible to RPZ evaluation will be
the (more stable) parent-side set.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Resolver implementations that have previously deployed strict glue
checking (rejecting sibling glue) may relax this restriction after
adopting the parent-centric model, because delegation information is
scoped per zone cut and sibling glue can no longer contaminate
unrelated delegations (see <xref target="strict-glue-problem"/>).  Accepting sibling
glue again reduces the number of iterative queries needed to resolve
out-of-bailiwick delegations and avoids the resolution failures
associated with strict glue rejection.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="elimination-of-child-side-ns-overwrite-attacks">
        <name>Elimination of Child-Side NS Overwrite Attacks</name>
        <t>The most significant security benefit of the parent-centric model is that
a compromised or malicious child zone cannot redirect resolution by
publishing rogue NS records at its apex.  Since the resolver never uses
child-side NS data for delegation decisions, such attacks are ineffective.</t>
        <t>This closes an attack vector that has been present in child-centric
resolvers since the inception of the DNS: an attacker who compromises only
the child zone (but not the parent) can add NS records pointing to
attacker-controlled servers, and a child-centric resolver will follow
those NS records for subsequent queries.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="mitigation-of-ghost-domain-and-phoenix-domain-attacks">
        <name>Mitigation of Ghost Domain and Phoenix Domain Attacks</name>
        <t>As discussed in <xref target="ghost-domains"/>, the Ghost Domain <xref target="GHOST-DOMAIN"/> and
Phoenix Domain <xref target="PHOENIX-DOMAIN"/> attacks exploit the child-centric cache
update logic to keep revoked domain names resolvable.  A parent-centric
resolver is immune to the T1 class of these attacks because:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>It does not accept child-side NS RRsets as delegation data, so an
attacker cannot refresh a stale or removed delegation by responding with
a child-side NS RRset carrying a new TTL.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Once the parent-side delegation information expires (or is never
received because the parent has removed the delegation), the resolver
falls back to the next enclosing zone cut or root hints, which will not
lead to the revoked zone.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The T2 class of Phoenix Domain attacks (which exploits protocol-level
TTL semantics in referral responses from still-delegated parent zones) is
not fully addressed by the parent-centric model alone, but the attack
surface is significantly reduced because the resolver maintains a clear
separation between delegation data and answer data.</t>
        <section anchor="elimination-of-cross-delegation-glue-contamination">
          <name>Elimination of Cross-Delegation Glue Contamination</name>
          <t>In a child-centric resolver with a shared cache, the primary risk of
sibling glue is cross-delegation contamination: an A/AAAA record for
<tt>ns1.example.net</tt> received in a referral for <tt>example.org</tt> enters the
shared cache and can be used when resolving <tt>example.net</tt>, even though the
glue was provided by the <tt>.org</tt> zone which has no authority over
<tt>example.net</tt> addresses.  This is the attack vector that strict glue
checking <xref target="STRICT-GLUE"/> was designed to prevent.</t>
          <t>In the parent-centric model, delegation information is self-contained per
zone cut.  Glue received in a referral for <tt>example.org</tt> is part of the
<tt>example.org</tt> delegation and is used only for contacting servers for that
zone.  It has no effect on the delegation information for <tt>example.net</tt> or
any other zone.  This scoping eliminates the cross-delegation
contamination vector entirely, without the operational cost of discarding
sibling glue.</t>
          <t>A parent-centric resolver can therefore safely accept sibling glue from
referral responses (see <xref target="strict-glue-problem"/>), recovering the
operational benefits of sibling glue (fewer iterative queries, faster
resolution, tolerance of out-of-bailiwick delegation configurations) while
maintaining security against cross-delegation poisoning.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="remaining-glue-trust-considerations">
          <name>Remaining Glue Trust Considerations</name>
          <t>Even with per-delegation scoping, glue records are still non-authoritative
data that can be forged by an on-path attacker between the parent zone's
authoritative server and the resolver.  A forged glue record would cause
the resolver to contact an attacker-controlled server for the specific
delegation that received the forged glue.  This risk is identical to the
existing risk of forged referral responses and is mitigated by the same
mechanisms (source port randomization, DNS cookies, DNSSEC validation of
the subsequent responses from the delegation).</t>
          <t>When DELEG records are used, server addresses included directly in the
DELEG RDATA are signed on the parent side, providing DNSSEC-validated
address information.  This eliminates the glue trust problem entirely for
DELEG-aware delegations, as the addresses are authenticated data rather
than unsigned glue, and out-of-bailiwick resolution of nameserver names
is no longer necessary.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="stable-delegation-view">
        <name>Stable Delegation View</name>
        <t>By ensuring that delegation decisions are always based on parent-side
data, the parent-centric model provides a more stable and predictable view
of the delegation hierarchy.  This stability benefits security mechanisms
that depend on knowing the authoritative server set, including RPZ, DNS
firewall policies, and logging/auditing systems.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This document has no IANA actions.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="implementation-status">
      <name>Implementation Status</name>
      <ul empty="true">
        <li>
          <t><strong>Note to the RFC Editor:</strong> Please remove this section before publication.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>The parent-centric resolver behavior described in this document has been
implemented in BIND 9 as part of a resolver refactoring.  The
implementation ensures that delegation decisions are based on
referral-learned data rather than child-side NS RRsets from the cache.
The fetch context uses a delegation set abstraction (containing nameserver
names, IPv4/IPv6 addresses, and DELEG/DELEGPARAM parameters) instead of
raw NS rdatasets throughout the resolution process.</t>
      <t>The implementation passes the full BIND 9 system test suite with
adjustments to tests that previously depended on child-side NS records
appearing in the authority section of recursive responses.</t>
      <t>The parent-centric approach has also been deployed in production by
Google Public DNS and was previously used by Nominum Vantio.</t>
      <t>More implementations?</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC1034">
          <front>
            <title>Domain names - concepts and facilities</title>
            <author fullname="P. Mockapetris" initials="P." surname="Mockapetris"/>
            <date month="November" year="1987"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This RFC is the revised basic definition of The Domain Name System. It obsoletes RFC-882. This memo describes the domain style names and their used for host address look up and electronic mail forwarding. It discusses the clients and servers in the domain name system and the protocol used between them.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="13"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="1034"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC1034"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC1035">
          <front>
            <title>Domain names - implementation and specification</title>
            <author fullname="P. Mockapetris" initials="P." surname="Mockapetris"/>
            <date month="November" year="1987"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This RFC is the revised specification of the protocol and format used in the implementation of the Domain Name System. It obsoletes RFC-883. This memo documents the details of the domain name client - server communication.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="13"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="1035"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC1035"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9471">
          <front>
            <title>DNS Glue Requirements in Referral Responses</title>
            <author fullname="M. Andrews" initials="M." surname="Andrews"/>
            <author fullname="S. Huque" initials="S." surname="Huque"/>
            <author fullname="P. Wouters" initials="P." surname="Wouters"/>
            <author fullname="D. Wessels" initials="D." surname="Wessels"/>
            <date month="September" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The DNS uses glue records to allow iterative clients to find the addresses of name servers that are contained within a delegated zone. Authoritative servers are expected to return all available glue records for in-domain name servers in a referral response. If message size constraints prevent the inclusion of all glue records for in-domain name servers, the server must set the TC (Truncated) flag to inform the client that the response is incomplete and that the client should use another transport to retrieve the full response. This document updates RFC 1034 to clarify correct server behavior.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9471"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9471"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4035">
          <front>
            <title>Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions</title>
            <author fullname="R. Arends" initials="R." surname="Arends"/>
            <author fullname="R. Austein" initials="R." surname="Austein"/>
            <author fullname="M. Larson" initials="M." surname="Larson"/>
            <author fullname="D. Massey" initials="D." surname="Massey"/>
            <author fullname="S. Rose" initials="S." surname="Rose"/>
            <date month="March" year="2005"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document is part of a family of documents that describe the DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC). The DNS Security Extensions are a collection of new resource records and protocol modifications that add data origin authentication and data integrity to the DNS. This document describes the DNSSEC protocol modifications. This document defines the concept of a signed zone, along with the requirements for serving and resolving by using DNSSEC. These techniques allow a security-aware resolver to authenticate both DNS resource records and authoritative DNS error indications.</t>
              <t>This document obsoletes RFC 2535 and incorporates changes from all updates to RFC 2535. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4035"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4035"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6840">
          <front>
            <title>Clarifications and Implementation Notes for DNS Security (DNSSEC)</title>
            <author fullname="S. Weiler" initials="S." role="editor" surname="Weiler"/>
            <author fullname="D. Blacka" initials="D." role="editor" surname="Blacka"/>
            <date month="February" year="2013"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document is a collection of technical clarifications to the DNS Security (DNSSEC) document set. It is meant to serve as a resource to implementors as well as a collection of DNSSEC errata that existed at the time of writing.</t>
              <t>This document updates the core DNSSEC documents (RFC 4033, RFC 4034, and RFC 4035) as well as the NSEC3 specification (RFC 5155). It also defines NSEC3 and SHA-2 (RFC 4509 and RFC 5702) as core parts of the DNSSEC specification.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6840"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6840"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9156">
          <front>
            <title>DNS Query Name Minimisation to Improve Privacy</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bortzmeyer" initials="S." surname="Bortzmeyer"/>
            <author fullname="R. Dolmans" initials="R." surname="Dolmans"/>
            <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
            <date month="November" year="2021"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a technique called "QNAME minimisation" to improve DNS privacy, where the DNS resolver no longer always sends the full original QNAME and original QTYPE to the upstream name server. This document obsoletes RFC 7816.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9156"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9156"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="GHOST-DOMAIN" target="https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss2012/">
          <front>
            <title>Ghost Domain Names: Revoked Yet Still Resolvable</title>
            <author initials="J." surname="Jiang" fullname="Jian Jiang">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="J." surname="Liang" fullname="Jinjin Liang">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="K." surname="Li" fullname="Kang Li">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="J." surname="Li" fullname="Jun Li">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="H." surname="Duan" fullname="Haixin Duan">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="J." surname="Wu" fullname="Jianping Wu">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2012" month="February"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="In" value="Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS 2012)"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="PHOENIX-DOMAIN" target="https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss-paper/ghost-domain-reloaded-vulnerable-links-in-domain-name-delegation-and-revocation/">
          <front>
            <title>Ghost Domain Reloaded: Vulnerable Links in Domain Name Delegation and Revocation</title>
            <author initials="X." surname="Li" fullname="Xiang Li">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="B." surname="Liu" fullname="Baojun Liu">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="X." surname="Bai" fullname="Xuesong Bai">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="H." surname="Duan" fullname="Haixin Duan">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="Q." surname="Li" fullname="Qi Li">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="Q." surname="Pan" fullname="Qingfeng Pan">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2023" month="February"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="In" value="Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS 2023)"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="STRICT-GLUE" target="https://kb.isc.org/docs/strict-glue">
          <front>
            <title>Operational Notification: Impact of Stricter Glue Checking</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Internet Systems Consortium</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2025" month="December"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-deleg">
          <front>
            <title>Extensible Delegation for DNS</title>
            <author fullname="Petr Špaček" initials="P." surname="Špaček">
              <organization>ISC</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Ralf Weber" initials="R." surname="Weber">
              <organization>Akamai Technologies</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="David C Lawrence" initials="" surname="Lawrence">
              <organization>Salesforce</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="6" month="February" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document proposes a new extensible method for the delegation of
   authority for a domain in the Domain Name System (DNS) using DELEG
   and DELEGPARAM records.

   A delegation in the DNS enables efficient and distributed management
   of the DNS namespace.  The traditional DNS delegation is based on NS
   records which contain only hostnames of servers and no other
   parameters.  The new delegation records are extensible, can be
   secured with DNSSEC, and eliminate the problem of having two sources
   of truth for delegation information.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-deleg-07"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7719">
          <front>
            <title>DNS Terminology</title>
            <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
            <author fullname="A. Sullivan" initials="A." surname="Sullivan"/>
            <author fullname="K. Fujiwara" initials="K." surname="Fujiwara"/>
            <date month="December" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The DNS is defined in literally dozens of different RFCs. The terminology used by implementers and developers of DNS protocols, and by operators of DNS systems, has sometimes changed in the decades since the DNS was first defined. This document gives current definitions for many of the terms used in the DNS in a single document.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7719"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7719"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 867?>

<section anchor="rationale-for-delegations-in-positive-responses">
      <name>Rationale for Delegations in Positive Responses</name>
      <t>During implementation, the question arose of whether delegation
information should also be recorded when it appears in positive
authoritative responses (AA set) rather than only in referrals.  Consider
the following zone structure:</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
zone             nameserver
----             ----------
example          ns1
foo.example      ns2
bar.foo.example  ns2
]]></artwork>
      <t>To resolve <tt>a.bar.foo.example</tt>, the resolver:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>Asks a root server for <tt>example</tt>, receives a referral to <tt>ns1</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Asks <tt>ns1</tt> for <tt>foo.example</tt>, receives a referral to <tt>ns2</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Asks <tt>ns2</tt> for <tt>bar.foo.example/NS</tt>, receives a positive authoritative
answer (AA set) with the NS in the answer section.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <t>If the delegation from step 3 is not recorded, the closest zone cut known
to the resolver is <tt>foo.example</tt>, which still works because <tt>ns2</tt> is
authoritative for both <tt>foo.example</tt> and <tt>bar.foo.example</tt>.</t>
      <t>However, not recording this delegation means the resolver will not have
address information for <tt>bar.foo.example</tt> nameservers available, so
additional section data in subsequent responses may be incomplete.  Whether
this trade-off is acceptable depends on the deployment context and whether
minimal responses options is in use.</t>
      <t>Implementations <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> choose to record delegation information learned from
positive authoritative responses, but <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> carefully evaluate the impact
on query volume and consistency.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="relationship-to-deleg">
      <name>Relationship to DELEG</name>
      <t>The DELEG record <xref target="I-D.ietf-deleg"/> defines an extensible delegation
mechanism that is exclusively parent-side.  The parent-centric resolver
behavior described in this document provides the necessary behavioral
foundation for DELEG support:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Delegation information as defined in this document naturally accommodates
DELEG data alongside or instead of NS-based delegations.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Each delegation can contain DELEG entries with embedded server addresses
(server-ipv4, server-ipv6), server names (server-name), and DELEGPARAM
references (include-delegparam), in addition to traditional NS names and
glue.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>When DELEG records are present at a delegation point, the parent-centric
model provides a natural enforcement point for the rule from
<xref target="I-D.ietf-deleg"/> Section 5.1.1 that a DELEG-aware resolver <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use
name servers from DELEG records and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> fall back to NS records.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Because DELEG is signed on the parent side, a parent-centric resolver
can validate delegation parameters through the normal DNSSEC chain of
trust -- a capability that is fundamentally impossible with unsigned
parent-side NS records.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>The parent-centric behavioral model is a prerequisite for correct DELEG
implementation.  A child-centric resolver that overwrites parent-side
delegation data with child-side NS data would lose the DELEG information
and could not maintain the invariant that DELEG takes precedence over NS.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="intellectual-property-note">
      <name>Intellectual Property Note</name>
      <ul empty="true">
        <li>
          <t><strong>Note to the RFC Editor:</strong> Please remove this appendix before
publication.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>The authors are aware of U.S. Patent 7,769,826 ("Systems and methods of
providing DNS services using separate answer and referral caches", filed
June 26, 2003, assigned to Nominum, Inc., now held by Akamai
Technologies).  That patent claims a specific cache architecture in which
answer information and referral information are stored in separate data
structures (a flat/hash table for answers and a hierarchical/tree
structure for referrals) with a particular lookup order and
classification-based routing of responses to the appropriate store.</t>
      <t>This document intentionally does not specify, recommend, or require any
particular cache architecture, data-structure choice, lookup ordering, or
response classification scheme.  It specifies only the behavioral
requirement that delegation decisions be based on parent-side NS (or
DELEG) data from referrals and not be overwritten by child-side NS data.
Conforming implementations are free to use any internal organization --
including a single unified cache -- that achieves the required behavior.</t>
      <t>The authors believe that this document is not Covered by the above mentioned
patent.</t>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgements">
      <name>Acknowledgements</name>
      <t>The concept of parent-centric delegation handling has been explored by
multiple DNS implementations over the years.  The authors would like to
acknowledge the prior work by Nominum (Vantio) and Google (Public DNS) in
deploying parent-centric resolvers at scale, which demonstrated the
viability of this approach.</t>
      <t>The BIND 9 implementation was developed by Colin Vidal with contributions
from Evan Hunt and Ondřej Surý, building on the issue analysis by Petr
Špaček.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
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