DNS Extensions working group                               V.Dolmatov, Ed.  
Internet-Draft                                             Cryptocom Ltd.    
Intended status: Standards Track                           April 8, 2009
Expires: December 31, 2009                                 


 Use of GOST signature algorithms in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records
                               for DNSSEC
                 draft-dolmatov-dnsext-dnssec-gost-00

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups.  Note that
   other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
   Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 31 December 2009.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
   publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.

Abstract

   This document describes how to produce GOST signature and hash algorithms
   DNSKEY and RRSIG resource records for use in the Domain Name System
   Security Extensions (DNSSEC, RFC 4033, RFC 4034, and RFC 4035).


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
   2.  DNSKEY Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
     2.1.  Using a public key with existing cryptographic libraries. .
     2.2.  GOST DNSKEY RR Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
   3.  RRSIG Resource Records  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
   4.  DS Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
   5.  NSEC3 Resource Records  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
   6.  Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
     6.1.  Key Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
     6.2.  Signature Sizes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
     6.3.  Digest Sizes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
   7.  Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
     7.1.  Support for GOST signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
     7.2.  Support for NSEC3 Denial of Existence . . . . . . . . . . . 
       7.2.1.  NSEC3 in Authoritative servers  . . . . . . . . . . . . 
       7.2.2.  NSEC3 in Validators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
   9.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
   10.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
     10.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
     10.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 


1.  Introduction

   The Domain Name System (DNS) is the global hierarchical distributed
   database for Internet Naming.  The DNS has been extended to use
   cryptographic keys and digital signatures for the verification of the
   authenticity and integrity of its data.  RFC 4033 [RFC4033], RFC 4034
   [RFC4034], and RFC 4035 [RFC4035] describe these DNS Security
   Extensions, called DNSSEC.

   RFC 4034 describes how to store DNSKEY and RRSIG resource records,
   and specifies a list of cryptographic algorithms to use.  This
   document extends that list with the signature and hash algorithms 
   GOST [GOST3410, GOST3411],
   and specifies how to store DNSKEY data and how to produce
   RRSIG resource records with these hash algorithms.

   Familiarity with DNSSEC  and GOST signature and hash
   algorithms is assumed in this document.

   The term "GOST" is not officially defined, but is usually used to
   refer to the collection of the Russian cryptographic algorithms
   GOST R 34.10-2001, GOST R 34.11-94, GOST 28147-89. Since GOST 28147-89
   is not used in DNSSEC, GOST will only refer to GOST R 34.10-2001 
   (signatire algorithm) and GOST R 34.11-94 (hash algorithm) in this
   document.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].


2.  DNSKEY Resource Records

   The format of the DNSKEY RR can be found in RFC 4034 [RFC4034].

   GOST R 34.10-2001 public keys are stored with the algorithm number {TBA1}.
   
   The public key parameters are those identified by
   id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet (1.2.643.2.2.35.1) [RFC4357].
   The digest parameters for signature are those identified by
   id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet (1.2.643.2.2.30.1) [RFC4357].
   
   The wire format of the public key is compatible with RFC 4491 [RFC4491]:

   According to [GOSTR341001], a public key is a point on the elliptic
   curve Q = (x,y).

   The wire representation of a public key MUST contain 64 octets, where the
   first 32 octets contain the little-endian representation of x and the
   second 32 octets contain the little-endian representation of y.  This
   corresponds to the binary representation of (<y>256||<x>256) from
   [GOSTR341001], ch.  5.3.

2.1.  Using a public key with existing cryptographic libraries

   Existing GOST-aware cryptographic libraries at time of this document
   writing are capable to read GOST public keys via generic X509 API if the
   key is encoded according to RFC 4491 [RFC4491], section 2.3.2.

   To make this encoding from the wire format of a GOST public key, prepend
   a key data with the following 37-byte sequence:

   0x30 0x63 0x30 0x1c 0x06 0x06 0x2a 0x85 0x03 0x02 0x02 0x13 0x30 0x12
   0x06 0x07 0x2a 0x85 0x03 0x02 0x02 0x23 0x01 0x06 0x07 0x2a 0x85 0x03
   0x02 0x02 0x1e 0x01 0x03 0x43 0x00 0x04 0x40
  
2.2.  GOST DNSKEY RR Example

   The following DNSKEY RR stores a DNS zone key for example.com

   example.com. 86400 IN DNSKEY 256 3 {TBA1} ( RamuUwTG1r4RUqsgXu/xF6B+Y
                                               tJLzZEykiZ4C2Fa1gV1pI/8GA
                                               el2Wm69Cz5h1T9eYAQKFAGwzW
                                               m4Lke0E26aw== )

3.  RRSIG Resource Records

   The value of the signature field in the RRSIG RR follows the RFC 4490
   [RFC4490] and is calculated as follows.  The values for the RDATA fields
   that precede the signature data are specified in RFC 4034 [RFC4034].

   hash = GOSTR3411(data)

   where "data" is the wire format data of the resource record set that is
   signed, as specified in RFC 4034 [RFC4034].  Hash MUST be calculated with
   GOST R 34.11-94 parameters identified by
   id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet [RFC4357].

   Signature is calculated from the hash according to the GOST R 34.10-2001
   standard and its wire format is compatible with RFC 4490 [RFC4490].
   Quoting RFC 4490:

   "The signature algorithm GOST R 34.10-2001 generates a digital
   signature in the form of two 256-bit numbers, r and s.  Its octet
   string representation consists of 64 octets, where the first 32
   octets contain the big-endian representation of s and the second 32
   octets contain the big-endian representation of r."

4.  DS Resource Records

   GOST R 34.11-94 digest algorithm is denoted in DS RR by the digest type
   {TBA2}.  The wire format of a digest value is compatible with RFC 4490
   [RFC4490].  Quoting RFC 4490: 
   
   "A 32-byte digest in little-endian representation."

   The digest MUST always be calculated with GOST R 34.11-94 parameters
   identified by id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet [RFC4357].

5.  NSEC3 Resource Records

   GOST R 34.11-94 digest algorithm is denoted in NSEC3 RR by the digest type
   {TBA2}.  The wire format of a digest value is compatible with RFC 4490
   [RFC4490].  Quoting RFC 4490: 
   
   "A 32-byte digest in little-endian representation."

   The digest MUST always be calculated with GOST R 34.11-94 parameters
   identified by id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet [RFC4357].

6.  Deployment Considerations

6.1.  Key Sizes

   According to RFC4357 [RFC4357] key size of GOST public keys MUST 
   be 512 bits.

6.2.  Signature Sizes

   According to GOST signature algorithm [GOST3410] size of GOST signature 
   is 512 bit.

6.3.  Digest Sizes

   According to GOST R 34.11-94 [GOST3411] size of GOST digest is 256 bit.

7.  Implementation Considerations

7.1.  Support for GOST signatures

   DNSSEC aware implementations SHOULD be able to support RRSIG and
   DNSKEY resource records created with the GOST algorithms as
   defined in this document.

7.2.  Support for NSEC3 Denial of Existence

   RFC5155 [RFC5155] defines new algorithm identifiers for existing
   signing algorithms, to indicate that zones signed with these
   algorithm identifiers use NSEC3 instead of NSEC records to provide
   denial of existence.  That mechanism was chosen to protect
   implementations predating RFC5155 from encountering resource records
   they could not know about.  This document does not define such
   algorithm aliases, and support for NSEC3 denial of existence is
   implicitly signaled with support for one of the algorithms defined in
   this document.

7.2.1.  NSEC3 in Authoritative servers

   An authoritative server that does not implement NSEC3 MAY still serve
   zones that use GOST with NSEC denial of existence.

7.2.2.  NSEC3 in Validators

   A DNSSEC validator that implements GOST MUST be able to handle
   both NSEC and NSEC3 [RFC5155] negative answers.  If this is not the
   case, the validator MUST treat a zone signed with GOST
   as signed with an unknown algorithm, and thus as insecure.


8.  IANA Considerations

   This document updates the IANA registry "DNS SECURITY ALGORITHM
   NUMBERS -- per [RFC4035] "
   (http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers).  The following
   entries are added to the registry:
                                        Zone     Trans.
   Value   Algorithm          Mnemonic  Signing  Sec.   References   Status
   {TBA1}  GOST R 34.10-2001  GOST      Y        *      (this memo)  OPTIONAL

   This document updates the RFC 4034 [RFC4034] Digest Types assignment
   (RFC 4034, section A.2):

   Value   Algorithm        Status
   {TBA2}  GOST R 34.11-94  OPTIONAL

9. Acknowledgments

   This document is a minor extension to RFC 4034 [RFC4034].  Also, we
   try to follow the documents RFC 3110 [RFC3110], RFC 4509 [RFC4509]
   and RFC 4357 [RFC4357] for consistency. The authors of and 
   contributors to these documents are gratefully acknowledged for 
   their hard work.

   The following people provided additional feedback and text: Dmitry 
   Burkov, Jaap Akkerhuis, Jelte Jansen and Wouter Wijngaards.


10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3110]  Eastlake, D., "RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the Domain
              Name System (DNS)", RFC 3110, May 2001.

   [RFC4033]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
              RFC 4033, March 2005.

   [RFC4034]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
              RFC 4034, March 2005.

   [RFC4035]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
              Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.

   [GOST3410] "Information technology.  Cryptographic data security.
              Signature and verification processes of [electronic]
              digital signature.", GOST R 34.10-2001, Gosudarstvennyi
              Standard of Russian Federation, Government Committee of
              the Russia for Standards, 2001.  (In Russian)

   [GOST3411] "Information technology.  Cryptographic Data Security.
              Hashing function.", GOST R 34.11-94, Gosudarstvennyi
              Standard of Russian Federation, Government Committee of
              the Russia for Standards, 1994.  (In Russian)

   [RFC4357] Popov, V., Kurepkin, I., and S. Leontiev, "Additional
             Cryptographic Algorithms for Use with GOST 28147-89,
             GOST R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94
             Algorithms", RFC 4357, January 2006.

   [RFC4490] S. Leontiev and G. Chudov, "Using the GOST 28147-89, 
	     GOST R 34.11-94, GOST R 34.10-94, and GOST R 34.10-2001 
             Algorithms with Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
             RFC 4490, May 2006.

   [RFC4491] S. Leontiev and D. Shefanovski, "Using the GOST 
             R 34.10-94, GOST R 34.10-2001, and GOST R 34.11-94 
             Algorithms with the Internet X.509 Public Key 
             Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile", RFC 4491,
             May 2006. 



10.2.  Informative References

   [NIST800-57]
              Barker, E., Barker, W., Burr, W., Polk, W., and M. Smid,
              "Recommendations for Key Management", NIST SP 800-57,
              March 2007.

   [RFC3447]  Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
              Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
              Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.

   [RFC4509]  Hardaker, W., "Use of SHA-256 in DNSSEC Delegation Signer
              (DS) Resource Records (RRs)", RFC 4509, May 2006.

   [RFC5155]  Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS
              Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
              Existence", RFC 5155, March 2008.

Authors' Addresses


Vasily Dolmatov, Ed.
Cryptocom Ltd.
Bolotnikovskaya, 23
Moscow, 117303, Russian Federation

EMail: dol@cryptocom.ru

Artem Chuprina
Cryptocom Ltd.
Bolotnikovskaya, 23
Moscow, 117303, Russian Federation

EMail: ran@cryptocom.ru

Igor Ustinov
Cryptocom Ltd.
Bolotnikovskaya, 23
Moscow, 117303, Russian Federation

EMail: igus@cryptocom.ru

                  Expires December 31, 2009                [Page ]


