THE ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE ASTRONOMICAL SOCIETY OF THE ATLANTIC
Volume 2, Number 5 - December 1990
THE GREAT MOON RACE:
THE SOVIET STORY, PART ONE
Copyright (c) 1990 by Andrew J. LePage
The author gives permission to any group or individual wishing
to distribute this article, so long as proper credit is given
and the article is reproduced in its entirety.
It has been almost thirty years since United States President John
F. Kennedy gave his famous speech which committed the United States,
then far behind in the Space Race with the Soviet Union, to landing a
man on Earth's Moon by the end of the 1960s with the APOLLO lunar
program. Both during and after the APOLLO missions there were those
who wondered if a bona fide race to the Moon between the Americans
and Soviets actually existed. Many Western politicians, engineers,
historians, analysts, and space enthusiasts have examined official and
unofficial statements made by Soviet figures, their space hardware,
space launches, and declassified American intelligence and other
government documents over the past decades. Their goal was to deter-
mine what the Soviets' intentions were during those years when the
American space program was committed to placing astronauts first on
the Moon.
Despite all these efforts, no Westerner could confidently resolve
the issue one way or the other. The often conflicting evidence could
be used to make a case for both sides of the issue. The problem was
that the Soviet government never made a definitive public statement as
to what their goals in space were during those early years. As a
result of glastnost, however, many important pieces of the puzzle have
been supplied. Scores of magazine and newspaper articles with inter-
views of various key Soviet space figures, recent Soviet books and U.S./
Soviet exchanges let us confidently say that the Soviet Union did in-
deed have a serious intensive program to be the first to send a man to
the Moon. In fact, the race to the Moon was "neck and neck" right up
to the 'end' in 1968-1969. If the American program had just one mishap
during a key mission, or if the Soviets had handled their program better,
or just had a bit more luck, a Soviet cosmonaut and not an American
astronaut would have been the first to set foot on the surface of the
Moon. If that had happened, there might have followed a new race to
the planet Mars.
History does not generally recognize "what ifs"; but what was the
history of the Soviet Moon program? In the beginning, the Soviet
manned Moon program - indeed, it can be argued the whole Soviet space
program - was dominated by one brilliant individual: Sergei P. Korolev.
Under his direction and with the political support of Premier Nikita
Krushchev, Korolev developed civilization's first InterContinental
Ballistic Missile (ICBM), the R-7. This rocket made a poor ICBM but
a superlative space launch vehicle. It was used to launch the Soviet
Union's first satellites. With the addition of an upper stage, it was
used to launch the first LUNA probes to the Moon in 1959 and the manned
VOSTOK craft into Earth orbit from 1961 to 1963. With an improved upper
stage, the R-7 launched more advanced probes to the Moon and the first
generation of unmanned Soviet vehicles to Venus and Mars. In fact,
this family of rockets after over one thousand launches is still in use
today, delivering everything from military reconnaissance satellites to
manned ferries for the Soviet MIR space station. This rocket was to
play a central role in the Soviet Union's original manned Moon program,
known as SOYUZ.
The original SOYUZ concept was for a simple circumlunar mission
that would make use of what is still the most powerful of the R-7
launch vehicle family, now also called SOYUZ. The plan required an
unfueled escape stage with a maneuvering module called SOYUZ B to be
launched into Earth orbit first. Over the next few days, three tankers
called SOYUZ V would be launched. These tankers would rendezvous and
dock with the SOYUZ B and transfer their load of fuel to it before
undocking. Finally, the manned SOYUZ A would be launched and would
dock with the SOYUZ B escape stage.
The SOYUZ A, like the SOYUZ B and V, was to weigh almost seven
metric tons and consist of three modules. In the rear was a cylin-
drical service module 2.3 meters (7.5 feet) long and 2.3 meters in
diameter. It would have solar panels to supply electrical power as
well as maneuvering engines, their fuel, and consumables such as air
and water. Next was a bell-shaped re-entry module also 2.3 meters
in diameter and 2.2 meters long. It would carry from one to three
cosmonauts during launch and would later be used to bring the crew
safely back to Earth at mission's end. Forward of the re-entry module
was the roughly spherical orbital module, which was 2.3 meters in
diameter and about 3.1 meters (10.2 feet) long, including the docking
mechanism at the front. It would serve as the cosmonauts' living
quarters, laboratory, air lock, and cargo hold during the mission and
was connected to the re-entry module through a hatch.
Once SOYUZ A and the now fully fueled SOYUZ B were docked, the
escape stage would ignite and send the manned SOYUZ A on a one-week
mission, where it would make a simple loop around the Moon and return
to Earth for a low gravity controlled landing in Soviet territory.
There appears to have been two test flights of the SOYUZ B. The first,
named POLYOT 1, was launched on November 1, 1963, and the second, POL-
YOT 2, was launched on April 12, 1964. Both spacecraft made extensive
maneuvers in Earth orbit testing the SOYUZ B maneuvering system. By
the time these test flights were made, however, Korolev's original SOYUZ
circumlunar flight plan appears to have been already scrapped in favor
of a much more ambitious plan to meet America's challenge. The race
to the Moon had begun.
In 1961, the Kremlin had broken up the Moon program into two
sections. One part, a simple circumlunar flight, was headed by
Vladimir N. Chelomei. The other more difficult part was an actual
lunar landing. This program was headed by Korolev himself. This
arrangement obviously did not sit well with Korolev. He felt the two
programs should be combined into one. Two parallel projects with
independently developed spacecraft and launch vehicles would take up
valuable resources. For the time being, however, the government
insisted on two independent manned Moon programs.
Unlike Korolev's SOYUZ circumlunar concept, Chelomei wanted a
single powerful rocket to launch a spacecraft towards the Moon. He
felt that Korolev's concept, which required five launches of the SOYUZ
launch vehicle and involved the then-unproven concept of in-orbit
rendezvous and docking, was far too complicated and risky. As a
result, Chelomei had to design a new and much more powerful launch
vehicle. Under one of his concepts a single rocket called the UR-900
would launch a modified VOSTOK manned spacecraft to the Moon. The
spacecraft would require relatively little development; there were
several plans to modify the VOSTOK for future flights on the drawing
boards already. The UR-900, which would have been over twice as
powerful as Korolev's SOYUZ launch vehicle, would require several
years of development.
Little is known of Korolev's earliest thinking or plans for his
manned lunar landing program. He definitely wanted to make use of the
SOYUZ concept. Its modularity made for very flexible development and
planning. Early on, it was obvious that a lunar landing would require
a launch vehicle much larger than anything developed to that date. On
the drawing boards of Korolev's design bureau was a launch vehicle
called N-1. Already approved by the Soviet government in 1960, the
N-1 was originally designed to be a modular, multipurpose launch
vehicle capable of lifting as much as forty to fifty metric tons into
Earth orbit. Korolev, who was heavily influenced by the writings of
the father of Soviet cosmonautics, Konstantin Tsiolkovsky (1857-1935),
appears to have always favored assembling his Moon craft in Earth
orbit. It is likely that, as in his early SOYUZ concept, several N-1
rockets would place the components for the Moon landing mission into
Earth orbit, where they would then be assembled for the journey.
Orbital rendezvous and docking techniques would have to be
developed to assemble Korolev's Moonship. Early test flights of the
SOYUZ could be used to practice these techniques, but certain aspects
of the mission could also be rehearsed using the existing manned VOSTOK
spacecraft. While the relatively primitive VOSTOK required more equip-
ment and maneuvering rockets to perform an actual rendezvous and
docking, the initial step of placing two ships in close orbits could
be accomplished. In August of 1962, VOSTOK 3 and 4 were launched just
one day apart into orbits that let them pass within 6.5 kilometers
(4.0 miles) of each other. The feat was repeated in June of 1963
with VOSTOK 5 and 6, which came within five kilometers (three miles)
of each other while in space. The orbits were close enough that if
these spacecraft had the proper equipment, the cosmonauts could have
easily rendezvoused and docked with each other.
In October of 1964, Kremlin politics shifted: Krushchev was ousted
from power after the three-man flight of VOSKHOD 1. Korolev seized
this opportunity and took over the manned circumlunar project from
Chelomei. Over the next several years, Korolev gradually consolidated
his power base and in the process finally defined the design and plans
of the Soviet response to the American challenge for a manned lunar
landing. This period of uncertainty and debate, however, cost the
Soviet efforts valuable time. Important hardware, especially the
all-important Moon rocket, the N-1, was constantly redesigned and
upgraded. In addition, there was a deep disagreement between Korolev
and his engine designer, Valentin P. Glushko, over fundamental N-1
design issues. Korolev wanted to make use of kerosene and liquid oxy-
gen as propellants, perhaps even liquid hydrogen. Glushko wanted to
use fluorine, nitric acid, dimethylhydrazine, and other exotic and
toxic fuels. Glushko thought that there was no practical application
for liquid hydrogen as a fuel; it was very light and would require
prohibitively large tanks to hold it. In addition, Korolev wanted to
make use of a large sychronized cluster of medium thrust engines.
Glushko wanted a smaller number of high-thrust engines.
In the end, Korolev and Glushko could not reach an agreement.
Glushko and his design bureau boycotted the N-1 project. Needing
engines for his N-1, Korolev turned to N. D. Kuznetsov and his design
bureau. Kuznetsov had developed and built only aircraft engines in
the past, such as those used in the Tu-144 SuperSonic Transport (SST)
and other TUPOLEV aircraft, but in the early 1960s the Soviets started
to back off their aircraft production. Kuznetsov and his factories in
Kuibyshev needed work and this would be the perfect opportunity to
diversify.
In its final configuration, the N-1 was the largest rocket of its
day, much larger than its American counterpart, the SATURN 5. The N-1
consisted of four stages and was about one hundred meters (330 feet)
long and fifteen meters (49 feet) across at its base. Its thirty
first-stage engines would produce about five thousand metric tons
(eleven million pounds) of thrust at lift off and it could place 95
metric tons (210,000 pounds) of payload into Earth orbit. Its two
upper stages were developed by Chelomei. A specially designed booster
stage producing one thousand metric tons (2.2 million pounds) of
thrust could be used with these stages to produce an interim launch
vehicle. Called the PROTON, this 44.3-meter (145-foot) long launch
vehicle could be used to place twenty metric ton (44,000-pound)
payloads into Earth orbit or, with the addition of a special escape
stage developed by Korolev, 5.5 metric tons (12,000 pounds) of payload
could be launched towards the Moon. In addition to being able to test
the upper stages of the N-1, the PROTON would be valuable in the Moon
program on its own merits.
With the launch vehicles he needed, Korolev finalized the plans
for the hardware that would carry cosmonauts to the Moon. He designed
three spacecraft based on his original SOYUZ concept. The L-1 was to
be used for the circumlunar mission. It was essentially a SOYUZ
without an orbital module. Without this module, the L-1 would weigh
about 5,500 kilograms (12,000 pounds), just enough for the four-stage
PROTON to launch the craft on its mission to make a simple loop around
the Moon and head back to Earth with a single cosmonaut on board.
The actual Moon landing mission would make use of two spacecraft.
The L-2 was virtually identical to Korolev's original SOYUZ concept.
The only significant difference was the addition of a torroidal fuel
tank that could hold the large amounts of additional fuel needed for
the Moon mission. With this tank empty, the L-2 would weigh about
6,600 kilograms (14,500 pounds) and could be launched for test flights
in Earth orbit using the SOYUZ launch vehicle. Fully fueled for its
trip to the Moon, the L-2 would weigh about 8,400 kilograms (18,500
pounds).
The L-3 lunar cabin was the Soviet equivalent of America's APOLLO
Lunar Module (LM). Like its American counterpart, the L-3 consisted
of two stages: A descent stage and an ascent stage. During the
descent to the lunar surface, the twenty metric ton (44,000 pound) L-3
made use of three engines, two mounted on the descent stage and one
mounted on the ascent stage, all drawing fuel from the fuel tanks on
the descent stage. If any problems occurred during the descent, the
ascent stage with its single engine still firing could switch to its
own fuel tanks, cut loose from the descent stage, and head back to
lunar orbit. Otherwise, the craft could safely land a single cosmonaut
on the lunar surface. The 7,500 kilogram (16,500 pound) ascent stage
was essentially a modified SOYUZ orbital module with a propulsion
system attached. Its primary purpose was to serve as a cockpit for
the cosmonaut and to boost him from the lunar surface into orbit.
The Soviet lunar landing mission would take place as follows:
A PROTON launch vehicle would place a fully fueled L-2 carrying two
cosmonauts into Earth orbit. Within a day, an N-1 would follow
carrying the L-3, a braking stage, and an escape stage into Earth
orbit. The L-2 would rendezvous and dock with this complex launched
by the N-1, after which the escape stage would ignite and head towards
the Moon. After it exhausted its fuel, the escape stage would be
jettisoned. Upon reaching the Moon, the braking stage would ignite
and place the L-2 and L-3 into lunar orbit. After casting off the
braking stage, one of the cosmonauts would enter the L-3 lunar cabin
and separate from the orbiting L-2. It would then fire its engines,
leave orbit, and land on the lunar surface. After he collected samples
and performed his experiments, the cosmonaut would re-enter the L-3 and
lift off towards lunar orbit. The L-3 ascent stage and the L-2 would
rendezvous and dock. After the cosmonaut transferred to the L-2 along
with his samples, the L-3 would be jettisoned. Making use of the fuel
in its torroidal fuel tank, the L-2 would leave lunar orbit and head
back to Earth for a landing in Soviet territory. If all went well,
the landing could take place by 1968.
Meanwhile, the L-1, L-2, and L-3 designs were eventually finalized
and prototype hardware could now be built. Other items were tested
also: On the VOSKHOD 2 mission, launched on March 18, 1965, cosmonaut
Alexei Leonov made the first "space walk" (EVA, or ExtraVehicular
Activity) using a prototype of the pressure suit that would be used
for the excursions on the lunar surface. No longer under political
pressure from the Kremlin for space firsts after the ouster of Krush-
chev, Korolev canceled the remaining manned VOSKHOD missions and
put all his resources into the Moon project. Much valuable time had
been lost developing these essentially dead-end missions.
On July 16, 1965, the first piece of N-1 hardware was flight
tested. The third stage of the N-1 was used in a two-stage version
of the PROTON to launch a test satellite, named PROTON 1, into Earth
orbit. Weighing 12.2 metric tons (26,800 pounds), it was the heaviest
payload ever placed into orbit. A second test on November 2, 1965,
which orbited PROTON 2, was equally successful. The third test flight,
launched on March 24, 1966, was a failure. It would prove to be an
ominous sign of things to come.
Flight testing of the L-1 and L-2 hardware finally began in
December of 1965. These sub-orbital flights, which continued until
June of 1966, were to test the performance the spacecraft's recovery
systems; an important prelude to in-orbit tests. Unfortunately, Kor-
olev would not live to see it. He died on January 14, 1966, apparently
from a botched operation to remove intestinal tumors. The Soviet space
program in general and their lunar program in particular would never
be the same after Korolev's passing.
Shortly after Korolev's death, Premier Leonid Brezhnev put Korolev's
assistant, Vasily P. Mishin, in charge of the Man-to-the-Moon program.
Mishin quickly finished the consolidation process that Korolev began.
No time could be lost now: The Americans had begun inflight testing
of their Moonship, APOLLO.
The first APOLLO flight, designated SA-201, was the first test of
a fully functional APOLLO spacecraft launched on the new SATURN IB
booster. The successful suborbital flight of February 26, 1966, went
off without a hitch. An orbital test of the SATURN IB, SA-203, was
launched on July 5 with a dummy payload. SA-202, launched on August
25, repeated SA-201's successful flight. Plans called for the first
manned test of APOLLO in Earth orbit in the first quarter of 1967.
From a hardware standpoint, the Soviets and Americans were neck
and neck in the race to the Moon. Both nations had successfully
tested their Moonships in suborbital tests. Both had tested the third
stage of their Moon rockets as the second stage of smaller launch
vehicles: The Soviets on their PROTON and the Americans with the
SATURN IB. The Americans, however, had more in-flight experience. As
their GEMINI program was drawing to a close in 1966, the Americans had
accumulated much more flight time with longer missions, more EVA time,
and - most importantly - they had more practical experience with the
techniques of in-orbit rendezvous and docking.
Despite continuing management problems, the Soviets pushed ahead
with the first orbital tests of the L-1 spacecraft. On November 28,
1966, they finally launched the first L-1 into orbit aboard a SOYUZ
launch vehicle. KOSMOS 133, as it was called, remained in Earth orbit
for almost two days before it was brought down. During re-entry
something went wrong: As a result of a manufacturing defect, the
heatshield failed. While the capsule was successfully recovered,
there was still significant damage to the module's interior. Further
work on the L-1 was needed.
Meanwhile in The United States, preparations for the first manned
APOLLO flight, known as both APOLLO 1 and SA-204, were in full swing.
The SATURN IB rocket was assembled and the APOLLO spacecraft was mated
to its launch vehicle in January of 1967. During an on-pad countdown
rehearsal on January 27, tragedy struck. While the three astronauts,
Virgil I. Grissom, Edward White, and Roger Chaffee, were proceeding
with the countdown rehearsal inside their spacecraft, an electrical
fire started. Because of the pure oxygen atmosphere in the Command
Module (CM) and an unforeseen availability of combustible materials,
the flames quickly spread and in seconds the three astronauts, unable
to escape quickly enough, died of suffocation. The tragedy stopped
the APOLLO program in its tracks. A board of inquiry was formed and
the whole APOLLO spacecraft design re-evaluated.
The Soviets saw their chance to pull ahead. A second L-1 flight,
KOSMOS 140, was launched on February 7, 1967, in a repeat of the
failed KOSMOS 133 mission. Again the spacecraft left orbit after
almost two days in space; and again, there was some sort of failure.
The exact nature of the failure is not known, but it involved either
the temperature control system, attitude control system, or the
parachutes. While this time the heatshield worked well, there were
still problems to be worked out on the L-1 and its sister, the L-2.
Pressure from the Kremlin was beginning to build on those in the
Soviet space program. The Soviet government gave formal approval to
the plan to land a man on the Moon by the end of 1968. Failing this,
the L-1 would be used to make a manned circumlunar flight using the
PROTON. At the same time the N-1 Moon rocket project was put into
high gear, with the third quarter of 1967 being the goal for the start
of flight hardware construction.
Despite two less than successful orbital test flights of the L-1,
the next phase of flight testing was begun. The ultimate goal of the
L-1 was to make a circumlunar flight; a flight to the Moon at his
point would have been too big a leap because of the complexities of
navigation and spacecraft control. As an interim step, it was decided
to use the PROTON vehicle to launch an L-1 into an extended Earth
orbit away from the influences of the Moon. This would allow the
problems of long-range communications and spacecraft control to be
worked out. It would also give the L-1 a realistic test of the re-
entry conditions it would experience returning from an actual mission
to the Moon.
On March 10, 1967, the first four-stage version of the PROTON
booster lifted the 5,017-kilogram (11,037-pound) L-1 test vehicle,
KOSMOS 146, into a 177 by 296-kilometer (110 by 184-mile) parking
orbit. After a short time, the PROTON's Block D escape stage would
ignite and send KOSMOS 146 into its elongated orbit. Come time for
ignition, though, nothing happened. The escape stage failed to ignite
and KOSMOS 146 was stranded in space. Hoping to salvage at least some
information from the mission, the spacecraft was separated from its
useless booster, whose Earth orbit was rapidly decaying. KOSMOS 146
then used its own engines to lift itself into a higher 185 by 350-
kilometer (115 by 218-mile) orbit. By the next day, the Block D
escape stage fell out of orbit. KOSMOS 146 continued on in low Earth
orbit for over eight days before it was commanded back. Again, the
L-1, either during its flight or recovery, experienced some sort of
system failure in its onboard control systems or its parachute.
The problems were quickly corrected and another test flight,
KOSMOS 154, was launched on April 8, 1967. As before, the PROTON's
Block D escape stage failed to push the L-1 into the intended elon-
gated Earth orbit. Again the spacecraft separated from its useless
escape stage in hope of salvaging part of the mission. This time,
however, there was yet another onboard system failure that prevented
KOSMOS 154 from moving into a higher orbit. After eleven days in
space, the lifeless spacecraft's orbit decayed and KOSMOS 154 burned
up in Earth's atmosphere.
After four unmanned orbital test flights of the L-1, the
spacecraft had failed to perform as intended. Under normal
circumstances there would have been more design evaluations and
testing, but pressure on Mishin and the other space program managers
was mounting. The government insisted that they catch up to and pass
the United States during their reevaluation of the APOLLO program.
Despite the problems of the L-1, its sister, the L-2, was to be
pressed into service for the first Soviet manned spaceflight in two
years.
In the first L-2 flight, the Soviets wanted to catch up to and
even surpass America's achievements of the GEMINI program. The plan
called for an L-2 to be launched on a SOYUZ booster with one man on
board. The large torroidal fuel tank would be empty on this flight to
lighten the L-2 enough so that the SOYUZ launch vehicle could place it
into orbit. The L-2's internal fuel reserves would be sufficient to
carry out this and any future Earth orbital mission. The day after
launch, a second L-2 would be launched into orbit, this time with a
crew of three cosmonauts. The two spacecraft would rendezvous and
dock. After docking, two of the crew members of the second L-2 would
don spacesuits, depressurize the orbital module, and perform an EVA
to transfer to the first L-2. After the crew transfer, the two space-
craft would undock and perform independent missions. Each would
return after spending about three days in Earth orbit.
If this mission was successful, the Soviets would have performed
the first docking of two manned spacecraft and the first crew
transfer. In addition, they would gain the flight experience they
needed to assemble their Moon craft in Earth orbit and later redock
the L-2 and L-3 in lunar orbit. The mission had to succeed, but Mishin
refused to approve the launch. He felt that it was too dangerous to
commit the L-2 to a manned mission until the problems with the similar
L-1 were solved. Moscow overruled him and the mission proceeded.
The first L-2 would be manned by space veteran Vladimir Komarov,
who flew on VOSKHOD 1 in 1964. The second L-2 was to be manned by
cosmonauts Valeriy Bykovsky, Yevgeniy Khrunov, and Aleksey Yeliseyev.
Khrunov and Yeliseyev would perform the EVA transfer. On the morning
of April 23, 1967, the 6,450-kilogram (14,190-pound) L-2 named SOYUZ 1
was launched into orbit with Komarov aboard. With its unique design
and extensive automated systems, it was the most complex and advanced
manned spacecraft to fly and almost immediately problems started. One
of the spacecraft's two solar panels would not deploy, depriving the
SOYUZ of half its electrical power. Still later problems developed
with the attitude control system. The launch of SOYUZ 2 was called
off. There was no way the mission could be accomplished. All efforts
were then poured into getting Komarov back.
Ground control sent commands up to Komarov to help bring the
malfunctioning spacecraft under control. A retrorocket burn on the
fifteenth orbit would bring SOYUZ 1 back home. The attempt failed.
As fuel ran low, Komarov got permission to try again on the seven-
teenth orbit, but again he could not control the spacecraft. Komarov
finally put the spacecraft into a spin to help stabilize it. On the
eighteenth orbit, the cosmonaut finally succeeded and was on his way
home. Because of the on board malfunctions, Komarov kept the re-entry
module spinning, resulting in a high-gravity ballistic re-entry. The
spinning spacecraft survived the re-entry, but when the landing para-
chute was deployed the lines snarled, preventing it from opening fully.
SOYUZ 1 with Komarov on board crashed into the ground at a speed of
about 500 kilometers per hour (about 300 miles per hour) near the
town of Orenburg in the Urals, one thousand kilometers (600 miles)
off course. The pilot of the first manned SOYUZ flight was killed
on impact.
Komarov's body was cremated and his ashes were placed in the wall
of the Kremlin. Like the Americans with APOLLO 1 only three months
earlier, the haste to reach the Moon resulted in the death of one of
the Soviet Union's best cosmonauts and a reevaluation of the design
of the L-1 and L-2 Moon craft.
End of Part One.
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About the Author -
Andrew J. LePage is a member of the Boston Group for the Study
of the Soviet Space Program, Krasnaya Orbita. In addition to his
interests in astronomical and space related topics, Andrew has been
a serious observer of the Soviet space program for over one decade.
Andrew is the author of "Mars 1994" in the March 1990 issue
of the EJASA.