TIBET Semantic Surface Manifest

Status of This Memo

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Table of Contents

1. Status of This Memo

This memo is an Internet-Draft working document derived from operational architecture notes and prototype work in the Humotica / TIBET / TAT / ICC stack during May 2026.¶

The present -00 version captures the core routing model, visible syntax, mirrored-surface concept, and mismatch consequences needed for first public review.¶

2. Problem Statement

Sealed containers often provide strong integrity but weak dispatch semantics.¶

Systems therefore face a recurring tradeoff: either encrypt and seal everything, delaying routing and policy choice until deep inspection, or expose too much metadata, weakening privacy and creating new security ambiguities.¶

The Semantic Surface Manifest addresses this by providing a constrained, readable routing layer that supports dispatch without decrypting content, minimizes metadata exposure, does not replace cryptographic verification, and composes with existing sealed-container workflows.¶

3. Terminology

Identity-Bound Continuity Container:

A cryptographically sealed bundle that combines identity binding, continuity semantics, and containerized payload transfer.¶

Semantic Surface Manifest:

A human-readable routing surface associated with a bundle, typically expressed through filename or object-name structure and optionally mirrored into sealed manifest fields.¶

Intrinsic Truth:

Properties established by the sealed object itself, such as magic bytes, manifest, signatures, hashes, and chain anchors.¶

Extrinsic Surface:

Properties expressed outside the sealed object for dispatch and routing, such as time fragment, context, profile, and priority.¶

Surface-Integrity Event:

A meaningful mismatch or anomaly involving visible routing surface and mirrored sealed routing fields.¶

4. Design Goals

The Semantic Surface Manifest is intended to remain human-readable, machine-parseable, bounded in disclosure, and composable with existing ICC or TBZ verification workflows.¶

It should support wildcard or policy matching, align with logs and audit ecosystems, and support mirrored sealed fields for consistency checks. It must not be treated as proof of identity or content, override manifest truth, or carry rich payload details.¶

5. Syntax

The normative external form is:¶

<time-fragment>.<context>.<profile>.<priority>[.<icc-ext>]

The Semantic Surface Manifest is intentionally flat and dot-delimited in version 1. The formal grammar uses ABNF as defined in [RFC5234].¶

Each segment is restricted to lowercase letters, digits, and hyphens. Segments must not contain spaces, slashes, underscores, nested dots, or uppercase letters.¶

surface-name    = time-fragment "." context "." profile "." priority
                  [ "." icc-ext ]

time-fragment   = date-frag [ "t" time-frag "z" ]
date-frag       = 4DIGIT "-" 2DIGIT "-" 2DIGIT
time-frag       = 2DIGIT "-" 2DIGIT
context         = 1*32(segment-char)
profile         = 1*16(segment-char)
priority        = 1*16(segment-char)
icc-ext         = 1*16(segment-char)
segment-char    = LCALPHA / DIGIT / "-"
LCALPHA         = %x61-7A
DIGIT           = %x30-39

6. Time Fragment Format

This document prefers an ISO8601-style fragment over compact local date forms because it is lexicographically sortable, readable across jurisdictions, aligned with logs, and supports both coarse and fine routing granularity.¶

Two forms are recommended in version 1:¶

2026-05-08
2026-05-08t18-38z

7. Vocabulary Registries

8. Processing Model

9. Mirrored Manifest Fields

This document defines optional mirrored manifest fields such as surface_time_fragment, surface_context, surface_profile, and surface_priority.¶

If both an external semantic surface and internal mirrored fields are present, the mirrored fields are authoritative for triage classification and deep semantic handling.¶

10. Example

Example external surface:¶

2026-05-08.redspecter-review.claude.urgent

Processing may route to an urgent queue, classify as a candidate profile, verify TBZ magic bytes, inspect the manifest, verify signatures and hashes, compare visible and sealed surface, and only then hand to a profile-aware handler if consistent or policy-approved.¶

11. Mismatch Classes

12. Security Considerations

The Semantic Surface Manifest is not a source of trust. Implementations must assume that external names can be changed and visible routing labels can be misleading. The sealed container remains the only strong source of truth.¶

Routing may depend on SSM, but trust must not depend on SSM alone.¶

13. Privacy Considerations

The Semantic Surface Manifest intentionally exposes limited metadata. Implementers should keep context low-sensitivity, avoid direct secrets or detailed personal data, and prefer naming for dispatch rather than disclosure.¶

14. Interoperability Considerations

The SSM is designed to compose with TBZ, ICC-based continuity containers, TIBET Drop or TAT flows, session-state bundles, attestation bundles, sealed capsules, local storage, transport objects, attachments, queues, and router decisions.¶

15. Relationship to JIS, TIBET, TAT, and ICC

This document does not replace JIS identity semantics, TIBET causal ordering, TAT transfer flow, or ICC sealed object semantics. It adds a visible routing surface above them.¶

A clean split is that JIS decides who is acting, TIBET decides causal truth, TAT decides transfer flow, ICC decides sealed object class, and SSM decides visible dispatch semantics.¶

16. Future Work

• richer but still bounded registries for profile¶
• explicit mirrored-surface validation modes¶
• MUX or SNAFT routing integration¶
• UI conventions for displaying safe routing metadata¶
• signed or policy-bound surface-to-manifest binding hints¶

17. Questions for Future Revisions

The following topics are non-blocking for the present -00 version and are recorded here to guide later discussion and interoperability work.¶

• whether profile should remain open-text or move to a tighter registry¶
• whether the optional suffix should be preserved, normalized, or ignored by parsers¶
• whether seconds-level time fragments should be allowed in version 1¶
• whether some domains should escalate all mismatch to quarantine while others allow low-risk auto-continue¶

18. IANA Considerations

This document requests two registries: a Surface Profile Registry and a Surface Priority Registry.¶

Registration policy for both is Expert Review as described in [RFC8126]. Initial profile values are claude, gemini, gpt, kit, iddrop, parentattest, capsule, and tza. Initial priority values are urgent, normal, background, and sealed.¶

No registries are requested for time-fragment, context, or icc-ext in version 1.¶

Appendix A. Acknowledgements

The author thanks the Humotica team for editorial assistance, RFC outline preparation, mismatch class formalization, and the operational tooling that made the surface consistency model concrete.¶

The author also thanks Richard Barron of Red Specter Security Research for adversarial framing that helped sharpen the address visible, content sealed principle and the rename-attack perspective.¶

Author's Address