Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) Protocol

4.1. Creating and Validating TEEP Messages

4.2. QueryRequest Message

A QueryRequest message is used by the TAM to learn information from the TEEP Agent, such as the features supported by the TEEP Agent, including cipher suites and protocol versions. Additionally, the TAM can selectively request data items from the TEEP Agent by using the data-item-requested parameter. Currently, the following features are supported:¶

• Request for attestation information of the TEEP Agent,¶

• Listing supported extensions,¶

• Querying installed Trusted Components, and¶

• Request for logging information in SUIT Reports.¶

Like other TEEP messages, the QueryRequest message is signed, and the relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL structure is shown in Appendix C.¶

query-request = [
  type: TEEP-TYPE-query-request,
  options: {
    ? token => bstr .size (8..64),
    ? supported-freshness-mechanisms => [ + $freshness-mechanism ],
    ? challenge => bstr .size (8..512),
    ? versions => [ + version ],
    ? attestation-payload-format => text,
    ? attestation-payload => bstr,
    ? suit-reports => [ + bstr .cbor SUIT_Report ],
    * $$query-request-extensions,
    * $$teep-option-extensions
  },
  supported-teep-cipher-suites: [ + $teep-cipher-suite ],
  supported-suit-cose-profiles: [ + $suit-cose-profile ],
  data-item-requested: uint .bits data-item-requested
]

version = uint .size 4
ext-info = uint .size 4

; data items as bitmaps
data-item-requested = &(
  attestation: 0,
  trusted-components: 1,
  extensions: 2,
  suit-reports: 3,
)

The message has the following fields:¶

type

The value of (1) corresponds to a QueryRequest message sent from the TAM to the TEEP Agent.¶

token

The value in the token parameter is used to match responses to requests, such as to look up any implementation-specific state it might have saved about that request, or to ignore responses to older QueryRequest messages before some configuration changes were made that affected their content. This is particularly useful when a TAM issues multiple concurrent requests to a TEEP Agent. The token MUST be present if and only if the attestation bit is clear in the data-item-requested value (i.e., the attestation bit, which is bit 0 in the bitmap, is not set). When the attestation bit is clear then a challenge will be included, which offers replay protection capabilities. The size of the token is at least 8 bytes (64 bits) and maximum of 64 bytes. The first usage of a token generated by a TAM MUST be randomly created. Subsequent token values MUST be different for each request message to distinguish the correct response from multiple requests. The token value MUST NOT be used for other purposes, such as a TAM to identify the devices and/or a device to identify TAMs or Trusted Components. The TAM SHOULD set an expiration time for each token to facilitate cleanup of stale request state, and MUST ignore any messages with expired tokens. Implementations without explicit token management (e.g., simple TAMs that process requests synchronously and do not maintain state) may not need explicit token expiration. The TAM MUST expire the token value after receiving the first response containing the token value and ignore any subsequent messages that have the same token value. Implementations SHOULD use a timeout mechanism (see Section 7.1) to eventually discard unanswered requests that have been awaiting responses for an excessive duration.¶

supported-teep-cipher-suites

The supported-teep-cipher-suites parameter lists the TEEP cipher suites supported by the TAM. Details about the cipher suite encoding can be found in Section 8.1.¶

supported-suit-cose-profiles

The supported-suit-cose-profiles parameter lists the SUIT profiles supported by the TAM for parsing SUIT Reports. Details about the cipher suite encoding can be found in Section 8.2.¶

data-item-requested

The data-item-requested parameter indicates what information the TAM requests from the TEEP Agent in the form of a bitmap.¶

attestation (1):

With this value the TAM requests the TEEP Agent to return an attestation payload, whether Evidence (e.g., an EAT) or an Attestation Result, in the response.¶

trusted-components (2):

With this value the TAM queries the TEEP Agent for all installed Trusted Components.¶

extensions (4):

With this value the TAM queries the TEEP Agent for supported capabilities and extensions, which allows a TAM to discover the capabilities of a TEEP Agent implementation.¶

suit-reports (8):

With this value the TAM requests the TEEP Agent to return SUIT Reports in the response.¶

Further values may be added in the future.¶

supported-freshness-mechanisms

The supported-freshness-mechanisms parameter lists the freshness mechanism(s) supported by the TAM. Details about the encoding can be found in Section 9. If this parameter is absent, it means only the nonce mechanism is supported. It MUST be absent if the attestation bit is clear.¶

challenge

The challenge field is an optional parameter used for ensuring the freshness of attestation Evidence returned with a QueryResponse message. It MUST be absent if the attestation bit is clear or the Passport model (see [RFC9334]) is used. When a challenge is provided in the QueryRequest and Evidence in the form of an EAT is returned with a QueryResponse message then the challenge contained in the QueryRequest MUST be used to generate the EAT, by copying the challenge into the eat_nonce claim (Section 4.1 of [RFC9711]) if the nonce-based freshness mechanism is used for attestation Evidence. For more details about freshness of Evidence see Section 9.¶

If any format other than EAT is used, it is up to that format to define the use of the challenge field.¶

versions

The versions parameter enumerates the TEEP protocol version(s) supported by the TAM. A value of 0 refers to the version of the TEEP protocol defined in this document. If this field is not present, it is to be treated the same as if it contained only version 0.¶

attestation-payload-format

The attestation-payload-format parameter indicates the IANA Media Type of the attestation-payload parameter, where media type parameters are permitted after the media type. For protocol version 0, the absence of this parameter indicates that the format is "application/eat+cwt; eat_profile=urn:ietf:rfc:rfcXXXX" (see [RFC9782] for further discussion). (RFC-editor: upon RFC publication, replace XXXX above with the RFC number of this document.) It MUST be present if the attestation-payload parameter is present and the format is not an EAT in CWT format with the profile defined below in Section 5.¶

attestation-payload

The attestation-payload parameter contains Evidence or an Attestation Result for the TEEP Agent to use to perform attestation of the TAM. If the attestation-payload-format parameter is absent, the attestation payload contained in this parameter MUST be an Entity Attestation Token following the encoding defined in [RFC9711]. See Section 4.3.1 for further discussion.¶

suit-reports

If present, the suit-reports parameter contains a set of TAM SUIT Reports related to “boot” time (including the start of an executable in an OS context), as defined by SUIT_Report in Section 4 of [I-D.ietf-suit-report]. SUIT Reports are encoded as CBOR byte strings. When a SUIT Report includes its own COSE protection (via signatures or MACs), the cryptographic key used MUST be distinct from the key used for the TEEP message's COSE security wrapper since otherwise its authenticity relies on the TEEP message's signature/MAC keys without adding any additional security. SUIT Reports can be useful in QueryRequest messages to pass additional information about the TAM to the TEEP Agent without depending on a Verifier including the relevant information in the TAM's Attestation Results.¶

4.3. QueryResponse Message

The QueryResponse message is the successful response by the TEEP Agent after receiving a QueryRequest message. As discussed in Section 7.2, it can also be sent unsolicited if the contents of the QueryRequest are already known and do not vary per message.¶

Like other TEEP messages, the QueryResponse message is signed, and the relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL structure is shown in Appendix C.¶

query-response = [
  type: TEEP-TYPE-query-response,
  options: {
    ? token => bstr .size (8..64),
    ? selected-version => version,
    ? attestation-payload-format => text,
    ? attestation-payload => bstr,
    ? suit-reports => [ + bstr .cbor SUIT_Report ],
    ? tc-list => [ + system-property-claims ],
    ? requested-tc-list => [ + requested-tc-info ],
    ? unneeded-manifest-list => [ + SUIT_Component_Identifier ],
    ? ext-list => [ + ext-info ],
    * $$query-response-extensions,
    * $$teep-option-extensions
  }
]

requested-tc-info = {
  component-id => SUIT_Component_Identifier,
  ? tc-manifest-sequence-number => uint,
  ? have-binary => bool
}

The QueryResponse message has the following fields:¶

type

The value of (2) corresponds to a QueryResponse message sent from the TEEP Agent to the TAM.¶

token

The value in the token parameter is used to match responses to requests. The value MUST correspond to the value received with the QueryRequest message if one was present, and MUST be absent if no token was present in the QueryRequest.¶

selected-version

The selected-version parameter indicates the TEEP protocol version selected by the TEEP Agent. The absence of this parameter indicates the same as if it was present with a value of 0.¶

attestation-payload-format

The attestation-payload-format parameter indicates the IANA Media Type of the attestation-payload parameter, where media type parameters are permitted after the media type. For protocol version 0, the absence of this parameter indicates that the format is "application/eat+cwt; eat_profile=urn:ietf:rfc:rfcXXXX" (see [RFC9782] for further discussion). (RFC-editor: upon RFC publication, replace XXXX above with the RFC number of this document.) It MUST be present if the attestation-payload parameter is present and the format is not an EAT in CWT format with the profile defined below in Section 5.¶

attestation-payload

The attestation-payload parameter contains Evidence or an Attestation Result. This parameter MUST be present if the QueryResponse is sent in response to a QueryRequest with the attestation bit set. If the attestation-payload-format parameter is absent, the attestation payload contained in this parameter MUST be an Entity Attestation Token following the encoding defined in [RFC9711]. See Section 4.3.1 for further discussion.¶

suit-reports

If present, the suit-reports parameter contains a set of "boot" (including starting an executable in an OS context) time SUIT Reports as defined by SUIT_Report in Section 4 of [I-D.ietf-suit-report], encoded using COSE as discussed in Section 8.2. If a token parameter was present in the QueryRequest message the QueryResponse message is in response to, the suit-report-nonce field MUST be present in the SUIT Report with a value matching the token parameter in the QueryRequest message. SUIT Reports can be useful in QueryResponse messages to pass information to the TAM without depending on a Verifier including the relevant information in Attestation Results.¶

tc-list

The tc-list parameter enumerates the Trusted Components installed on the device in the form of system-property-claims objects, as defined in Section 4 of [I-D.ietf-suit-report]. The system-property-claims can be used to learn device identifying information and TEE identifying information for distinguishing which Trusted Components to install in the TEE. This parameter MUST be present if the QueryResponse is sent in response to a QueryRequest with the trusted-components bit set.¶

requested-tc-list

The requested-tc-list parameter enumerates the Trusted Components that are not currently installed in the TEE, but which are requested to be installed, for example by an installer of an Untrusted Application that has a TA as a dependency, or by a Trusted Application that has another Trusted Component as a dependency. Requested Trusted Components are expressed in the form of requested-tc-info objects. A TEEP Agent can get this information from the RequestTA conceptual API defined in [RFC9397] Section 6.2.1.¶

unneeded-manifest-list

The unneeded-manifest-list parameter enumerates the SUIT manifests whose components are currently installed in the TEE, but which are no longer needed by any other application. The TAM can use this information in determining whether a SUIT manifest can be unlinked. Each unneeded SUIT manifest is identified by its SUIT Manifest Component ID (note that this is the Component ID for the manifest itself, which is different from the Component ID of a component installed by the manifest, see [I-D.ietf-suit-trust-domains] for more discussion). A TEEP Agent can get this information from the UnrequestTA conceptual API defined in [RFC9397] Section 6.2.1.¶

ext-list

The ext-list parameter lists the supported extensions. This document does not define any extensions. This parameter MUST be present if the QueryResponse is sent in response to a QueryRequest with the extensions bit set.¶

The requested-tc-info message has the following fields:¶

component-id

A SUIT Component Identifier; see [RFC9124].¶

tc-manifest-sequence-number

The minimum suit-manifest-sequence-number value from a SUIT manifest for the Trusted Component. If not present, indicates that any sequence number will do.¶

have-binary

If present with a value of true, indicates that the TEEP Agent already has the Trusted Component binary and only needs an Update message with a SUIT manifest that authorizes installing it. If have-binary is true, the tc-manifest-sequence-number field MUST be present.¶

4.4. Update Message

The Update message is used by the TAM to install and/or delete one or more Trusted Components via the TEEP Agent. It can also be used to pass a successful Attestation Report back to the TEEP Agent when the TAM is configured as an intermediary between the TEEP Agent and a Verifier, as shown in Figure 1, where the Attestation Result passed back to the Attester can be used as a so-called "passport" (see Section 5.1 of [RFC9334]) that can be presented to other Relying Parties.¶

         +---------------+
         |   Verifier    |
         +---------------+
               ^    | Attestation
      Evidence |    v   Result
         +---------------+
         |     TAM /     |
         | Relying Party |
         +---------------+
 QueryResponse ^    |    Update
   (Evidence)  |    | (Attestation
               |    v    Result)
         +---------------+             +---------------+
         |  TEEP Agent   |------------>|     Other     |
         |  / Attester   | Attestation | Relying Party |
         +---------------+    Result   +---------------+

Like other TEEP messages, the Update message is signed, and the relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL structure is shown in Appendix C.¶

update = [
  type: TEEP-TYPE-update,
  options: {
    ? token => bstr .size (8..64),
    ? unneeded-manifest-list => [ + SUIT_Component_Identifier ],
    ? manifest-list => [ + bstr .cbor SUIT_Envelope ],
    ? attestation-payload-format => text,
    ? attestation-payload => bstr,
    ? err-code => (0..23),
    ? err-msg => text .size (1..128),
    ? err-lang => text .size (1..35),
    * $$update-extensions,
    * $$teep-option-extensions
  }
]

The Update message has the following fields:¶

type

The value of (3) corresponds to an Update message sent from the TAM to the TEEP Agent. In case of successful processing, a Success message is returned by the TEEP Agent. In case of an error, an Error message is returned. Note that the Update message is used for initial Trusted Component installation as well as for updates and deletes.¶

token

The value in the token field is used to match responses to requests.¶

unneeded-manifest-list

The unneeded-manifest-list parameter enumerates the SUIT manifests to be unlinked. Each unneeded SUIT manifest is identified by its SUIT Manifest Component ID. The SUIT manifest processor MAY execute uninstall section in the manifest. See Section 7 of [I-D.ietf-suit-trust-domains] for more information about the suit-uninstall Command Sequence.¶

manifest-list

The manifest-list field is used to convey one or multiple SUIT manifests to install. A manifest is a bundle of metadata about a Trusted Component, such as where to find the code, the devices to which it applies, and cryptographic information protecting the manifest. The manifest may also convey personalization data. Trusted Component binaries and personalization data can be signed and encrypted by the same Trusted Component Signer. Other combinations are, however, possible as well. For example, it is also possible for the TAM to sign and encrypt the personalization data and to let the Trusted Component Developer sign and/or encrypt the Trusted Component binary.¶

attestation-payload-format

The attestation-payload-format parameter indicates the IANA Media Type of the attestation-payload parameter, where media type parameters are permitted after the media type. The absence of this parameter indicates that the format is "application/eat+cwt; eat_profile=urn:ietf:rfc:rfcXXXX" (see [RFC9782] for further discussion). (RFC-editor: upon RFC publication, replace XXXX above with the RFC number of this document.) It MUST be present if the attestation-payload parameter is present and the format is not an EAT in CWT format with the profile defined in Section 5.¶

attestation-payload

The attestation-payload parameter contains an Attestation Result. If the attestation-payload-format parameter is absent, the attestation payload contained in this parameter MUST be an Entity Attestation Token following the encoding defined in [RFC9711]. See Section 4.3.1 for further discussion.¶

err-code

The err-code parameter contains one of the error codes listed in the Section 4.6, which describes the reasons for the error when performing QueryResponse in the TAM.¶

err-msg

The err-msg parameter is human-readable diagnostic text that MUST be encoded using UTF-8 [RFC3629] in Net-Unicode format [RFC5198] with a maximum of 128 bytes.¶

err-lang

The err-lang parameter is an OPTIONAL RFC 5646 [RFC5646] language tag identifying the language of the err-msg text. When present, implementations MUST use the language tag to aid human operators in interpreting diagnostic text. The err-msg field SHOULD be formatted in the language indicated by this tag.¶

Note that an Update message carrying one or more SUIT manifests will inherently involve multiple signatures, one by the TAM in the TEEP message and one from a Trusted Component Signer inside each manifest. This is intentional as they are for different purposes.¶

The TAM is what authorizes apps to be installed, updated, and deleted on a given TEE and so the TEEP signature is checked by the TEEP Agent at protocol message processing time. (This same TEEP security wrapper is also used on messages like QueryRequest so that Agents only send potentially sensitive data such as Evidence to trusted TAMs.)¶

The Trusted Component signer, on the other hand, is what authorizes the Trusted Component to actually run, so the manifest signature could be checked at install time, load (or run) time, or both, and this checking is done by the TEE independent of whether TEEP is used or some other update mechanism. See Section 5 of [RFC9397] for further discussion.¶

The Update message has a SUIT_Envelope containing SUIT manifests. Following are some example scenarios using SUIT manifests in the Update Message.¶

    +------------+           +-------------+
    | TAM        |           | TEEP Agent  |
    +------------+           +-------------+

             Update  ---->

    +=================== teep-protocol(TAM) ==================+
    | TEEP_Message([                                          |
    |   TEEP-TYPE-update,                                     |
    |   options: {                                            |
    |     manifest-list: [                                    |
    |       += suit-manifest "tc-uuid" (TC Developer) ======+ |
    |       | SUIT_Envelope({                               | |
    |       |   manifest: {                                 | |
    |       |     install: {                                | |
    |       |       override-parameters: {                  | |
    |       |         uri: "https://example.org/tc-uuid.ta" | |
    |       |       },                                      | |
    |       |       fetch                                   | |
    |       |     }                                         | |
    |       |   }                                           | |
    |       | })                                            | |
    |       +===============================================+ |
    |     ]                                                   |
    |   }                                                     |
    | ])                                                      |
    +=========================================================+

    and then,

    +-------------+          +--------------+
    | TEEP Agent  |          | TC Developer |
    +-------------+          +--------------+

                     <----

      fetch "https://example.org/tc-uuid.ta"

          +======= tc-uuid.ta =======+
          | 48 65 6C 6C 6F 2C 20 ... |
          +==========================+

    +------------+           +-------------+
    | TAM        |           | TEEP Agent  |
    +------------+           +-------------+

             Update  ---->

      +=========== teep-protocol(TAM) ============+
      | TEEP_Message([                            |
      |   TEEP-TYPE-update,                       |
      |   options: {                              |
      |     manifest-list: [                      |
      |       +== suit-manifest(TC Developer) ==+ |
      |       | SUIT_Envelope({                 | |
      |       |   manifest: {                   | |
      |       |     install: {                  | |
      |       |       override-parameters: {    | |
      |       |         uri: "#tc"              | |
      |       |       },                        | |
      |       |       fetch                     | |
      |       |     }                           | |
      |       |   },                            | |
      |       |   "#tc": h'48 65 6C 6C ...'     | |
      |       | })                              | |
      |       +=================================+ |
      |     ]                                     |
      |   }                                       |
      | ])                                        |
      +===========================================+

    +------------+           +-------------+
    | TAM        |           | TEEP Agent  |
    +------------+           +-------------+

             Update  ---->

      +================== teep-protocol(TAM) ======================+
      | TEEP_Message([                                             |
      |   TEEP-TYPE-update,                                        |
      |   options: {                                               |
      |     manifest-list: [                                       |
      |       +========= suit-manifest(TC Developer) ============+ |
      |       | SUIT_Envelope({                                  | |
      |       |   manifest: {                                    | |
      |       |     common: {                                    | |
      |       |       dependencies: {                            | |
      |       |         dependency-prefix 1: {                   | |
      |       |           [tc-uuid, 'suit']                      | |
      |       |         }                                        | |
      |       |       }                                          | |
      |       |       components: [                              | |
      |       |         ['config.json']                          | |
      |       |       ]                                          | |
      |       |     },                                           | |
      |       |     dependency-resolution: {                     | |
      |       |       override-parameters: {                     | |
      |       |         uri: "https://example.org/tc-uuid"       | |
      |       |       },                                         | |
      |       |       fetch                                      | |
      |       |     },                                           | |
      |       |     install: {                                   | |
      |       |       set-component-index 0,                     | |
      |       |       override-parameters: {                     | |
      |       |         content: h'48FE0794...'                  | |
      |       |         encryption-info: << ... >>               | |
      |       |       },                                         | |
      |       |       write,                                     | |
      |       |       set-component-index 1,                     | |
      |       |       process-dependency                         | |
      |       |     }                                            | |
      |       |   }                                              | |
      |       | })                                               | |
      |       +==================================================+ |
      |     ]                                                      |
      |   }                                                        |
      | ])                                                         |
      +============================================================+

4.5. Success Message

The Success message is used by the TEEP Agent to return a success in response to an Update message.¶

Like other TEEP messages, the Success message is signed, and the relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL structure is shown in Appendix C.¶

teep-success = [
  type: TEEP-TYPE-teep-success,
  options: {
    ? token => bstr .size (8..64),
    ? msg => text .size (1..128),
    ? suit-reports => [ + bstr .cbor SUIT_Report ],
    * $$teep-success-extensions,
    * $$teep-option-extensions
  }
]

The Success message has the following fields:¶

type

The value of (5) corresponds to a Success message sent from the TEEP Agent to the TAM.¶

token

The value in the token parameter is used to match responses to requests. It MUST match the value of the token parameter in the Update message the Success is in response to, if one was present. If none was present, the token MUST be absent in the Success message.¶

msg

The msg parameter contains optional diagnostics information encoded in UTF-8 [RFC3629] using Net-Unicode form [RFC5198] with max 128 bytes returned by the TEEP Agent.¶

suit-reports

If present, the suit-reports parameter contains a set of SUIT Reports as defined in Section 4 of [I-D.ietf-suit-report], encoded as CBOR byte strings containing either protected or unprotected SUIT Report payloads. When a SUIT Report includes its own COSE protection (signatures or MACs), the cryptographic key used MUST be distinct from the key used for the TEEP message's COSE security wrapper. If a token parameter was present in the Update message the Success message is in response to, the suit-report-nonce field MUST be present in the SUIT Report with a value matching the token parameter in the Update message.¶

4.6. Error Message

The Error message is used by the TEEP Agent to return an error in response to a message from the TAM.¶

Like other TEEP messages, the Error message is signed, and the relevant CDDL snippet is shown below. The complete CDDL structure is shown in Appendix C.¶

teep-error = [
  type: TEEP-TYPE-teep-error,
  options: {
     ? token => bstr .size (8..64),
     ? err-msg => text .size (1..128),
     ? err-lang => text .size (1..35),
     ? supported-teep-cipher-suites => [ + $teep-cipher-suite ],
     ? supported-freshness-mechanisms => [ + $freshness-mechanism ],
     ? supported-suit-cose-profiles => [ + $suit-cose-profile ],
     ? challenge => bstr .size (8..512),
     ? versions => [ + version ],
     ? suit-reports => [ + bstr .cbor SUIT_Report ],
     * $$teep-error-extensions,
     * $$teep-option-extensions
  },
  err-code: (0..23)
]

; The err-code parameter, uint (0..23)
ERR_PERMANENT_ERROR = 1
ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION = 2
ERR_UNSUPPORTED_FRESHNESS_MECHANISMS = 3
ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION = 4
ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_SUITES = 5
ERR_BAD_CERTIFICATE = 6
ERR_ATTESTATION_REQUIRED = 7
ERR_UNSUPPORTED_SUIT_REPORT = 8
ERR_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED = 9
ERR_TEMPORARY_ERROR = 10
ERR_MANIFEST_PROCESSING_FAILED = 17

The Error message has the following fields:¶

type

The value of (6) corresponds to an Error message sent from the TEEP Agent to the TAM.¶

token

The value in the token parameter is used to match responses to requests. It MUST match the value of the token parameter in the message the Success is in response to, if one was present. If none was present, the token MUST be absent in the Error message.¶

err-msg

The err-msg parameter is human-readable diagnostic text that MUST be encoded using UTF-8 [RFC3629] using Net-Unicode form [RFC5198] with max 128 bytes.¶

err-lang

The err-lang parameter is an OPTIONAL RFC 5646 [RFC5646] language tag identifying the language of the err-msg text. When present, implementations SHOULD use the language tag to aid human operators in interpreting diagnostic text. The err-msg field SHOULD be formatted in the language indicated by this tag.¶

supported-teep-cipher-suites

The supported-teep-cipher-suites parameter lists the TEEP cipher suite(s) supported by the TEEP Agent. Details about the cipher suite encoding can be found in Section 8.1. This otherwise optional parameter MUST be returned if err-code is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_SUITES.¶

supported-freshness-mechanisms

The supported-freshness-mechanisms parameter lists the freshness mechanism(s) supported by the TEEP Agent. Details about the encoding can be found in Section 9. This otherwise optional parameter MUST be returned if err-code is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_FRESHNESS_MECHANISMS.¶

supported-suit-cose-profiles

The supported-suit-cose-profiles parameter lists the SUIT profiles supported by the TEEP Agent. Details about the cipher suite encoding can be found in Section 8.2. This otherwise optional parameter MUST be returned if err-code is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_SUIT_REPORT.¶

challenge

The challenge field is an optional parameter used for ensuring the freshness of attestation Evidence included with a QueryRequest message. When a challenge is provided in the Error message and Evidence in the form of an EAT is returned with a QueryRequest message then the challenge contained in the Error message MUST be used to generate the EAT, by copying the challenge value into the eat_nonce claim, as described in the EAT profile Section 5, if the nonce-based freshness mechanism is used. For more details see Section 9.¶

If any format other than EAT is used, it is up to that format to define the use of the challenge field.¶

versions

The versions parameter enumerates the TEEP protocol version(s) supported by the TEEP Agent. This otherwise optional parameter MUST be returned if err-code is ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION.¶

suit-reports

If present, the suit-reports parameter contains a set of SUIT Reports as defined in Section 4 of [I-D.ietf-suit-report], encoded as CBOR byte strings containing either protected or unprotected SUIT Report payloads. When a SUIT Report includes its own COSE protection (signatures or MACs), the cryptographic key used MUST be distinct from the key used for the TEEP message's COSE security wrapper. If a token parameter was present in the Update message the Error message is in response to, the suit-report-nonce field MUST be present in the SUIT Report with a value matching the token parameter in the Update message.¶

err-code

The err-code parameter contains one of the error codes listed below. Only selected values are applicable to each message. Note that error codes are restricted to the range (0..23) to permit encoding as single-byte CBOR unsigned integers. Error code values 0, 11-16, and 18-22 are currently unassigned and reserved for future use. Error code 0 is intentionally reserved to prevent accidental use. Extensions that define new error codes SHOULD constrain values to this range; however, implementations that receive unrecognized error code values greater than 23 SHOULD handle them gracefully, treating them as unknown errors.¶

This specification defines the following initial error messages:¶

ERR_PERMANENT_ERROR (1)

The received TEEP message contained incorrect fields or fields that are inconsistent with other fields. For diagnosis purposes it is RECOMMENDED to identify the failure reason in the error message field. A TEEP implementation receiving this error might refuse to communicate further with the problematic TEEP message sender, by silently dropping any TEEP messages received, for some period of time until it has reason to believe it is worth trying again, but it should take care not to give up on communication. In contrast, ERR_TEMPORARY_ERROR is an indication that a more aggressive retry is warranted.¶

ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION (2)

The TEEP implementation does not support an extension included in the TEEP message it received. For diagnosis purposes it is RECOMMENDED to identify the unsupported extension in the error message field. A TAM implementation receiving this error might retry sending the last message it sent to the sender of this error, without using any TEEP extensions.¶

ERR_UNSUPPORTED_FRESHNESS_MECHANISMS (3)

The TEEP Agent does not support any freshness algorithm mechanisms in the request message. A TAM receiving this error might retry the request using a different set of supported freshness mechanisms in the request message.¶

ERR_UNSUPPORTED_MSG_VERSION (4)

The TEEP implementation does not support the TEEP protocol version indicated in the received message. A TAM receiving this error might retry the request using a different TEEP protocol version.¶

ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_SUITES (5)

The TEEP Agent does not support any cipher suites indicated in the request message. A TAM receiving this error might retry the request using a different set of supported cipher suites in the request message.¶

ERR_BAD_CERTIFICATE (6)

Processing of a certificate failed. For diagnosis purposes it is RECOMMENDED to include information about the failing certificate in the error message field. For example, the certificate was of an unsupported type, or the certificate was revoked by its signer. A TEEP implementation receiving this error might attempt to use an alternate certificate.¶

ERR_ATTESTATION_REQUIRED (7)

Indicates that the TEEP implementation sending this error requires attestation of the TEEP implementation receiving this error.¶

ERR_UNSUPPORTED_SUIT_REPORT (8)

Indicates that the TEEP Agent does not support the suit-cose-profile of the SUIT Reports which was sent by the TAM. The TEEP Agent must report the error code ERR_UNSUPPORTED_SUIT_REPORT supplying the supported-suit-cose-profiles.¶

ERR_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED (9)

A certificate has expired or is not currently valid. A TEEP implementation receiving this error might attempt to renew its certificate before using it again.¶

ERR_TEMPORARY_ERROR (10)

A miscellaneous temporary error, such as a memory allocation failure, occurred while processing the TEEP message. A TEEP implementation receiving this error might retry the last message it sent to the sender of this error at some later point, which is up to the implementation.¶

ERR_MANIFEST_PROCESSING_FAILED (17)

The TEEP Agent encountered one or more manifest processing failures. If the suit-reports parameter is present, it contains the failure details. A TAM receiving this error might still attempt to install or update other components that do not depend on the failed manifest.¶

New error codes should be added sparingly, not for every implementation error. That is the intent of the err-msg field, which can be used to provide details meaningful to humans. New error codes should only be added if the TAM is expected to do something behaviorally different upon receipt of the error message, rather than just logging the event. Hence, each error code is responsible for saying what the behavioral difference is expected to be.¶

5.1. Relationship to AR4SI

[I-D.ietf-rats-ar4si] defines an EAT profile for arbitrary Relying Parties to use with Attestation Results. However the TAM as a Relying Party needs specific claims that are not required in the AR4SI profile, and so needs its own more specific profile.¶

In some deployments, a TAM can be used as an intermediary between Verifier and a TEEP Agent acting as an Attester in the Passport model or acting as a Relying Party in the Background Check Model of [RFC9334]. This is depicted in the example in Figure 1. In such a case, both profiles need to be obtained from the Verifier: one for use by the TAM itself, and the other to pass on to the TEEP Agent.¶

When the TAM and Verifier are combined into the same implementation, obtaining both profiles can be straightforward, but when they are on different machines, the situation is more complex, especially if Nonces are used to ensure freshness of Evidence. There are thus several such cases:¶

1. The protocol between the TAM and the Verifier (which is outside the scope of TEEP itself) allows requesting multiple Attestation Results from the same Evidence. In this case, the TAM can request both EAT profiles be returned.¶

2. The protocol between the TAM and the Verifier only allows requesting one Attestation Result format, but the Evidence freshness mechanism does not use Nonces. In this case, the TAM can send the same Evidence in two separate requests, each requesting a different EAT profile for the Attestation Results.¶

3. The protocol between the TAM and the Verifier only allows requesting one Attestation Result format, and the Evidence freshness mechanism uses Nonces. In this case, it is simpler to not have the TAM be an intermediary, since the Verifier will require a separate Nonce for each Attestation Result, but have the Attester or Relying Party contact the Verifier directly to get Attestation Results in the AR4SI profile.¶

7.1. TAM Behavior

When the ProcessConnect API is invoked, the TAM sends a QueryRequest message.¶

When the ProcessTeepMessage API is invoked, the TAM first does validation as specified in Section 4.1.2, and drops the message if it is not valid. It may also do additional implementation specific actions such as logging the results or attempting to update the TEEP Agent to a version that does not send invalid messages. Otherwise, it proceeds as follows.¶

If the message includes a token, it can be used to match the response to a request previously sent by the TAM. The TAM MUST expire the token value after receiving the first response from the device that has a valid signature and ignore any subsequent messages that have the same token value. The token value MUST NOT be used for other purposes, such as a TAM to identify the devices and/or a device to identify TAMs or Trusted Components.¶

A TAM implementation that sends multiple concurrent requests to a TEEP Agent needs to track outstanding requests and their associated tokens. To prevent unbounded storage of token state, a TAM MUST implement a timeout mechanism to eventually discard unanswered requests and their tokens. This timeout SHOULD be configurable, with a recommended minimum duration of several hours to account for scenarios where devices may take considerable time to process updates and resolve dependencies (as noted in Section 7.1, such processing may take hours or longer). A TAM MAY also implement a per-device maximum storage limit for outstanding requests, reusing tokens for new requests once the per-device limit is reached (after discarding the oldest outstanding request).¶

7.2. TEEP Agent Behavior

When the RequestTA API is invoked, the TEEP Agent first checks whether the requested TA is already installed. If it is already installed, the TEEP Agent passes no data back to the caller. Otherwise, if the TEEP Agent chooses to initiate the process of requesting the indicated TA, it determines (in any implementation specific way) the TAM URI based on any TAM URI provided by the RequestTA caller and any local configuration, and passes back the TAM URI to connect to. It MAY also pass back a QueryResponse message if all of the following conditions are true:¶

• The last QueryRequest message received from that TAM contained no token or challenge,¶

• The ProcessError API was not invoked for that TAM since the last QueryResponse message was received from it, and¶

• The public key or certificate of the TAM is cached and not expired.¶

When the RequestPolicyCheck API is invoked, the TEEP Agent decides whether to initiate communication with any trusted TAMs (e.g., it might choose to do so for a given TAM unless it detects that it has already communicated with that TAM recently). If so, it passes back a TAM URI to connect to. If the TEEP Agent has multiple TAMs it needs to connect with, it just passes back one, with the expectation that RequestPolicyCheck API will be invoked to retrieve each one successively until there are no more and it can pass back no data at that time. Thus, once a TAM URI is returned, the TEEP Agent can remember that it has already initiated communication with that TAM.¶

When the ProcessError API is invoked, the TEEP Agent can handle it in any implementation specific way, such as logging the error or using the information in future choices of TAM URI.¶

When the ProcessTeepMessage API is invoked, the Agent first does validation as specified in Section 4.1.2, and if it is not valid then the Agent responds with an Error message. Otherwise, processing continues as follows based on the type of message.¶

8.1. TEEP Messages

The TEEP protocol uses COSE for protection of TEEP messages in both directions. To negotiate cryptographic mechanisms and algorithms, the TEEP protocol defines the following cipher suite structure, which is used to specify an ordered set of operations (e.g., sign) done as part of composing a TEEP message. Although this specification only specifies the use of signing and relies on payload encryption to protect sensitive information, future extensions might specify support for encryption and/or MAC operations if needed.¶

; teep-cipher-suites
$teep-cipher-suite /= teep-cipher-suite-sign1-ed25519
$teep-cipher-suite /= teep-cipher-suite-sign1-esp256

;The following two cipher suites have only a single operation each.
;Other cipher suites may be defined to have multiple operations.
;It is MANDATORY for TAM to support them, and OPTIONAL
;to support any additional ones that use COSE_Sign_Tagged, or other
;signing, encryption, or MAC algorithms.

teep-operation-sign1-ed25519 = [ cose-sign1, cose-alg-ed25519 ]
teep-operation-sign1-esp256  = [ cose-sign1, cose-alg-esp256 ]

teep-cipher-suite-sign1-ed25519 = [ teep-operation-sign1-ed25519 ]
teep-cipher-suite-sign1-esp256  = [ teep-operation-sign1-esp256 ]

;MANDATORY for TAM and TEEP Agent to support the following COSE
;operations, and OPTIONAL to support additional ones such as
;COSE_Sign_Tagged, COSE_Encrypt0_Tagged, etc.

cose-sign1 = 18      ; CoAP Content-Format value

;MANDATORY for TAM to support the following, and OPTIONAL to
;implement any additional algorithms from the IANA COSE Algorithms
;registry.

cose-alg-esp256  = -9   ; ECDSA using P-256 curve and SHA-256
cose-alg-ed25519 = -19  ; EdDSA using Ed25519 curve

Each operation in a given cipher suite has two elements:¶

• a COSE-type defined in Section 2 of [RFC9052] that identifies the type of operation, and¶

• a specific cryptographic algorithm as defined in the COSE Algorithms registry [COSE.Algorithm] to be used to perform that operation.¶

A TAM MUST support both of the cipher suites defined above. A TEEP Agent MUST support at least one of the two but can choose which one. For example, a TEEP Agent might choose a given cipher suite if it has hardware support for it. A TAM or TEEP Agent MAY also support any other algorithms in the COSE Algorithms registry in addition to the mandatory ones listed above. It MAY also support use with COSE_Sign or other COSE types in additional cipher suites.¶

Any cipher suites without confidentiality protection can only be added if the associated specification includes a discussion of security considerations and applicability, since manifests may carry sensitive information. For example, Section 6 of [RFC9397] permits implementations that terminate transport security inside the TEE and if the transport security provides confidentiality then additional encryption might not be needed in the manifest for some use cases. For most use cases, however, manifest confidentiality will be needed to protect sensitive fields from the TAM as discussed in Section 9.8 of [RFC9397].¶

The cipher suites defined above do not do encryption at the TEEP layer, but permit encryption of the SUIT payload using a mechanism such as [I-D.ietf-suit-firmware-encryption]. See Section 10 and Section 8.2 for more discussion of specific payloads.¶

For the initial QueryRequest message, unless the TAM has more specific knowledge about the TEEP Agent (e.g., if the QueryRequest is sent in response to some underlying transport message that contains a hint), the message does not use COSE_Sign1 with one of the above cipher suites, but instead uses COSE_Sign with multiple signatures, one for each algorithm used in any of the cipher suites listed in the supported-teep-cipher-suites parameter of the QueryRequest, so that a TEEP Agent supporting any one of them can verify a signature. If the TAM does have specific knowledge about which cipher suite the TEEP Agent supports, it MAY instead use that cipher suite with the QueryRequest.¶

For an Error message with code ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER_SUITES, the TEEP Agent MUST protect it with any of the cipher suites mandatory for the TAM.¶

For all other TEEP messages between the TAM and TEEP Agent, the selected TEEP cipher suite MUST be used in both directions.¶

8.2. EATs and SUIT Reports

TEEP uses COSE for confidentiality of EATs and SUIT Reports sent by a TEEP Agent. The TEEP Agent obtains a signed EAT and then SHOULD encrypt it using the TAM as the recipient, unless the transport layer provides sufficient confidentiality protection or the TEEP Agent's deployment environment does not permit access to the TAM's public key. A SUIT Report is created by a SUIT processor, which is part of the TEEP Agent itself. The TEEP Agent is therefore in control of signing the SUIT Report and SHOULD encrypt it for the same reasons, to protect sensitive information from intermediate processors and transport mechanisms. Again, the TAM is the recipient of the encrypted content. For content-key distribution Ephemeral-Static Diffie-Hellman (ES-DH) is used in this specification. See Section 8.5.5 and Appendix B of [RFC9052] for more details. (If [I-D.ietf-suit-firmware-encryption] is used, it is also the same as discussed in Section 6.2 of that document.)¶

ES-DH is a scheme that provides public key encryption given a recipient's public key. Hence, the TEEP Agent needs to be in possession of the public key of the TAM. See Section 5 of [RFC9397] for more discussion of TAM keys used by the TEEP Agent. There are multiple variants of this scheme; this document uses the variant specified in Section 8.5.5 of [RFC9052].¶

The following two layer structure is used:¶

• Layer 0: Has a content encrypted with the Content Encryption Key (CEK), a symmetric key. For encrypting SUIT Reports and EATs the content MUST NOT be detached.¶

• Layer 1: Uses the AES Key Wrap algorithm to encrypt the randomly generated CEK with the Key Encryption Key (KEK) derived with ES-DH, whereby the resulting symmetric key is fed into the HKDF-based key derivation function.¶

As a result, the two layers combine ES-DH with AES-KW and HKDF.¶

This document reuses the CDDL defined in Section 6.2.3 of [I-D.ietf-suit-firmware-encryption] and the context information structure defined in Section 6.2.4 of [I-D.ietf-suit-firmware-encryption] although with an important modification. The COSE_KDF_Context.SuppPubInfo.other value MUST be set to "SUIT Report Encryption" when a SUIT Report is encrypted and MUST be set to "EAT Encryption" when an EAT is encrypted. The COSE_KDF_Context.SuppPubInfo.other field captures the protocol in which the ES-DH content key distribution algorithm is used.¶

This specification defines cipher suites for confidentiality protection of EATs and SUIT Reports. The TAM MUST support each cipher suite defined below, based on definitions in [I-D.ietf-suit-mti]. A TEEP Agent MUST support at least one of the cipher suites below but can choose which one. For example, a TEEP Agent might choose a given cipher suite if it has hardware support for it. A TAM or TEEP Agent MAY also support other algorithms in the COSE Algorithms registry. It MAY also support use with COSE_Encrypt or other COSE types in additional cipher suites.¶

; suit-cose-profile
$suit-cose-profile /= suit-sha256-esp256-ecdh-a128ctr
$suit-cose-profile /= suit-sha256-ed25519-ecdh-a128ctr
$suit-cose-profile /= suit-sha256-esp256-ecdh-a128gcm
$suit-cose-profile /= suit-sha256-ed25519-ecdh-chacha-poly

10.1. Operational Considerations

This section summarizes operational and management guidance for deployments using the TEEP protocol. It complements the general operational guidelines in the IETF operations-area document [I-D.ietf-opsawg-rfc5706bis] and refers implementers to the architecture and conceptual APIs in [RFC9397] for configuration and management points.¶

• Configuration and placement: Protocol-specific configuration is typically performed in the TAM, the TEEP Agent, and any Verifier used by the TAM. See the conceptual APIs in [RFC9397] for the configuration points exposed by implementations (e.g., which Trusted Components to manage, trust anchors, and per-device state).¶

• Token lifecycle and state management: Tokens are used to match requests and responses and to provide limited replay protection. The guidance in this document requires random initial tokens and non-reuse; implementers MUST ensure bounded storage of outstanding tokens (timeouts, per-device caps) and MUST expire tokens after the first valid response. Operational deployments SHOULD tune token timeouts to accommodate device processing time (see Section 7.1).¶

• Key and certificate lifecycle: Operators MUST run procedures for certificate and key issuance, rollover, revocation, and timely renewal. Implementations SHOULD support certificate status checks and have clear behavior when certificates are expired or revoked (see err-code behaviors such as ERR_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED and ERR_BAD_CERTIFICATE).¶

• Logging, monitoring, and diagnostics: Implementations SHOULD log operational events, but MUST avoid placing sensitive data (e.g., raw Evidence, private keys) into logs. Diagnostic fields, such as err-msg (optionally accompanied by err-lang), are intended for human operators; logs should capture structured error codes and minimal diagnostic text to aid incident response.¶

• Rate limiting and DoS protection: Implementations SHOULD apply rate limits and backoff policies to mitigate malformed or high-volume requests. Agents SHOULD limit the size and number of concurrent manifests processed and protect local resources (CPU, memory, storage) from exhausting.¶

• Time synchronization: Accurate device time is important for certificate validity checks and for some attestation freshness mechanisms. Operators SHOULD ensure devices maintain adequate time synchronization.¶

• Privacy and data minimization Attestation results, SUIT reports, and system-property-claims can contain identifying information. Do not expose such data to unauthorised parties; apply least-privilege principles when requesting or returning attestation or component lists.¶

• Upgrade and rollback procedures: Manifest processing can be disruptive. Operators SHOULD plan for safe upgrade and rollback procedures, including verification of manifests prior to execution, mechanisms for retry, and consideration of partial failure modes.¶

• Transport and deployment-specific concerns: TEEP is transport agnostic; operators MUST ensure the chosen transport provides adequate confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and replay protection. See the HTTP binding draft [I-D.ietf-teep-otrp-over-http] for transport-specific operational details when that binding is used.¶

• Scaling and batching: Large-scale deployments SHOULD consider batching updates and asynchronous workflows to avoid overwhelming devices or management servers. Unsolicited messages and polling behavior should be chosen to balance timeliness and operational load.¶

• Emergency recovery: Provide procedures for emergency recovery, including factory-reset processes, certificate revocation handling, and operational steps for devices that become non-responsive after updates.¶

Where operational considerations are covered by other documents (for example, the TEEP architecture [RFC9397]), implementers SHOULD follow the guidance in those documents as applicable.¶

13.1. Media Type Registration

IANA is requested to assign a media type for application/teep+cbor.¶

Type name:

application¶

Subtype name:

teep+cbor¶

Required parameters:

none¶

Optional parameters:

none¶

Encoding considerations:

Same as encoding considerations of application/cbor.¶

Security considerations:

See Security Considerations Section of this document.¶

Interoperability considerations:

Same as interoperability considerations of application/cbor as specified in [RFC8949].¶

Published specification:

This document.¶

Applications that use this media type:

TEEP protocol implementations¶

Fragment identifier considerations:

N/A¶

Additional information:

• Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A¶

• Magic number(s): N/A¶

• File extension(s): N/A¶

• Macintosh file type code(s): N/A¶

Person to contact for further information:

teep@ietf.org¶

Intended usage:

COMMON¶

Restrictions on usage:

none¶

Author:

See the "Authors' Addresses" section of this document¶

Change controller:

IETF¶

13.2. TEEP Message Type Registry

IANA is requested to create a new registry titled "TEEP Message Types" within the TEEP registry. The registry has the following format:¶

Registration procedures are as follows:¶

• 0-12: Standards Action¶

• 13-23: Specification Required¶

13.3. data-item-requested Bitmap Registry

IANA is requested to create a registry titled "TEEP data-item-requested Bits" within the TEEP registry. The registry has the following format:¶

Registration procedures are as follows:¶

• 0-23: Standards Action¶

• 24-31: Specification Required¶

13.4. TEEP Error Code Registry

IANA is requested to create a registry titled "TEEP Error Codes" within the TEEP registry. The registry has the following format:¶

Note: Error codes are constrained to the range 0-23 to permit encoding as single-byte CBOR unsigned integers.¶

Registration procedures are as follows:¶

• 1-10, 17: Standards Action¶

• 11-16, 18-23: Reserved for future use by Specification Required¶

13.5. TEEP CBOR Label Registry

IANA is requested to create a registry titled "TEEP CBOR Labels" within the TEEP registry. The registry has the following format:¶

Note: Labels are not constrained to a specific range.¶

Registration procedures are as follows:¶

• 0-255:: Standards Action¶

• 256 and above: Specification Required¶

13.6. TEEP Cipher Suite Registry

IANA is requested to create a registry titled "TEEP Cipher Suites" within the TEEP registry. The registry has the following format:¶

Registration procedures are as follows:¶

• 0-23: Standards Action¶

• 24-255: Specification Required¶

Any new cipher suites MUST provide authentication, integrity, and SHOULD provide confidentiality protection.¶

13.7. TEEP Freshness Mechanism Registry

IANA is requested to create a registry titled "TEEP Freshness Mechanisms" within the TEEP registry. The registry has the following format:¶

Registration procedures are as follows:¶

• 0-23: Standards Action¶

• 24-255: Specification Required¶

14.1. Normative References

[COSE.Algorithm]

IANA, "COSE Algorithms", n.d., <https://www.iana.org/assignments/cose/cose.xhtml#algorithms>.

[I-D.ietf-suit-manifest]

Moran, B., Tschofenig, H., Birkholz, H., Zandberg, K., and O. Rønningstad, "A Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)-based Serialization Format for the Software Updates for Internet of Things (SUIT) Manifest", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-suit-manifest-34, 28 May 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-suit-manifest-34>.

[I-D.ietf-suit-mti]

Moran, B., Rønningstad, O., and A. Tsukamoto, "Cryptographic Algorithms for Internet of Things (IoT) Devices", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-suit-mti-23, 22 July 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-suit-mti-23>.

[I-D.ietf-suit-report]

Moran, B. and H. Birkholz, "Secure Reporting of SUIT Update Status", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-suit-report-18, 9 December 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-suit-report-18>.

[I-D.ietf-suit-trust-domains]

Moran, B. and K. Takayama, "Software Update for the Internet of Things (SUIT) Manifest Extensions for Multiple Trust Domain", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-suit-trust-domains-12, 22 July 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-suit-trust-domains-12>.

[RFC2119]

Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

[RFC3629]

Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3629>.

[RFC5198]

Klensin, J. and M. Padlipsky, "Unicode Format for Network Interchange", RFC 5198, DOI 10.17487/RFC5198, March 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5198>.

[RFC5646]

Phillips, A., Ed. and M. Davis, Ed., "Tags for Identifying Languages", BCP 47, RFC 5646, DOI 10.17487/RFC5646, September 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5646>.

[RFC8174]

Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

[RFC8747]

Jones, M., Seitz, L., Selander, G., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs)", RFC 8747, DOI 10.17487/RFC8747, March 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8747>.

[RFC8949]

Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949, DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8949>.

[RFC9052]

Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process", STD 96, RFC 9052, DOI 10.17487/RFC9052, August 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9052>.

[RFC9679]

Isobe, K., Tschofenig, H., and O. Steele, "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) Key Thumbprint", RFC 9679, DOI 10.17487/RFC9679, December 2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9679>.

[RFC9711]

Lundblade, L., Mandyam, G., O'Donoghue, J., and C. Wallace, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", RFC 9711, DOI 10.17487/RFC9711, April 2025, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9711>.

14.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-opsawg-rfc5706bis]

Claise, B., Clarke, J., Farrel, A., Barguil, S., Pignataro, C., and R. Chen, "Guidelines for Considering Operations and Management in IETF Specifications", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-opsawg-rfc5706bis-01, 17 December 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-opsawg-rfc5706bis-01>.

[I-D.ietf-rats-ar4si]

Voit, E., Birkholz, H., Hardjono, T., Fossati, T., and V. Scarlata, "Attestation Results for Secure Interactions", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-ar4si-09, 15 August 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-ar4si-09>.

[I-D.ietf-rats-concise-ta-stores]

Wallace, C., Housley, R., Fossati, T., and Y. Deshpande, "Concise TA Stores (CoTS)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-concise-ta-stores-02, 5 December 2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-concise-ta-stores-02>.

[I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models]

Birkholz, H., Eckel, M., Pan, W., and E. Voit, "Reference Interaction Models for Remote Attestation Procedures", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models-15, 5 November 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models-15>.

[I-D.ietf-suit-firmware-encryption]

Tschofenig, H., Housley, R., Moran, B., Brown, D., and K. Takayama, "Encrypted Payloads in SUIT Manifests", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-suit-firmware-encryption-26, 8 December 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-suit-firmware-encryption-26>.

[I-D.ietf-teep-otrp-over-http]

Thaler, D., "HTTP Transport for Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning: Agent Initiated Communication", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-teep-otrp-over-http-15, 27 March 2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-teep-otrp-over-http-15>.

[RFC5934]

Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor Management Protocol (TAMP)", RFC 5934, DOI 10.17487/RFC5934, August 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5934>.

[RFC8610]

Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610, June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8610>.

[RFC8915]

Franke, D., Sibold, D., Teichel, K., Dansarie, M., and R. Sundblad, "Network Time Security for the Network Time Protocol", RFC 8915, DOI 10.17487/RFC8915, September 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8915>.

[RFC9124]

Moran, B., Tschofenig, H., and H. Birkholz, "A Manifest Information Model for Firmware Updates in Internet of Things (IoT) Devices", RFC 9124, DOI 10.17487/RFC9124, January 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9124>.

[RFC9334]

Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and W. Pan, "Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Architecture", RFC 9334, DOI 10.17487/RFC9334, January 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9334>.

[RFC9397]

Pei, M., Tschofenig, H., Thaler, D., and D. Wheeler, "Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP) Architecture", RFC 9397, DOI 10.17487/RFC9397, July 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9397>.

[RFC9782]

Lundblade, L., Birkholz, H., and T. Fossati, "Entity Attestation Token (EAT) Media Types", RFC 9782, DOI 10.17487/RFC9782, May 2025, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9782>.

D.1. QueryRequest Message

/ query-request = /
[
  / type: / 1 / TEEP-TYPE-query-request /,
  / options: /
  {
    / token / 20 : h'A0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAF',
    / versions / 3 : [ 0 ]  / 0 is current TEEP Protocol /
  },
  / supported-teep-cipher-suites: / [
    [ [ 18, -9 ] ] / Sign1 using ESP256 /,
    [ [ 18, -19 ] ] / Sign1 using Ed25519 /
  ],
  / supported-suit-cose-profiles: / [
    [-16, -9, -29, -65534] / suit-sha256-esp256-ecdh-a128ctr /,
    [-16, -19, -29, -65534] / suit-sha256-ed25519-ecdh-a128ctr /,
    [-16, -9, -29, 1]      / suit-sha256-esp256-ecdh-a128gcm /,
    [-16, -19, -29, 24]     / suit-sha256-ed25519-ecdh-chacha-poly /
  ],
  / data-item-requested: / 3 / attestation | trusted-components /
]

=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

85                  # array(5)
   01               # unsigned(1) / TEEP-TYPE-query-request /
   A2               # map(2)
      14            # unsigned(20) / token: /
      50            # bytes(16)
         A0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAF
      03            # unsigned(3) / versions: /
      81            # array(1) / [ 0 ] /
         00         # unsigned(0)
   82               # array(2) / supported-teep-cipher-suites /
      81            # array(1)
         82         # array(2)
            12      # unsigned(18) / cose-sign1 /
            28      # negative(8) / -9 = cose-alg-esp256 /
      81            # array(1)
         82         # array(2)
            12      # unsigned(18) / cose-sign1 /
            32      # negative(18) / -19 = cose-alg-ed25519 /
   84               # array(4) / supported-suit-cose-profiles /
      84            # array(4) / suit-sha256-esp256-ecdh-a128ctr /,
         2f         # negative(15) / -16 = SHA-256 /
         28         # negative(8) / -9 = ESP256 /
         38 1C      # negative(28) / -29 = ECDH-ES + A128KW /
         39 fffd    # negative(65533) / -65534 = A128CTR /
      84            # array(4) / suit-sha256-ed25519-ecdh-a128ctr /
         2f         # negative(15) / -16 = SHA-256 /
         32         # negative(18) / -19 = Ed25519 /
         38 1C      # negative(28) / -29 = ECDH-ES + A128KW /
         39 fffd    # negative(65533) / -65534 = A128CTR /
      84            # array(4) / suit-sha256-esp256-ecdh-a128gcm /
         2f         # negative(15) / -16 = SHA-256 /
         28         # negative(6) / -9 = ESP256 /
         38 1C      # negative(28) / -29 = ECDH-ES + A128KW /
         01         # unsigned(1) / A128GCM /
      84            # array(4) / suit-sha256-ed25519-ecdh-chacha-\
                                                               poly /
         2f         # negative(15) / -16 = SHA-256 /
         32         # negative(18) / Ed25519 /
         38 1C      # negative(28) / -29 = ECDH-ES + A128KW /
         18 18      # unsigned(24) / 24 = ChaCha20/Poly1305 /
   03               # unsigned(3) / attestation | trusted-\
                                                         components /

D.2. Entity Attestation Token

This is shown below in CBOR diagnostic form. Only the payload signed by COSE is shown.¶

/ eat-claim-set = /
{
    / cnf /          8: {
                         / kid /
                         3 : h'ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223'
                             h'b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad'
                        },
    / eat_nonce /   10: h'948f8860d13a463e8e',
    / ueid /       256: h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea',
    / oemid /      258: h'894823', / IEEE OUI format OEM ID /
    / hwmodel /    259: h'549dcecc8b987c737b44e40f7c635ce8'
                          / Hash of chip model name /,
    / hwversion /  260: ["1.3.4", 1], / Multipart numeric  /
    / manifests /  273: [
                          [ 60,
                             / application/cbor, TO BE REPLACED /
                             / with the format value for a /
                            / SUIT_Reference once one is allocated /
                            {
                              / SUIT_Reference /
                              / suit-report-manifest-uri /
                              1: "https://example.com/manifest.cbor",
                              / suit-report-manifest-digest /
                              0:[
                                / algorithm-id /
                                -16 / "sha256" /,
                                / digest-bytes /
                                h'a7fd6593eac32eb4be578278e6540c5c'
                                h'09cfd7d4d234973054833b2b93030609'
                                ]
                            }
                          ]
                        ]
}

D.3. QueryResponse Message

=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

/ query-response = /
[
  / type: / 2 / TEEP-TYPE-query-response /,
  / options: /
  {
    / token / 20 : h'A0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAF',
    / selected-version / 6 : 0,
    / attestation-payload / 7 : h'' / empty only for example \
                                                           purpose /,
    / tc-list / 8 : [
      {
        / system-component-id / 0 : [ h'\
                                   0102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F' ],
        / suit-parameter-image-digest / 3: << [
          / suit-digest-algorithm-id / -16 / SHA256 /,
          / suit-digest-bytes / h'\
    A7FD6593EAC32EB4BE578278E6540C5C09CFD7D4D234973054833B2B93030609'
            / SHA256 digest of tc binary /
        ] >>
      }
    ]
  }
]

=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

82                  # array(2)
   02               # unsigned(2) / TEEP-TYPE-query-response /
   A4               # map(4)
      14            # unsigned(20) / token: /
      50            # bytes(16)
         A0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAF
      06            # unsigned(6) / selected-version: /
      00            # unsigned(0)
      07            # unsigned(7) / attestation-payload: /
      40            # bytes(0)
                    # ""
      08            # unsigned(8) / tc-list: /
      81            # array(1)
         A2         # map(2)
            00      # unsigned(0) / system-component-id: /
            81      # array(1)
               4F   # bytes(15)
                  0102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
            03      # unsigned(3) / suit-parameter-image-digest: /
            58 24   # bytes(36)
               \
822F5820A7FD6593EAC32EB4BE578278E6540C5C09CFD7D4D234973054833B2B9303\
                                                                 0609

D.4. Update Message

=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

/ update = /
[
  / type: / 3 / TEEP-TYPE-update /,
  / options: /
  {
    / token / 20 : h'A0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAF',
    / manifest-list / 10 : [
      <<
        / SUIT_Envelope / {
          / suit-authentication-wrapper / 2: << [
            << [
              / suit-digest-algorithm-id: / -16 / suit-cose-alg-\
                                                            sha256 /,
              / suit-digest-bytes: / h'\
    DB601ADE73092B58532CA03FBB663DE49532435336F1558B49BB622726A2FEDD'
            ] >>,
            << / COSE_Sign1_Tagged / 18( [
              / protected: / << {
                / algorithm-id / 1: -7 / ES256 /
              } >>,
              / unprotected: / {},
              / payload: / null,
              / signature: / h'\
5B2D535A2B6D5E3C585C1074F414DA9E10BD285C99A33916DADE3ED38812504817AC\
        48B62B8E984EC622785BD1C411888BE531B1B594507816B201F6F28579A4'
            ] ) >>
          ] >>,
          / suit-manifest / 3: << {
            / suit-manifest-version / 1: 1,
            / suit-manifest-sequence-number / 2: 3,
            / suit-common / 3: << {
              / suit-components / 2: [
                [
                  h'544545502D446576696365',           / "TEEP-\
                                                            Device" /
                  h'5365637572654653',                 / "SecureFS" /
                  h'8D82573A926D4754935332DC29997F74', / tc-uuid /
                  h'7461'                              / "ta" /
                ]
              ],
              / suit-common-sequence / 4: << [
                / suit-directive-override-parameters / 20, {
                  / suit-parameter-vendor-identifier / 1: h'\
                                   C0DDD5F15243566087DB4F5B0AA26C2F',
                  / suit-parameter-class-identifier / 2: h'\
                                   DB42F7093D8C55BAA8C5265FC5820F4E',
                  / suit-parameter-image-digest / 3: << [
                    / suit-digest-algorithm-id: / -16 / suit-cose-\
                                                        alg-sha256 /,
                    / suit-digest-bytes: / h'\
    8CF71AC86AF31BE184EC7A05A411A8C3A14FD9B77A30D046397481469468ECE8'
                  ] >>,
                  / suit-parameter-image-size / 14: 20
                },
                / suit-condition-vendor-identifier / 1, 15,
                / suit-condition-class-identifier / 2, 15
              ] >>
            } >>,
            / suit-install / 9: << [
              / suit-directive-override-parameters / 20, {
                / suit-parameter-uri / 21: "https://example.org/\
                             8d82573a-926d-4754-9353-32dc29997f74.ta"
              },
              / suit-directive-fetch / 21, 15,
              / suit-condition-image-match / 3, 15
            ] >>
          } >>
        }
      >>
    ] / array of bstr wrapped SUIT_Envelope /
  }
]

=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

82                  # array(2)
   03               # unsigned(3) / TEEP-TYPE-update /
   A2               # map(2)
      14            # unsigned(20) / token: /
      50            # bytes(16)
         A0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAF
      0A            # unsigned(10) / manifest-list: /
      81            # array(1)
         59 014E    # bytes(336)
            A2025873825824822F5820DB601ADE73092B58532CA03FBB663DE495
            \
         32435336F1558B49BB622726A2FEDD584AD28443A10126A0F658405B2D53
            \
         5A2B6D5E3C585C1074F414DA9E10BD285C99A33916DADE3ED38812504817
            \
         AC48B62B8E984EC622785BD1C411888BE531B1B594507816B201F6F28579
            \
         A40358D4A401010203035884A20281844B544545502D4465766963654853
            \
         65637572654653508D82573A926D4754935332DC29997F74427461045854
            \
         8614A40150C0DDD5F15243566087DB4F5B0AA26C2F0250DB42F7093D8C55
            \
         BAA8C5265FC5820F4E035824822F58208CF71AC86AF31BE184EC7A05A411
            \
         A8C3A14FD9B77A30D046397481469468ECE80E14010F020F0958458614A1
            \
         15783B68747470733A2F2F6578616D706C652E6F72672F38643832353733
            \
         612D393236642D343735342D393335332D3332646332393939376637342E
            7461150F030F

D.5. Success Message

/ teep-success = /
[
  / type: / 5 / TEEP-TYPE-teep-success /,
  / options: /
  {
    / token / 20 : h'A0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAF'
  }
]

82                  # array(2)
   05               # unsigned(5) / TEEP-TYPE-teep-success /
   A1               # map(1)
      14            # unsigned(20) / token: /
      50            # bytes(16)
         A0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAF

D.6. Error Message

/ teep-error = /
[
  / type: / 6 / TEEP-TYPE-teep-error /,
  / options: /
  {
    / token / 20 : h'A0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAF',
    / err-msg / 12 : "disk-full"
  },
  / err-code: / 17 / ERR_MANIFEST_PROCESSING_FAILED /
]

83                  # array(3)
   06               # unsigned(6) / TEEP-TYPE-teep-error /
   A2               # map(2)
      14            # unsigned(20) / token: /
      50            # bytes(16)
         A0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAF
      0C            # unsigned(12) / err-msg: /
      69            # text(9)
         6469736B2D66756C6C # "disk-full"
   11               # unsigned(17) / ERR_MANIFEST_PROCESSING_FAILED /

Example 1: SUIT Manifest pointing to URI of the Trusted Component Binary

=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

/ SUIT_Envelope / {
  / authentication-wrapper / 2: << [
    << [
      / digest-algorithm-id: / -16 / SHA256 /,
      / digest-bytes: / h'\
    B39B52B0B747EA79588C190F567BFC2C8437BA8A73F7EA983182E79F0148D59B'
    ] >>,
    << / COSE_Sign1_Tagged / 18([
      / protected: / << {
        / algorithm-id / 1: -9 / ESP256 /
      } >>,
      / unprotected: / {},
      / payload: / null,
      / signature: / h'\
B35BF8C5276ACF6131F4661E76A7F19945FF928A4B7D79572583E857C695DFD48725\
        C1B8253EF6E805A9EEE9262CAAB61A09DF69CCBD996F2431BC2515EB59FF'
    ]) >>
  ] >>,
  / manifest / 3: << {
    / manifest-version / 1: 1,
    / manifest-sequence-number / 2: 3,
    / common / 3: << {
      / components / 2: [
        [
           'TEEP-Device',
           'SecureFS',
          h'8D82573A926D4754935332DC29997F74', / tc-uuid /
           'ta'
        ]
      ],
      / shared-sequence / 4: << [
        / directive-override-parameters / 20, {
          / parameter-vendor-identifier / 1: h'\
                                   C0DDD5F15243566087DB4F5B0AA26C2F',
          / parameter-class-identifier / 2: h'\
                                   DB42F7093D8C55BAA8C5265FC5820F4E',
          / parameter-image-digest / 3: << [
            / digest-algorithm-id: / -16 / SHA256 /,
            / digest-bytes: / h'\
    8CF71AC86AF31BE184EC7A05A411A8C3A14FD9B77A30D046397481469468ECE8'
          ] >>,
          / parameter-image-size / 14: 20
        },
        / condition-vendor-identifier / 1, 15,
        / condition-class-identifier / 2, 15
      ] >>
    } >>,
    / manifest-component-id / 5: [
       'TEEP-Device',
       'SecureFS',
      h'8D82573A926D4754935332DC29997F74',  / tc-uuid /
       'suit'
    ],
    / install / 20: << [
      / directive-override-parameters / 20, {
        / parameter-uri / 21: "https://example.org/8d82573a-926d-\
                                           4754-9353-32dc29997f74.ta"
      },
      / directive-fetch / 21, 15,
      / condition-image-match / 3, 15
    ] >>,
    / uninstall / 24: << [
      / directive-unlink / 33, 15
    ] >>
  } >>
}

A2025873825824822F5820B39B52B0B747EA79588C190F567BFC2C8437BA
8A73F7EA983182E79F0148D59B584AD28443A10128A0F65840B35BF8C527
6ACF6131F4661E76A7F19945FF928A4B7D79572583E857C695DFD48725C1
B8253EF6E805A9EEE9262CAAB61A09DF69CCBD996F2431BC2515EB59FF03
590108A601010203035884A20281844B544545502D446576696365485365
637572654653508D82573A926D4754935332DC29997F7442746104585486
14A40150C0DDD5F15243566087DB4F5B0AA26C2F0250DB42F7093D8C55BA
A8C5265FC5820F4E035824822F58208CF71AC86AF31BE184EC7A05A411A8
C3A14FD9B77A30D046397481469468ECE80E14010F020F05844B54454550
2D446576696365485365637572654653508D82573A926D4754935332DC29
997F7444737569741458458614A115783B68747470733A2F2F6578616D70
6C652E6F72672F38643832353733612D393236642D343735342D39333533
2D3332646332393939376637342E7461150F030F1818448218210F

Example 2: SUIT Manifest including the Trusted Component Binary

=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

/ SUIT_Envelope / {
  / authentication-wrapper / 2: << [
    << [
      / digest-algorithm-id: / -16 / SHA256 /,
      / digest-bytes: / h'\
    CEDB0457952F7DD0A33FA4692F73BC833A6A6E2300B16F6605993F0192E3F219'
    ] >>,
    << / COSE_Sign1_Tagged / 18([
      / protected: / << {
        / algorithm-id / 1: -9 / ESP256 /
      } >>,
      / unprotected: / {},
      / payload: / null,
      / signature: / h'\
6A9F4D3DE3B8BC49A47F12E13A3EF76C5E2B4BB1D8EE6EFFA659220A6D8D164B3926\
        A722220283A9C7B48DA012A188F0C6F98F3962613E63CD4C597D4C01F56C'
    ]) >>
  ] >>,
  / manifest / 3: << {
    / manifest-version / 1: 1,
    / manifest-sequence-number / 2: 3,
    / common / 3: << {
      / components / 2: [
        [
           'TEEP-Device',
           'SecureFS',
          h'8D82573A926D4754935332DC29997F74', / tc-uuid /
           'ta'
        ]
      ],
      / shared-sequence / 4: << [
        / directive-override-parameters / 20, {
          / parameter-vendor-identifier / 1: h'\
                                   C0DDD5F15243566087DB4F5B0AA26C2F',
          / parameter-class-identifier / 2: h'\
                                   DB42F7093D8C55BAA8C5265FC5820F4E',
          / parameter-image-digest / 3: << [
            / digest-algorithm-id: / -16 / SHA256 /,
            / digest-bytes: / h'\
    8CF71AC86AF31BE184EC7A05A411A8C3A14FD9B77A30D046397481469468ECE8'
          ] >>,
          / parameter-image-size / 14: 20
        },
        / condition-vendor-identifier / 1, 15,
        / condition-class-identifier / 2, 15
      ] >>
    } >>,
    / manifest-component-id / 5: [
       'TEEP-Device',
       'SecureFS',
      h'8D82573A926D4754935332DC29997F74',  / tc-uuid /
       'suit'
    ],
    / install / 20: << [
      / directive-override-parameters / 20, {
        / uri / 21: "#tc"
      },
      / directive-fetch / 21, 15,
      / condition-image-match / 3, 15
    ] >>,
    / uninstall / 24: << [
      / directive-unlink / 33, 15
    ] >>
  } >>,
  "#tc" : 'Hello, Secure World!'
}
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Example 3: Supplying Personalization Data for Trusted Component Binary

This example uses the following parameters:¶

• SUIT Profile: suit-sha256-esp256-ecdh-a128ctr (see [I-D.ietf-suit-mti] Section 3.2)¶

  • Algorithm for payload encryption: A128CTR (-65534)¶

  • Algorithm for key wrap: ECDH-ES + A128KW (-29)¶

• KEK (Receiver's Private Key):¶

  • kty: EC2¶

  • crv: P-256¶

  • x: h'5886CD61DD875862E5AAA820E7A15274 C968A9BC96048DDCACE32F50C3651BA3'¶

  • y: h'9EED8125E932CD60C0EAD3650D0A485C F726D378D1B016ED4298B2961E258F1B'¶

  • d: h'60FE6DD6D85D5740A5349B6F91267EEA C5BA81B8CB53EE249E4B4EB102C476B3'¶

• COSE_KDF_Context¶

  • AlgorithmID: -3 (A128KW)¶

  • SuppPubInfo¶

    • keyDataLength: 128¶

    • protected: << {/ alg / 1: -29 / ECDH-ES+A128KW / } >>¶

    • other: 'SUIT Payload Encryption'¶

=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

/ SUIT_Envelope / {
  / authentication-wrapper / 2: << [
    << [
      / digest-algorithm-id: / -16 / SHA256 /,
      / digest-bytes: / h'\
    506D4796D65AE599EE0A3F7D123ED6819E0FA1A324A5DE547F6D7F50D465508A'
    ] >>,
    << / COSE_Sign1_Tagged / 18([
      / protected: / << {
        / algorithm-id / 1: -9 / ESP256 /
      } >>,
      / unprotected: / {},
      / payload: / null,
      / signature: / h'\
9AF4896B66B0642122C5317D1D8A81BB4CE3C0B022A7A53879224BA14AE954DE456D\
        01069DEF0B5CE2E6B0325ACF21B5059320ABBA8480602C8A6FD7BF7894FF'
    ]) >>
  ] >>,
  / manifest / 3: << {
    / manifest-version / 1: 1,
    / manifest-sequence-number / 2: 3,
    / common / 3: << {
      / dependencies / 1: {
        / component-index / 1: {
          / dependency-prefix / 1: [
             'TEEP-Device',
             'SecureFS',
            h'8D82573A926D4754935332DC29997F74', / tc-uuid /
             'suit'
          ]
        }
      },
      / components / 2: [
        [
          'TEEP-Device',
          'SecureFS',
          'config.json'
        ]
      ],
      / shared-sequence / 4: << [
        / directive-set-component-index / 12, 0,
        / directive-override-parameters / 20, {
          / parameter-vendor-identifier / 1: h'\
                                   C0DDD5F15243566087DB4F5B0AA26C2F',
          / parameter-class-identifier / 2: h'\
                                    DB42F7093D8C55BAA8C5265FC5820F4E'
        },
        / condition-vendor-identifier / 1, 15,
        / condition-class-identifier / 2, 15
      ] >>
    } >>,
    / manifest-component-id / 5: [
      'TEEP-Device',
      'SecureFS',
      'config.suit'
    ],
    / validate / 7: << [
      / directive-set-component-index / 12, 0,
      / directive-override-parameters / 20, {
        / NOTE: image-digest and image-size of plaintext config.\
                                                               json /
        / parameter-image-digest / 3: << [
          / digest-algorithm-id: / -16 / SHA256 /,
          / digest-bytes: / h'\
    8273468FB64BD84BB04825F8371744D952B751C73A60F455AF681E167726F116'
        ] >>,
        / image-size / 14: 61
      },
      / condition-image-match / 3, 15
    ] >>,
    / dependency-resolution / 15: << [
      / directive-set-component-index / 12, 1,
      / directive-override-parameters / 20, {
        / parameter-image-digest / 3: << [
          / algorithm-id / -16 / SHA256 /,
          / digest-bytes / h'\
    B39B52B0B747EA79588C190F567BFC2C8437BA8A73F7EA983182E79F0148D59B'
        ] >>,
        / parameter-image-size / 14: 389,
        / parameter-uri / 21: "https://example.org/8d82573a-926d-\
                                         4754-9353-32dc29997f74.suit"
      },
      / directive-fetch / 21, 2
    ] >>,
    / install / 20: << [
      / directive-set-component-index / 12, 1,
      / directive-process-dependency / 11, 0,

      / NOTE: fetch encrypted firmware /
      / directive-set-component-index / 12, 0,
      / directive-override-parameters / 20, {
        / NOTE: encrypted payload and encryption-info /
        / parameter-content / 18: h'\
6D5BE4F569E98AE01F38B071EF025437B742FF28854AB32C868BC6A76CD33B5CA112\
             FF22BA95EA4672B7199C89A7829183794A21A6BE345C4371DCB0DC',
        / parameter-encryption-info / 19: << 96([
          / protected: / h'',
          / unprotected: / {
            / alg / 1: -65534 / A128CTR /,
            / IV / 5: h'67E3BA7CD42D02BBC39C508B5EA0F1C4'
          },
          / payload: / null / detached ciphertext /,
          / recipients: / [
            [
              / protected: / << {
                / alg / 1: -29 / ECDH-ES + A128KW /
              } >>,
              / unprotected: / {
                / ephemeral key / -1: {
                  / kty / 1: 2 / EC2 /,
                  / crv / -1: 1 / P-256 /,
                  / x / -2: h'\
   F2452399667F57993B14C5F1107F667884854C190894FC08531C1E2290A7BA19',
                  / y / -3: h'\
    275EDDE29FD75C9393AFFA706F8FAD3C49D03D67D47F8B0C027BE5F0BCA884CB'
                }
              },
              / payload: / h'\
                    7D806DA1ACEC6F704D803F0CFE7420525C81E1957699FCCE'
            ]
          ]
        ]) >>
      },

      / decrypt encrypted firmware /
      / directive-write / 18, 15 / consumes the \
                                         SUIT_Encryption_Info above /
      / NOTE: decrypted payload would be ``{"name":"FOO Bar","secret\
                             ":"0123456789abfcdef0123456789abcd"}'' /
    ] >>,
    / uninstall / 24: << [
      / directive-set-component-index / 12, 1,
      / directive-process-dependency / 11, 0,
      / directive-set-component-index / 12, 0,
      / directive-unlink / 33, 15
    ] >>
  } >>
}

A2025873825824822F5820506D4796D65AE599EE0A3F7D123ED6819E0FA1
A324A5DE547F6D7F50D465508A584AD28443A10128A0F658409AF4896B66
B0642122C5317D1D8A81BB4CE3C0B022A7A53879224BA14AE954DE456D01
069DEF0B5CE2E6B0325ACF21B5059320ABBA8480602C8A6FD7BF7894FF03
590242A801010203035886A301A101A101844B544545502D446576696365
485365637572654653508D82573A926D4754935332DC29997F7444737569
740281834B544545502D4465766963654853656375726546534B636F6E66
69672E6A736F6E04582D880C0014A20150C0DDD5F15243566087DB4F5B0A
A26C2F0250DB42F7093D8C55BAA8C5265FC5820F4E010F020F05834B5445
45502D4465766963654853656375726546534B636F6E6669672E73756974
075831860C0014A2035824822F58208273468FB64BD84BB04825F8371744
D952B751C73A60F455AF681E167726F1160E183D030F0F5872860C0114A3
035824822F5820B39B52B0B747EA79588C190F567BFC2C8437BA8A73F7EA
983182E79F0148D59B0E19018515783D68747470733A2F2F6578616D706C
652E6F72672F38643832353733612D393236642D343735342D393335332D
3332646332393939376637342E7375697415021458D88A0C010B000C0014
A212583D6D5BE4F569E98AE01F38B071EF025437B742FF28854AB32C868B
C6A76CD33B5CA112FF22BA95EA4672B7199C89A7829183794A21A6BE345C
4371DCB0DC13588AD8608440A20139FFFD055067E3BA7CD42D02BBC39C50
8B5EA0F1C4F6818344A101381CA120A401022001215820F2452399667F57
993B14C5F1107F667884854C190894FC08531C1E2290A7BA19225820275E
DDE29FD75C9393AFFA706F8FAD3C49D03D67D47F8B0C027BE5F0BCA884CB
58187D806DA1ACEC6F704D803F0CFE7420525C81E1957699FCCE120F1818
4A880C010B000C0018210F

F.1. Example 1: Success

SUIT Reports have no records if no conditions have failed. The URI in this example is the reference URI provided in the SUIT manifest.¶

{
  / suit-report-manifest-digest / 1:<<[
    / algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /,
    / digest-bytes / h'a7fd6593eac32eb4be578278e6540c5c'
                     h'09cfd7d4d234973054833b2b93030609'
  ]>>,
  / suit-report-manifest-uri / 2: "tam.teep.example/personalisation",
  / suit-report-records / 4: []
}

F.2. Example 2: Failure

{
  / suit-report-manifest-digest / 1:<<[
    / algorithm-id / -16 / "sha256" /,
    / digest-bytes / h'a7fd6593eac32eb4be578278e6540c5c09cfd7d4d23497
3054833b2b93030609'
  ]>>,
  / suit-report-manifest-uri / 2: "tam.teep.example/personalisation",
  / suit-report-records / 4: [
    {
      / suit-record-manifest-id / 1:[],
      / suit-record-manifest-section / 2: 7 / dependency-resolution /,
      / suit-record-section-offset / 3: 66,
      / suit-record-dependency-index / 5: 0,
      / suit-record-failure-reason / 6: 404
    }
  ]
}

where the dependency-resolution refers to:¶

{
  authentication-wrapper,
  / manifest / 3:<<{
    / manifest-version / 1:1,
    / manifest-sequence-number / 2:3,
    common,
    dependency-resolution,
    install,
    validate,
    run,
    text
  }>>,
}

and the suit-record-section-offset refers to:¶

<<[
  / directive-set-dependency-index / 13,0,
  / directive-set-parameters / 19,{
    / uri / 21:'tam.teep.example/'
               'edd94cd8-9d9c-4cc8-9216-b3ad5a2d5b8a',
    } ,
  / directive-fetch / 21,2,
  / condition-image-match / 3,15
]>>,