]> Stellarminds.ai

Richmond California United States of America sharath@stellarminds.ai https://stellarminds.ai

Security Network Working Group AI agents discovery registry corroboration transparency AI agents are discovered and identified through independent sources — registries, name services, DID methods, catalogs. A single source can misrepresent an agent by omission (withholding a record it holds) or equivocation (serving different answers to different observers); no signature on a served artifact defends against either. This document specifies a corroboration procedure: how one source's claim about one agent, observed from one network vantage, is classified; how a claim is reduced to a comparable view; how claims are diffed into findings with deterministic attribution; how legitimate propagation delay is distinguished from persistent disagreement; and a signed Corroboration Record emitted on every sweep — agreement included — that other evidence formats can bind by digest. The procedure is source-, format-, and layer-agnostic, requires no cooperation from or modification of any source, and is verifiable from recorded bytes.

Introduction An artifact served by a discovery source can be self-certifying: signed such that any consumer verifies its content offline. Self-certification defeats tampering. It cannot, in principle, defeat two other misbehaviors available to any source: omission (a withheld artifact has no signature to check) and equivocation (two inconsistent artifacts served to different observers are each individually valid). Both require a structurally different defense — comparison of independent observations — with its own failure modes and its own evidence. This document specifies that comparison. It normatively fixes the decision procedure — claim classification (Section 4), the view contract (Section 5), the diff (Section 6), the confirmation discipline (Section 7), the self-description mechanism (Section 8), and the Corroboration Record (Section 9) — and treats the byte-level fetch per source as an injectable implementation detail, because interoperability lives in the comparison and the record, not in any source's wire format. The procedure serves any layer at which a middleman answers questions about an agent: discovery (which endpoint), identity (which key), capability (which functions), and evidence (which records exist). Section 10 gives the two reference layer instantiations.

Conventions and Definitions The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. Source: Anything that answers "what do you have for agent X?" — a registry, a name service, a DID method, a catalog, an evidence store. Vantage: A network perspective from which a source is observed. One source MAY be observed from multiple vantages; vantage is part of a claim's identity. Watch set: The set of canonical agent identifiers a consumer corroborates. Claim: One source's answer about one agent as observed from one vantage at one instant, classified present, absent, or error (Section 4), carrying an observed_at timestamp. View: The comparable reduction of a present claim: named string fields (Section 5). Resolver: The per-source adapter mapping a canonical agent identifier to a classified claim (Section 4), applying that source's native verification. Sweep: One corroboration cycle: every watch-set identifier resolved against every (source, vantage), diffed, and recorded. Finding: One detected disagreement: {kind, agent_id, confirmation, detail} (Section 6). Corroboration Record: The signed, content-addressed result of one sweep for one subject (Section 9). Self-Description: An agent-signed bundle of sequence number, aliases, and service endpoints (Section 8). CORR-DIGEST: lowercase-hex(SHA-256(JCS(v))), the SHA-256 of the RFC 8785 JSON Canonicalization Scheme serialization of a value. All digests in this document use this construction. Values in digest-bearing fields MUST NOT be JSON floating-point numbers.

Claim Model The unit of observation is the tuple (source, vantage, agent, observed_at). Vantage MUST be preserved as a distinct axis and MUST NOT be encoded by treating each vantage as an independent source: intra-source disagreement across vantages attributes a different misbehavior (equivocation by that source) than inter-source disagreement, and collapsing the axes destroys the attribution (Section 6.3). A sweep with fewer than two present-or-absent claims for a subject has nothing to corroborate; its verdict is INSUFFICIENT (Section 9), and an implementation MUST NOT report agreement in that case.

Classifying One Claim For a source S, vantage V, and agent A, a resolver MUST classify the outcome as exactly one of: present — S served a claim for A, reduced to a view (Section 5). absent — S positively asserts A is unknown. Each resolver defines the positive-absence predicate for its source type; for HTTP sources a 404 MUST be classified absent, and a 200 whose body positively signals not-found SHOULD be classified absent. Non-normative examples of the latter include {"success": false} bodies and error strings containing "not found". error — any other outcome: connection failure, timeout, non-absence error status, unparseable body, or an answer the resolver cannot map to a view. A resolver MUST NOT raise; failures are error claims. An error claim MUST be excluded from the diff entirely. This rule is central: a source that failed to answer has asserted nothing and MUST NOT be treated as claiming absence — otherwise every transient fault becomes a false omission finding.

The View Contract A present claim MUST be reduced to a view: a mapping of field names to string values or null. A null value MUST NOT participate in the diff: an unverifiable or missing field is not a disagreement. Fields whose values are compared as strings MUST be canonicalized by the layer before entering the view, such that two references to the same resource compare equal. For URI-valued fields (e.g., endpoints), implementations MUST apply syntax-based normalization per RFC 3986 Section 6 (case of scheme and host, default ports, empty path) before comparison. For key-valued fields, the multibase did:key form is the comparison encoding. Where a field carries its own proof (a signed record's DID, a key), the resolver MUST populate it only from a successfully verified artifact whose subject binds to the outer agent identifier; on any verification failure the field is null. A verifier MUST NOT allow an unverified value to produce a divergence finding against a verified one (the no-laundering rule).

The Diff Input: the claims of one sweep for one agent. The diff MUST be pure — deterministic ordering, no I/O, no exceptions — and MUST derive findings as follows. One agent MAY yield multiple simultaneous findings.

omission Emit an omission finding iff the agent is present on at least one source and absent on at least one other source. Both sides MUST be positive claims; error claims contribute to neither. Detail: {present_on, missing_from} as sorted lists of source labels.

Field Divergence For each field name appearing in any present view, collect the non-null values keyed by (source, vantage). Emit a finding of kind equal to the field name iff more than one distinct value appears across sources (using, per source, the value agreed by its vantages; see Section 6.3 when they disagree). Detail: {field, values} where values maps source labels to values.

source_equivocation For each source observed from more than one vantage, if that source's vantages yield differing non-null values for any field, emit a source_equivocation finding attributing that source. Detail: {source, field, values} where values maps vantage labels to values. A source under source_equivocation for a field contributes no single agreed value to the Section 6.2 comparison for that field; its per-vantage values are carried in the record for audit.

Observation Time and Confirmation Sources propagate updates asynchronously; a legitimate change is served inconsistently for a bounded window. Every claim MUST carry observed_at. Every finding MUST carry a confirmation state: suspected — first observation of the disagreement. confirmed — the disagreement was re-observed in a sweep whose observed_at exceeds the first observation by at least the deployment's configured staleness window for the participating sources. The staleness window is deployment configuration derived from the sources' propagation characteristics (TTLs, sync intervals). A verifier evaluates confirmation deterministically from the recorded timestamps and the window recorded in the Corroboration Record; no external clock is consulted. Consumers SHOULD treat suspected findings as monitoring signals and confirmed findings as evidence.

The Self-Description Corroboration requires knowing each source's name for the same agent (identity correspondence). This document defines an OPTIONAL agent-signed bundle that makes the correspondence verifiable rather than configured:

": "", ... }, "endpoints": [ "", ... ], "signature": "" } ]]>

Rules: The signature MUST verify against the key encoded in subject (offline; did:key per its method specification ). On failure the description contributes nothing and the consumer falls back to caller-supplied correspondence. A fallback MUST NOT be silently overridden by an unverifiable description. Supersession. seq is a monotonically increasing integer. Among validly signed descriptions for one subject, the highest seq is authoritative. A source serving a description with seq lower than one the consumer has already verified is serving superseded material; this SHOULD be reported as a finding of kind stale_description attributing that source. Agent equivocation. Two validly signed descriptions for one subject with equal seq and differing JCS bytes MUST be reported as a finding of kind agent_equivocation. This indicates key compromise or a misbehaving agent and is not attributable to any source. Distribution. The description SHOULD be obtainable from each participating source and MUST, when so distributed, be corroborated as its own layer under this procedure (view: {seq, aliases_digest, endpoints_digest}), so that omission or replay of the description by a source is an ordinary finding. Verify-back. A record fetched via an alias asserted in a description MUST bind to the same subject key to contribute a claim; a record that does not bind back contributes no claim and MUST NOT produce a divergence finding (Section 5's no-laundering rule extended to correspondence). The bundle is deliberately the minimal offline-verifiable profile of DID Core's alsoKnownAs and service constructs; implementations integrating richer self-descriptions (e.g., AgentFacts) MAY derive this bundle from them.

The Corroboration Record An implementation MUST emit a Corroboration Record for every (sweep, subject) pair, whatever the verdict — AGREE, DIVERGENT, or INSUFFICIENT. A corroboration trail recording only disagreements cannot prove its checks ran; the agreement record is the positive attestation downstream consumers bind.

", "subject": { "agent_id": "", "did": "" }, "observed_at": "", "staleness_window_s": , "verdict": "AGREE" | "DIVERGENT" | "INSUFFICIENT", "claims": [ { "source": "", "vantage": "", "status": "present" | "absent" | "error", "view": { "": "", ... } | null, "outcome": "" } ], "findings": [ { "kind": "", "agent_id": "", "confirmation": "suspected" | "confirmed", "detail": { ... } } ], "sweeper": "did:key:z6Mk...", "signature": "" } ]]>

Rules: record_id MUST equal the CORR-DIGEST of the record minus record_id and signature. A verifier MUST recompute and compare. observed_at is an RFC 3339 UTC timestamp with a Z suffix. The signature MUST verify against sweeper. Self-attestation by the sweeping party is the base tier; a record MAY additionally be registered with an append-only transparency service (e.g., a SCITT Transparency Service ), in which case a consumer MUST NOT report the anchored tier without verifying an inclusion proof against a log key it trusts. All monetary, count, and window values are exact integers or decimal strings; floating-point values MUST NOT appear. claims MUST include error-status entries (excluded from the diff, preserved for audit). A consumer binding a Corroboration Record from another evidence format SHOULD bind record_id and SHOULD state the verdict it relied upon.

Reference Layer Instantiations Discovery — view {endpoint, did}. Resolvers: a by-id HTTP registry resolver (GET {base}/api/agents/{id}, path injectable); a two-hop index resolver (resolve a locator to {registry_url, identifier}, then fetch the record; a missing or empty hop field is error, a not-found at either hop is absent). The did field is populated only per Section 5's verified-field rule, from a signed record verified offline against its embedded did:key, with subject binding to the outer id. Identity — view {key}, the agent's Ed25519 verification key in did:key multibase form (the encoding shared by did:key identifiers and Ed25519VerificationKey2020 publicKeyMultibase, so keys compare as strings). Resolvers: did:key (offline; the self-certifying root), did:web (fetched from the method-specified document location; 404 is absent), and a Universal Resolver adapter. A method serving a different key than the root is a key divergence.

Finding Kinds and Extensibility Kinds seeded by this document: omission, source_equivocation, stale_description, agent_equivocation, and one kind per view field name of a registered layer (this document seeds endpoint, did, key). Bare (un-prefixed) kind names are reserved for values seeded in this document and its successors; any party introducing a new kind MUST namespace it with a reverse-DNS or URI prefix. A consumer MUST treat unknown kinds as informational and MUST NOT reject a record for carrying one.

Conformance A conforming implementation MUST reproduce, for the shared corpus of fixed per-claim inputs, the exact finding set of Section 6 and the exact verdicts of Section 9, including: agreement yields no findings and an AGREE record; present-beside-absent yields omission with correct attribution; distinct field values yield that field's kind; an error claim is excluded and creates no omission; a positive soft-404 is absent; vantage disagreement within one source yields source_equivocation and withholds that source from the cross-source field comparison; one subject may carry multiple simultaneous findings; and every sweep yields a record whose record_id recomputes. The corpus is view-agnostic and reused by every layer.

Security Considerations Independence. Corroboration among k sources is worth exactly the independence among them. Sources sharing an upstream feed, an operator, or an incentive corroborate each other's misinformation by construction. This procedure records which sources agreed, enabling diversity-weighted consumption; it cannot manufacture diversity. Deployments SHOULD select sources with distinct operational and data lineage and SHOULD disclose known dependencies. Residual equivocation. Cross-vantage comparison detects per-network-path splits. It cannot detect a source lying identically to all of one consumer's vantages while answering other consumers differently; that residual requires witnessed, append-only transparency over served answers (, , ), out of scope here. The Corroboration Record is forward-compatible with such logs (a witnessed history of records). Watch-set bootstrap. A consumer cannot detect omission of an agent it never watched; a watch set enumerated from a single source inherits that source's omissions. Watch-set construction SHOULD draw on multiple sources. Sweeper honesty. A record attests the sweep's recorded observations, not the sweeper's honesty; a dishonest sweeper can sign a fiction. Anchoring bounds timing and prevents silent substitution; consumers with high assurance requirements SHOULD corroborate the corroborator — multiple independent sweepers over the same watch set — which this procedure supports without modification (sweep records are themselves views to diff). Staleness abuse. An attacker aware of the staleness window can rotate lies faster than confirmation. suspected findings therefore MUST be preserved in records even when never confirmed; a pattern of unconfirmed, short-lived divergences from one source is itself signal, and its evaluation is consumer policy. Self-description replay and squatting. Addressed structurally in Section 8 (supersession, corroborated distribution, verify-back); implementations MUST NOT skip the verify-back rule, which is the sole defense against alias squatting manufacturing false divergences. Privacy. A watch set reveals the sweeping party's interests to every queried source; records reveal them to every consumer. Deployments handling sensitive watch sets SHOULD consider query padding and record-level access control; both are out of scope.

IANA Considerations This document requests no IANA actions. The finding-kind vocabulary is governed by the namespacing convention of Section 11; the record and self-description version strings are governed by this document and its successors. A future revision MAY register a media type for the Corroboration Record (candidate: application/corroboration-record+json) once transport contexts warrant it.

In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. This document defines a date and time format for use in Internet protocols that is a profile of the ISO 8601 standard for representation of dates and times using the Gregorian calendar. A Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) is a compact sequence of characters that identifies an abstract or physical resource. This specification defines the generic URI syntax and a process for resolving URI references that might be in relative form, along with guidelines and security considerations for the use of URIs on the Internet. The URI syntax defines a grammar that is a superset of all valid URIs, allowing an implementation to parse the common components of a URI reference without knowing the scheme-specific requirements of every possible identifier. This specification does not define a generative grammar for URIs; that task is performed by the individual specifications of each URI scheme. [STANDARDS-TRACK] Cryptographic operations like hashing and signing need the data to be expressed in an invariant format so that the operations are reliably repeatable. One way to address this is to create a canonical representation of the data. Canonicalization also permits data to be exchanged in its original form on the "wire" while cryptographic operations performed on the canonicalized counterpart of the data in the producer and consumer endpoints generate consistent results. This document describes the JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS). This specification defines how to create a canonical representation of JSON data by building on the strict serialization methods for JSON primitives defined by ECMAScript, constraining JSON data to the Internet JSON (I-JSON) subset, and by using deterministic property sorting. W3C W3C Credentials Community Group This document describes an experimental protocol for publicly logging the existence of Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates as they are issued or observed, in a manner that allows anyone to audit certificate authority (CA) activity and notice the issuance of suspect certificates as well as to audit the certificate logs themselves. The intent is that eventually clients would refuse to honor certificates that do not appear in a log, effectively forcing CAs to add all issued certificates to the logs. Logs are network services that implement the protocol operations for submissions and queries that are defined in this document. This document describes version 2.0 of the Certificate Transparency (CT) protocol for publicly logging the existence of Transport Layer Security (TLS) server certificates as they are issued or observed, in a manner that allows anyone to audit certification authority (CA) activity and notice the issuance of suspect certificates as well as to audit the certificate logs themselves. The intent is that eventually clients would refuse to honor certificates that do not appear in a log, effectively forcing CAs to add all issued certificates to the logs. This document obsoletes RFC 6962. It also specifies a new TLS extension that is used to send various CT log artifacts. Logs are network services that implement the protocol operations for submissions and queries that are defined in this document. CA/Browser Forum

Mapping to the Reference Implementation Every normative element of this document is implemented in the reference implementation, split across two packages: the source-agnostic sm-resolver kernel (the claim model of Section 3, the view contract of Section 5, the diff of Section 6, and the confirmation discipline of Section 7, producing an unsigned sweep result with the verdict of Section 9) and sm-divergence built on it (the reference discovery and identity layers of Section 10, the agent self-description of Section 8, and the signing that seals a sweep result into the Corroboration Record of Section 9). The present/absent/error classification (Section 4), the view contract (Section 5), and the diff (Section 6) are the kernel's stable core; the vantage axis and source_equivocation (Sections 3, 6.3), observation time and confirmation (Section 7), the self-description schema and hardening (Section 8), and the Corroboration Record emitted on every verdict (Section 9) are all present and covered by the conformance corpus. The reference implementation is available as open-source software (MIT License) at https://github.com/Sharathvc23/sm-divergence and https://github.com/Sharathvc23/sm-resolver, and is published on PyPI as sm-divergence and sm-resolver. The companion informative essay is "The Quilt That Checks Itself" (Stellarminds.ai / Project NANDA research).

Related Work The multi-perspective corroboration pattern this document applies to agent discovery mirrors the CA/Browser Forum's Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration for certificate issuance and transparency-log constructions . Adjacent agent-identity work includes Agent Name Service v2 and SCITT-based evidence profiles ; this document is complementary, defining the cross-source comparison and record rather than a naming or transparency substrate.