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Cc: "Automated Systems Security Incident Support Team" <ASSIST@assist.ims.disa.mil>
Reply-To: "Automated Systems Security Incident Support Team" <ASSIST@assist.ims.disa.mil>
Subject: A vulnerability exists in /bin/login on some UNIX platforms.
Date: Mon, 23 May 94 12:16:49 -0400
From: "Kenneth R. van Wyk" <krvw@assist.ims.disa.mil>
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<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>  
    
          Automated Systems Security Incident Support Team
                                                _____
             ___   ___  _____   ___  _____     |     /
      /\    /   \ /   \   |    /   \   |       |    / Integritas
     /  \   \___  \___    |    \___    |       |   <      et
    /____\      \     \   |        \   |       |    \ Celeritas
   /      \ \___/ \___/ __|__  \___/   |       |_____\
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>  
    
                       Bulletin  94-19
 
           Release date: 23 May 1994, 12:00 AM EDT
 
SUBJECT:   A vulnerability exists in /bin/login on some UNIX platforms.

SUMMARY: ASSIST has learned of a vulnerability in the UNIX /bin/login.
This vulnerability potentially affects all IBM AIX 3 systems, Linux
systems, and perhaps other UNIX platforms as well.  Information
available at the time of this advisory's publication indicates that
only IBM AIX 3 and Linux systems are at risk.

BACKGROUND: A vulnerability exists in /bin/login on some UNIX
platforms.  Local and remote users can obtain unauthorized access to
any account, including root.  This vulnerability has been widely
discussed in detail on public Internet forums, therefore ASSIST
strongly recommends that system administrators IMMEDIATELY install
recommended workarounds and patches until IBM releases an official
fix, at which time ASSIST will release an follow-up bulletin.

IMPACT: Local and remote users can obtain unauthorized access to any
account, including root.

RECOMMENDED SOLUTION: ASSIST strongly recommends applying the IBM
workarounds or Linux patches.  Included with this advisory in appendix
A is a list of the vendors which have responded to inquires, and the
status of their investigations into this vulnerability report.  Also
on the ASSIST BBS and anonymous FTP is a file called ASSIST
94-19.readme, which is the living appendix A file.  ASSIST will update
the file as new information from the vendors is received.



A.  Description of IBM AIX vulnerability

     A vulnerability exists in /bin/login on all IBM AIX 3 systems.

    Impact of IBM AIX vulnerability

     Remote users can obtain unauthorized root access on the affected
     hosts. 

    Solution for IBM AIX vulnerability

     IBM is working on an official fix, which is still under
     development.  The reference number for this fix is APAR IX44254.
     Until you obtain the official fix from IBM, we encourage you to
     apply the workarounds or install the emergency fix below.

        A. Workarounds

           The recommended workaround is to disable the rlogin daemon:

           1. As root, edit /etc/inetd.conf
              Comment out the line 'login ... rlogin'
           2. Run 'inetimp'
           3. Run 'refresh -s inetd'

        B. Emergency fix 

           The emergency fix for the different levels of AIX 3
           affected by this vulnerability is available via anonymous
           FTP from software.watson.ibm.com:/pub/rlogin/rlogin.tar.Z.
           Installation instructions are included in the README file
           (which is included in rlogin.tar.Z).

           Checksum information for rlogin.tar.Z:
              BSD:      25285   317
              SystemV:  13021 633 rlogin.tar.Z
              MD5:      MD5 (rlogin.tar.Z) = 803ee38c2e3b8c8c575e2ff5e921034c

        C. Official fix 

           The official fix for this problem can be ordered as 
           APAR IX44254. 

           To order an APAR from IBM in the U.S., call 1-800-237-5511 
           and ask IBM to ship it as soon as it is available.
           According to IBM, this fix will be available in
           approximately two weeks.  APARs may be obtained outside the
           U.S. by contacting your local IBM representative.  


B.  Description of Linux vulnerability

     A vulnerability exists in /bin/login for Linux systems.

    Impact of Linux vulnerability

     Any user, remote or local, can obtain unauthorized root access on
     the affected hosts.

    Solution for Linux vulnerability

     A patch that addresses the remote access problem has been made
     available via anonymous FTP from sunsite.unc.edu: 
     /pub/Linux/system/Network/sunacm/URGENT/README.security
     /pub/Linux/system/Network/sunacm/URGENT/security.tgz

     The "security.tgz" file includes other security fixes in addition
     to the /bin/login patch. 

     Checksum information for README.security:
          BSD:      09575     1
          SystemV:  20945 1 README.security
          MD5:      MD5 (README.security) = 41d14d7b8725c7a1015adeb49601619b

     Checksum information for security.tgz:
          BSD:      32878   257
          SystemV:  40797 513 security.tgz
          MD5:      MD5 (security.tgz) = dd4585cf4da1b52d25d619bf45f55b75

     To address the local access problem, we encourage you to install
     a version of /bin/login that does not allow the -f option in the
     form "-f<user>", but only allows this option in the form 
     "-f <user>", as two arguments.  At this time, we do not know
     which versions of login.c are vulnerable.  As we receive
     additional information, we will update the CA-94:09.README file.
     Again, we encourage you to check this README file regularly for
     updates.
_________________________________________________________________________

ASSIST would like to thank the CERT Coordination Center for the information  
contained within this bulletin.

_________________________________________________________________________
APPENDIX A.

The CERT Coordination Center has received feedback from these vendors,
who indicated that all versions of their products on all hardware
platforms are not vulnerable:

     Amdahl
     Apple 
     BSD   
     BSDI  
     Harris
     HP    
     Motorola 
     NeXT     
     Pyramid  
     SCO      
     SGI      
     Solbourne
     Sony     
     Sun      

The CERT Coordination Center has verified that the following vendor
products are not vulnerable:

     FreeBSD 

The CERT Coordination Center has received feedback from these vendors,
who have made patches available to address the /bin/login
vulnerability:

     IBM
       workaround:       see Section A. Solution for IBM AIX
                         vulnerability. 
                          
       emergency patch:  software.watson.ibm.com:/pub/rlogin/rlogin.tar.Z
       Official patch:   APAR IX44254

     Linux  
       patch:  sunsite.unc.edu:/pub/Linux/system/Network/sunacm/URGENT/*
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------

ASSIST is an element of the Defense Information Systems Agency 
(DISA), Center for Information Systems Security (CISS), that 
provides service to the entire DoD community.  If you are a 
constituent of the DoD and have any questions about ASSIST or
computer security issues, contact ASSIST using one of the methods
listed below.  If your organization/institution is non-DoD,
contact your Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams
(FIRST) representative.  You can obtain a list of FIRST member
organizations and their constituencies by sending email to
docserver@first.org with an empty "subject" line and a message body
containing the line "send first-contacts".

ASSIST INFORMATION RESOURCES: If you would like to be included  in
the distribution list for these bulletins, send your Milnet
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Back issues of ASSIST bulletins, and other security related  
information, are available from the ASSIST BBS at 703-756-7993/
1154 DSN 289, and through anonymous FTP from assist.ims.disa.mil
(IP address 137.130.234.30).  Note: assist.ims.disa.mil will only
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registered with the NIC or DNS.
 
ASSIST contact information: 
PHONE: 703-756-7974, DSN 289, duty hours are 06:00 to 22:30 EST  
Monday through Friday.  During off duty hours, weekends, and  
holidays, ASSIST can be reached via pager at 800-SKY-PAGE  
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minutes, however if a quicker response is required, prefix
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ELECTRONIC MAIL: Send to assist@assist.ims.disa.mil. 
ASSIST BBS: Leave a message for the "sysop". 
  
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software for UNIX systems is available from Trusted Information
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additional versions are likely to be offered from other
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Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or
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-----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----

