Internet-Draft M. Norton Intended status: Informational Independent Expires: November 30, 2026 May 31, 2026 SDLP Security Architecture (sec-arch) draft-norton-sdlp-sec-arch-00 M. Norton Email: mark433norton@gmail.com May 2026 Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Abstract This document defines the SDLP Lifecycle Architecture, the framework that governs the behavior, transitions, and integrity of legitimately purchased digital goods. The lifecycle exists to prevent illegitimate use, uncontrolled redistribution, and unauthorized sharing of digital entertainment products. It establishes predictable state transitions, decay rules, lineage accountability, and use-based mortality to restore order to digital entertainment sharing and ensure that all SDLP-governed objects behave in a verifiable, enforceable, and cryptographically accountable manner. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Conventions Used in This Document The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 0. Purpose, Intent, and Design Philosophy The Secured Digital Lifecycle Protocol (SDLP) defines a deterministic, physics-based framework for the creation, ownership, use, decay, and retirement of digital goods. SDLP exists to restore clarity, predictability, and fairness to digital ecosystems by replacing arbitrary platform behavior with universal, verifiable rules. SDLP is not a rights-management system, a licensing scheme, or a content protection mechanism. It is a digital physics model: a set of laws that govern how digital objects behave, how they change over time, and how they interact with the environments in which they run. SDLP is designed to ensure that digital goods behave consistently across all platforms, all runtimes, and all implementations. The protocol defines identity, decay, lineage, transfer, policy enforcement, serialization, and destruction as first-class lifecycle operations governed by cryptographically verifiable rules. SDLP is built on the principle that digital goods SHOULD serve all participants in the ecosystem - creators, distributors, and customers - without favoring any one party at the expense of another. SDLP establishes a neutral, physics-like foundation that cannot be bent, overridden, or selectively applied. SDLP is here for the best of everyone. Design Goals: * Predictability: Digital goods MUST behave deterministically. * Integrity: Identity, lineage, and state MUST be verifiable. * Fairness: No participant may gain advantage by bypassing physics. * Transparency: Rules MUST be explicit, inspectable, and immutable. * Portability: Behavior MUST be identical across all platforms. * Security: Tampering MUST be detectable and irreversible. * Finality: Destruction MUST be permanent and provable. * Universality: The protocol MUST apply uniformly to all digital goods. Non-Goals: * SDLP does not enforce business models. * SDLP does not define content licensing terms. * SDLP does not manage user identity or personal data. * SDLP does not provide encryption for confidentiality. * SDLP does not replace application logic or platform policy. SDLP provides the physics. Implementations provide the world built on top of those physics. The sections that follow define the complete lifecycle model, including identity, decay, tamper detection, environment validation, policy enforcement, serialization, and destruction. These rules form the immutable foundation upon which all SDLP-governed digital goods MUST operate. 1. Introduction The SDLP Lifecycle Architecture defines the complete state model, transitions, and behavioral rules that govern legitimately purchased digital goods. The lifecycle exists to prevent illegitimate use, uncontrolled redistribution, and unauthorized sharing of digital entertainment products. By establishing predictable transitions, decay mechanics, lineage accountability, and use-based mortality, SDLP restores order to digital entertainment sharing and ensures that all governed objects behave in a verifiable and enforceable manner. 2. SDLP Lifecycle Overview The SDLP Lifecycle Architecture defines the complete set of states, transitions, and behavioral constraints that govern the existence and use of legitimately purchased digital goods. Each SDLP-governed object moves through a predictable and enforceable lifecycle that ensures accountability, prevents unauthorized redistribution, and maintains the integrity of digital product ecosystems. The lifecycle is composed of discrete states, each representing a specific phase in the object's existence. Transitions between states are triggered by user actions, system events, or policy-defined conditions. Every transition is cryptographically verifiable and recorded as part of the object's lineage, ensuring that all SDLP objects maintain a complete and tamper-evident history. SDLP enforces mortality, decay, and lineage rules to prevent uncontrolled propagation of digital goods. These mechanisms ensure that digital objects cannot be duplicated, shared, or reused outside the boundaries of legitimate ownership and authorized use. The lifecycle model provides the foundation for all higher-level SDLP behaviors, including distribution, transfer, consumption, and archival. 3. Lifecycle States The SDLP lifecycle is composed of a finite set of states that define the existence, usability, and legitimacy of a digital object at any point in time. Each state represents a distinct phase in the object's lifecycle, and transitions between states are governed by strict, cryptographically verifiable rules. These states ensure that SDLP-governed objects behave predictably, maintain lineage integrity, and cannot be duplicated or redistributed outside authorized boundaries. The lifecycle states defined by SDLP are as follows: * Manufactured: The object has been created by an authorized distributor but has not yet been purchased or assigned to a customer. * Owned: The object has been legitimately purchased and is bound to a specific customer identity. It is eligible for consumption, transfer, and authorized use. * Consumed: The object has been used in a manner that triggers a consumption event, such as playback, activation, or execution. Consumption may decrement remaining uses or advance decay mechanics. * Dormant: The object is temporarily inactive but remains valid and owned. Dormancy may occur due to inactivity, device changes, or policy-defined conditions. * Decayed: The object has reached a state where its remaining uses or decay counters have expired. For subscription-based software, this state may also result from the expiration of a time-limited license. A decayed object cannot be consumed but may still retain lineage value. * Transferred: The object has been legitimately transferred from one customer to another through an authorized SDLP mechanism. All lineage and state information persists across transfers. * Archived: The object has been retired from active use but remains preserved for historical, audit, or lineage purposes. Archived objects cannot re-enter active states. * Terminated: The object has reached the end of its lifecycle and is no longer valid for any form of use, transfer, or archival. A terminated object represents a final, irreversible state. 4. State Transition Rules SDLP defines strict, deterministic rules governing how digital objects transition between lifecycle states. These rules ensure that all state changes are predictable, enforceable, and cryptographically verifiable. Unauthorized or undefined transitions are explicitly disallowed, preventing illegitimate redistribution, duplication, or manipulation of SDLP-governed objects. Each transition is triggered by a specific event, such as purchase, consumption, transfer, expiration of a subscription license, or policy-defined conditions. All transitions are recorded as part of the object's lineage, ensuring that every state change is traceable and tamper-evident. The allowed transitions are as follows: * Manufactured -> Owned: Occurs when a customer legitimately purchases the object from an authorized distributor. * Owned -> Consumed: Occurs when the object is used in a manner that triggers a consumption event, such as playback, activation, or execution. * Owned -> Dormant: Occurs when the object becomes temporarily inactive due to device changes, inactivity, or policy-defined conditions. * Consumed -> Owned: Occurs when the object remains valid after a consumption event and retains remaining uses or value. * Owned -> Decayed: Occurs when the object's remaining uses or decay counters reach zero. For subscription-based software, this transition may also occur when a time-limited license expires. * Owned -> Transferred: Occurs when the object is legitimately transferred to another customer through an authorized SDLP mechanism. * Transferred -> Owned: Occurs when the receiving customer becomes the new legitimate owner of the object. * Any State -> Archived: Occurs when the object is retired from active use but preserved for historical, audit, or lineage purposes. * Archived -> Terminated: Occurs when the object reaches the end of its lifecycle and is no longer valid for any form of use, transfer, or archival. The following transitions are explicitly forbidden: * Any State -> Manufactured: Objects cannot be recreated or returned to a pre-purchase state. * Consumed -> Manufactured, Consumed -> Transferred, or Consumed -> Archived: Consumption does not grant the ability to reset, transfer, or retire an object unless explicitly permitted by policy. * Decayed -> Owned or Decayed -> Consumed: A decayed object cannot regain validity or re-enter active use. * Terminated -> Any State: Termination is final and irreversible. These rules ensure that SDLP-governed objects follow a predictable, enforceable lifecycle that preserves legitimacy, prevents unauthorized redistribution, and maintains the integrity of digital product ecosystems. 5. Cryptographic Guarantees SDLP relies on strong cryptographic mechanisms to ensure that all lifecycle events, state transitions, and lineage records are verifiable, tamper-evident, and resistant to unauthorized manipulation. These guarantees form the foundation of trust within the SDLP ecosystem and ensure that digital objects behave in a predictable and enforceable manner. Every SDLP-governed object is bound to a unique cryptographic identity at the time of manufacture. This identity includes a distributor signature, a product identifier, and a set of immutable attributes that define the object's origin. Once created, the object cannot be altered without invalidating its signature. All state transitions are recorded as signed lineage entries. Each entry includes the previous state, the new state, the triggering event, and a timestamp. These entries are chained together using cryptographic hashes, forming a tamper-evident history that can be independently verified by any authorized SDLP participant. Customer ownership is enforced through cryptographic binding to a customer identity. Ownership transfers require signatures from both the transferring and receiving parties, as well as validation by an authorized SDLP service. This ensures that transfers cannot be forged or replayed. Consumption events, decay counters, and subscription expirations are also cryptographically recorded. This prevents rollback attacks, unauthorized resets, or attempts to reuse expired or consumed objects. SDLP objects include a mandatory tamper-response mechanism. If an object detects an unauthorized modification, signature violation, rollback attempt, or execution in an untrusted environment, it will immediately perform a cryptographic bitdump. This process destroys the object's usable content while preserving a final lineage entry that records the tamper event. A bitdump is irreversible and ensures that no compromised object can continue to exist or be exploited. SDLP does not rely on centralized trust. Instead, it uses a distributed verification model in which any authorized participant can validate the authenticity, lineage, and current state of an object. This ensures that SDLP-governed objects remain trustworthy even in the presence of compromised devices or untrusted networks. These cryptographic guarantees ensure that SDLP objects maintain integrity, authenticity, and verifiable lineage throughout their entire lifecycle. 6. Lineage Model The SDLP lineage model defines how the complete history of a digital object is recorded, preserved, and verified throughout its lifecycle. Lineage provides an immutable, tamper-evident record of every state transition, ownership change, consumption event, and cryptographic validation associated with the object. This record ensures that all SDLP-governed objects remain accountable and verifiable at all times. Each lineage entry contains the following elements: * Previous State: The object's state prior to the transition. * New State: The object's state after the transition. * Triggering Event: The action or condition that caused the transition, such as purchase, consumption, transfer, decay, or subscription expiration. * Timestamp: A cryptographically signed time value indicating when the transition occurred. * Actor Signature: A signature from the entity responsible for the transition, such as a distributor, customer, or authorized SDLP service. * Object Signature: A signature from the object itself, confirming that the transition is valid and consistent with its internal rules. Lineage entries are chained together using cryptographic hashes. Each entry includes the hash of the previous entry, forming a continuous, tamper-evident chain. Any attempt to modify, remove, or reorder entries invalidates the chain and triggers the object's mandatory tamper-response mechanism. SDLP objects maintain their lineage locally and may also synchronize lineage entries with authorized SDLP services for redundancy and distributed verification. However, no centralized authority is required to validate lineage. Any authorized participant can verify the chain by checking signatures, hashes, and state transitions against SDLP rules. Lineage persists across ownership transfers, device changes, and archival. Even after an object becomes decayed, archived, or terminated, its lineage remains intact and verifiable. This ensures that SDLP objects retain historical value and accountability throughout their entire existence. If an object detects a lineage inconsistency, rollback attempt, missing entry, or invalid signature, it will immediately perform a cryptographic bitdump. This guarantees that no object with corrupted or manipulated lineage can continue to exist or be exploited. The lineage model ensures that SDLP-governed objects maintain a complete, trustworthy, and tamper-evident history from manufacture to termination. 7. Decay and Mortality Model The SDLP decay and mortality model defines how digital objects lose value, exhaust their permitted uses, or reach the end of their lifecycle. Decay is a controlled and predictable process that ensures SDLP-governed objects cannot be reused, duplicated, or redistributed outside authorized boundaries. Mortality guarantees that every object eventually reaches a terminal state, preventing uncontrolled propagation. SDLP defines two primary forms of decay: * Use-Based Decay: The object's remaining uses are decremented when a consumption event occurs. Once all permitted uses are exhausted, the object transitions to the Decayed state. * Structural Decay: The object may accumulate decay counters based on policy-defined conditions, such as repeated uploads, device migrations, or lineage depth. When these counters reach their limits, the object transitions to the Decayed state. SDLP does not impose time-based decay on standard digital goods. Time-limited expiration applies only to subscription-based software, where the business model requires a defined temporal boundary. When a subscription expires, the object transitions to the Decayed state and cannot be consumed further. Mortality is enforced through strict transition rules. Once an object becomes decayed, it cannot regain validity, re-enter active states, or reset its counters. A decayed object may still retain lineage value, but it is no longer eligible for consumption or transfer. SDLP objects include a mandatory self-protection mechanism. If an object detects unauthorized modification, rollback, tampering, or execution in an untrusted environment, it will immediately perform a cryptographic bitdump. This irreversible process destroys the object's usable content while recording a final lineage entry that documents the tamper event. Bitdump ensures that no compromised object can continue to exist or be exploited. Mortality guarantees that every SDLP-governed object follows a predictable and enforceable lifecycle, ultimately reaching a final state that preserves lineage integrity and prevents unauthorized reuse. 8. Transfer and Ownership Model The SDLP transfer and ownership model defines how digital objects are bound to customer identities, how ownership changes occur, and how unauthorized redistribution is prevented. Ownership is a cryptographically enforced relationship between a customer and an SDLP-governed object. This relationship persists across devices, platforms, and environments, ensuring that only the legitimate owner may consume, transfer, or manage the object. Each object is bound to a customer identity at the moment of purchase. This binding is enforced through cryptographic signatures that associate the object with a unique customer identifier. An object cannot be consumed or transferred unless the customer's signature matches the identity recorded in the object's lineage. Ownership transfers are permitted only through authorized SDLP mechanisms. A valid transfer requires signatures from both the transferring customer and the receiving customer, as well as validation by an authorized SDLP service. This ensures that transfers cannot be forged, replayed, or executed without mutual consent. During a transfer, the object's lineage is updated to reflect the new owner. All previous lineage entries remain intact, preserving the complete history of the object. The receiving customer becomes the new legitimate owner and gains the ability to consume, manage, or further transfer the object according to SDLP rules. SDLP strictly prohibits unauthorized redistribution. An object cannot be duplicated, cloned, or shared outside the transfer mechanism. Any attempt to copy an object, alter its ownership binding, or execute it under a mismatched identity triggers the object's mandatory tamper-response mechanism. This results in an immediate cryptographic bitdump, ensuring that compromised or redistributed objects cannot be used or propagated. Ownership persists until the object is transferred, decayed, archived for historical purposes, or terminated. Even after termination, the object's lineage remains verifiable, ensuring that ownership history is preserved for audit and accountability. The transfer and ownership model ensures that SDLP-governed objects remain legitimate, traceable, and protected from unauthorized redistribution throughout their entire lifecycle. 9. Distribution and Manufacturing Model The SDLP distribution and manufacturing model defines how digital objects are created, prepared for release, and instantiated within the SDLP ecosystem. Manufacturing produces a distributable artifact, but this artifact is not yet an SDLP object. It becomes an SDLP object only when it is downloaded or activated by a customer. During manufacturing, an authorized distributor generates a product artifact and assigns it a distributor signature, product identifier, and a set of immutable attributes. These attributes define the artifact's origin and ensure that it can be validated prior to instantiation. However, the artifact remains in a pre-object state until it is personalized through customer interaction. Instantiation occurs at the moment of download or activation. At this point, the artifact becomes a fully realized SDLP object. The object receives its CustomerID binding, DownloadID, timestamp, and initial lineage entry. These values uniquely identify the object and ensure that it can be traced, validated, and governed throughout its lifecycle. Once instantiated, the object enters the Manufactured or Owned state depending on the distribution model. For direct purchases, the object immediately enters the Owned state. For pre-distributed artifacts, such as activation codes, the object enters the Manufactured state until the customer completes activation. SDLP prohibits the creation of duplicate or parallel instances of an object. Each instantiation event produces exactly one SDLP object with a unique lineage. Any attempt to create additional instances, alter the instantiation record, or bypass the activation process triggers the object's mandatory tamper-response mechanism, resulting in an immediate cryptographic bitdump. The distribution and manufacturing model ensures that SDLP-governed objects are created in a controlled, verifiable manner and that each object begins its lifecycle with a unique, immutable identity. 10. Enforcement Model The SDLP enforcement model defines how digital objects validate their environment, verify their integrity, and ensure that all lifecycle rules are followed at runtime. Enforcement is performed locally by the object itself, using cryptographic trust anchors and internal validation logic. This ensures that SDLP-governed objects remain secure and predictable regardless of the platform or device on which they execute. Each SDLP object contains a set of embedded trust anchors, including distributor signatures, object signatures, and policy-defined validation keys. These anchors allow the object to verify its own authenticity, confirm the integrity of its lineage, and validate the identity of the customer attempting to consume or manage it. Before any operation is performed, the object evaluates its execution environment. This includes verifying device identity, checking for trusted runtime conditions, and ensuring that no unauthorized debugging, interception, or modification tools are present. If the environment fails validation, the object refuses to execute and records a lineage entry indicating the failure. SDLP objects continuously validate their internal state. This includes checking lineage continuity, verifying decay counters, confirming ownership bindings, and ensuring that no rollback or tampering has occurred. Any inconsistency results in immediate enforcement action. Enforcement actions include refusal to execute, transition to a restricted state, or invocation of the mandatory tamper-response mechanism. The tamper-response mechanism performs a cryptographic bitdump, destroying the object's usable content while preserving a final lineage entry that documents the violation. Bitdump ensures that no compromised object can continue to exist, propagate, or be exploited. SDLP enforcement is decentralized. Objects do not rely on continuous connectivity or external authorization to validate their state. Instead, each object independently enforces SDLP rules using its embedded trust anchors and lineage history. When connectivity is available, objects may synchronize lineage entries with authorized SDLP services for redundancy and distributed verification. The enforcement model ensures that SDLP-governed objects remain secure, tamper-evident, and compliant with lifecycle rules regardless of the execution environment. This guarantees predictable behavior and prevents unauthorized use, redistribution, or manipulation. 11. Execution Environment Requirements The SDLP execution environment requirements define the conditions under which an SDLP-governed object may operate. These requirements ensure that objects execute only in trusted, verifiable environments that preserve integrity, prevent tampering, and enforce SDLP lifecycle rules. An environment that fails to meet these requirements is considered untrusted, and SDLP objects MUST refuse execution. A trusted execution environment MUST provide the following capabilities: * Device Identity Verification: The environment MUST expose a stable and verifiable device identity that the object can authenticate. This identity is used to confirm that the object is executing on a legitimate device associated with the owning customer. * Integrity Protection: The environment MUST prevent unauthorized modification of the object's code, data, or lineage. This includes protection against memory tampering, binary patching, and runtime manipulation. * Debugging and Interception Controls: The environment MUST restrict or disable unauthorized debugging tools, interception frameworks, and instrumentation mechanisms. If such tools are detected, the object MUST refuse execution. * Secure Storage: The environment MUST provide a secure mechanism for storing cryptographic keys, lineage entries, and ownership bindings. This storage MUST be resistant to extraction, rollback, and unauthorized duplication. * Trusted Time Source: The environment MUST provide a reliable and tamper-evident time source for recording lineage timestamps and validating subscription-based expiration events. * Policy Enforcement: The environment MUST enforce SDLP policies related to consumption, decay, transfer, and ownership. This includes preventing unauthorized resets, rollbacks, or attempts to bypass lifecycle rules. Before executing any operation, an SDLP object evaluates the environment against these requirements. If any requirement is not met, the object refuses to execute and records a lineage entry indicating the failure. The object may re-evaluate the environment when conditions change. If the object detects active tampering, unauthorized debugging, rollback attempts, or execution in a hostile environment, it MUST invoke the mandatory tamper-response mechanism. This results in an immediate cryptographic bitdump, ensuring that the object cannot be exploited or misused. Execution environment requirements ensure that SDLP-governed objects operate only under secure, verifiable conditions and remain protected from unauthorized manipulation throughout their lifecycle. 12. Interoperability and Platform Independence The SDLP interoperability and platform independence model ensures that SDLP-governed objects remain portable across devices, operating systems, and execution environments while still enforcing all lifecycle, ownership, and security rules locally. SDLP does not rely on any specific hardware platform, software stack, or vendor ecosystem. Instead, each object carries its own enforcement logic, trust anchors, and lineage history, enabling consistent behavior across diverse environments. Interoperability is achieved through a standardized object format that defines how signatures, lineage entries, decay counters, ownership bindings, and policy attributes are represented. Any platform capable of providing a trusted execution environment may host an SDLP object, regardless of architecture or operating system. Platform independence is maintained through self-contained enforcement logic. Each object validates its environment, verifies its lineage, and enforces lifecycle rules without relying on external services. When connectivity is available, objects may synchronize lineage entries or retrieve policy updates, but such connectivity is not required for normal operation. SDLP objects MUST NOT assume the presence of platform-specific features. Instead, they rely on abstracted capabilities such as secure storage, device identity verification, and tamper detection. Platforms that implement these capabilities may host SDLP objects without modification to the object itself. To ensure consistent behavior across platforms, SDLP defines a set of minimum interoperability requirements. These include support for cryptographic primitives, secure timestamping, signature validation, and protected execution. Platforms that fail to meet these requirements are considered untrusted, and SDLP objects MUST refuse execution. Interoperability does not weaken enforcement. An object that is transferred between platforms MUST revalidate its environment, confirm ownership bindings, and verify lineage continuity. Any inconsistency triggers enforcement action, including refusal to execute or invocation of the mandatory tamper-response mechanism. The interoperability and platform independence model ensures that SDLP-governed objects remain portable, secure, and predictable across diverse environments while maintaining strict adherence to SDLP lifecycle and security rules. 13. Policy Framework The SDLP policy framework defines how rules governing consumption, decay, transfer, ownership, and execution are created, distributed, and enforced. Policies determine the operational behavior of SDLP- governed objects and ensure consistent rule application across distributors, platforms, and environments. Policies are cryptographically signed, versioned, and validated by each object at runtime. Policies are authored by distributors, platform operators, or other authorized SDLP participants. Each policy defines a set of rules that govern object behavior, including consumption limits, decay thresholds, transfer permissions, subscription requirements, and environment constraints. Policies MUST be signed using an authorized policy key to ensure authenticity and prevent unauthorized modification. SDLP objects retrieve applicable policies during instantiation or when connectivity is available. Policies may be embedded within the object, distributed through platform services, or provided by authorized SDLP policy endpoints. Objects MUST validate the signature and version of each policy before applying it. Policies are hierarchical. Distributor policies define baseline rules for all objects of a given product. Platform policies define additional requirements for execution environments. Customer-specific policies may define optional constraints such as parental controls or usage restrictions. When multiple policies apply, objects MUST evaluate them in a deterministic order and enforce the most restrictive rule where conflicts occur. Policies cannot override core SDLP lifecycle rules. No policy may authorize duplication, rollback, unauthorized transfer, or execution in an untrusted environment. Policies may extend SDLP rules but may not weaken or bypass them. When a policy update is detected, the object MUST validate the new policy, record a lineage entry, and apply the updated rules. If a policy is invalid, expired, or improperly signed, the object MUST reject it and continue operating under the last known valid policy. If a policy attempts to authorize behavior that violates SDLP security guarantees, the object MUST refuse to apply the policy and record a lineage entry indicating the violation. If the policy appears malicious or inconsistent with the object's lineage, the object MUST invoke the mandatory tamper-response mechanism. The policy framework ensures that SDLP-governed objects operate under consistent, verifiable, and cryptographically enforced rules while allowing distributors, platforms, and customers to define flexible behavior within the boundaries of SDLP security guarantees. 14. Identity and Customer Binding Model The SDLP identity and customer binding model defines how digital objects associate themselves with a specific customer and how this association is validated throughout the object's lifecycle. Customer identity is a core security anchor within SDLP, ensuring that only the legitimate owner may instantiate, consume, or transfer an SDLP- governed object. Each SDLP object is bound to a CustomerID at the moment of instantiation. This binding is cryptographically enforced and cannot be altered, removed, or reassigned without a valid ownership transfer. The CustomerID is included in the object's initial lineage entry and is validated during every subsequent operation. Customer identity validation requires the following elements: * Customer Signature: A cryptographic signature proving that the customer initiating an operation is the same customer recorded in the object's lineage. * Device Identity: A verifiable device identifier that confirms the object is executing on a device associated with the owning customer. * Environment Validation: Confirmation that the execution environment meets SDLP trust requirements and has not been spoofed, modified, or tampered with. SDLP objects MUST refuse instantiation if the CustomerID cannot be validated. This prevents unauthorized downloads, parallel instantiations, or attempts to impersonate a legitimate customer. If a second party attempts to download or activate an object using a stolen link, intercepted file, or spoofed identity, the object MUST reject the request and record a lineage entry indicating the failed validation. Identity spoofing attempts are explicitly prohibited. These include attempts to impersonate a customer, forge a customer signature, falsify device identity, or simulate a trusted environment. If an object detects identity spoofing during execution, it MUST invoke the mandatory tamper-response mechanism. This results in an immediate cryptographic bitdump, ensuring that no spoofed or compromised object can continue to exist. Customer binding persists for the entire lifecycle of the object, including consumption, decay, transfer, and archival. During a legitimate transfer, the object's lineage is updated with the new CustomerID, and all previous identity bindings remain preserved for audit and accountability. The identity and customer binding model ensures that SDLP-governed objects remain tied to their legitimate owners, resistant to impersonation, and protected from unauthorized access or redistribution. 15. Device Identity and Multi-Device Ownership Model The SDLP device identity and multi-device ownership model defines how SDLP-governed objects validate the devices on which they execute and how customers may use multiple devices without compromising security. Device identity is a critical component of SDLP enforcement, ensuring that objects operate only on trusted devices associated with the legitimate customer. Each device that executes an SDLP object MUST present a verifiable device identity. This identity MUST be stable, unique, and resistant to spoofing. Device identity may be derived from hardware-backed identifiers, secure platform modules, or other cryptographically verifiable mechanisms. The object uses this identity to confirm that the device is authorized for use by the owning customer. SDLP supports multi-device ownership. A customer may register multiple devices, and SDLP objects may execute on any registered device as long as the device meets trust requirements. Device registration is performed through an authorized SDLP service, which associates the device identity with the customer's account and records the association in a verifiable manner. When an SDLP object executes on a device, it MUST validate the following: * The device identity matches a registered device for the owning customer. * The device provides a trusted execution environment that meets SDLP requirements. * The device has not been tampered with, modified, or spoofed. If any validation step fails, the object MUST refuse execution and record a lineage entry indicating the failure. If the object detects active tampering or attempts to falsify device identity, it MUST invoke the mandatory tamper-response mechanism, resulting in an immediate cryptographic bitdump. Device registration does not weaken ownership binding. The CustomerID remains the primary identity anchor, and device identity serves as a secondary validation layer. A device cannot assume ownership of an object, nor can it override or modify the object's customer binding. When a customer adds a new device, SDLP objects may execute on the new device after successful registration and environment validation. When a device is removed or revoked, SDLP objects MUST refuse execution on that device and record a lineage entry if execution is attempted. The device identity and multi-device ownership model ensures that SDLP-governed objects remain portable across customer devices while maintaining strict protections against spoofing, tampering, and unauthorized execution. 16. Trust Model and Key Hierarchy The SDLP trust model defines the cryptographic foundations that allow SDLP-governed objects to validate authenticity, enforce lifecycle rules, and resist unauthorized modification. Trust is established through a hierarchical key structure that ensures each participant operates within a defined and verifiable scope of authority. The SDLP key hierarchy consists of the following key classes: * Root Trust Key: A top-level key used to validate distributor and policy authority keys. This key is rarely used and MUST be stored in a secure, offline environment. Compromise of this key would undermine the entire SDLP ecosystem. * Distributor Authority Key: A key used by authorized distributors to sign manufactured artifacts, define product attributes, and issue product-level policies. Objects rely on this key to verify that they originate from a legitimate distributor. * Policy Authority Key: A key used to sign SDLP policies, including consumption rules, decay thresholds, transfer permissions, and environment requirements. Objects MUST validate policy signatures before applying any policy. * Object Key: A unique key pair generated for each SDLP object at instantiation. The object uses its private key to sign lineage entries, validate state transitions, and confirm internal integrity. The public portion of this key is included in the object's lineage. * Customer Signature Key: A key associated with the customer's identity. This key is used to authorize consumption, transfers, and device registration events. Objects MUST validate customer signatures before performing any customer-initiated operation. Each key class has a defined scope of authority. Distributor keys may sign manufactured artifacts but cannot sign lineage entries. Object keys may sign lineage entries but cannot sign policies. Customer keys may authorize consumption but cannot modify distributor attributes. This separation of authority prevents privilege escalation and ensures that no single key can override SDLP lifecycle rules. SDLP objects MUST validate all signatures using the appropriate key class. If a signature is missing, invalid, expired, or signed with an unauthorized key, the object MUST reject the operation and record a lineage entry indicating the failure. If the signature appears malicious or inconsistent with the object's lineage, the object MUST invoke the mandatory tamper-response mechanism. Key rotation is supported for distributor and policy authority keys. When a key is rotated, objects MUST validate the new key using the root trust key and record a lineage entry acknowledging the update. Object keys and customer keys are not rotated except in cases of transfer or re-instantiation. The trust model and key hierarchy ensure that SDLP-governed objects operate within a secure, verifiable, and cryptographically enforced framework that prevents unauthorized signing, key misuse, and tampering throughout the object's lifecycle. 17. State Machine Specification The SDLP state machine defines all valid lifecycle states for an SDLP- governed object and the legal transitions between those states. Each state represents a distinct phase in the object's lifecycle, and all transitions MUST be recorded as lineage entries signed by the object and the appropriate authority. Any transition not explicitly defined in this section is prohibited. The SDLP object lifecycle consists of the following states: * Pre-Object: A manufactured artifact that has not yet been instantiated. This state exists prior to download or activation and is not considered part of the SDLP lifecycle. * Manufactured: An instantiated object that has been created through download or activation but has not yet been consumed or transferred. The object is bound to a CustomerID and has an initial lineage entry. * Owned: An active object that is bound to a customer and eligible for consumption, transfer, or execution. Most SDLP operations occur in this state. * Consumed: An object that has undergone a consumption event. If the object supports multiple uses, it may return to the Owned state with updated decay counters. If all permitted uses are exhausted, it transitions to the Decayed state. * Decayed: An object that has exhausted its permitted uses, reached a decay threshold, or expired due to subscription rules. Decayed objects retain lineage value but may not be consumed or transferred. * Archived: An object that has been preserved for historical or audit purposes. Archived objects are immutable and may not return to active states. * Terminated: An object that has reached the end of its lifecycle through a controlled termination event. Terminated objects retain lineage but have no remaining operational capability. * Bitdumped: An object that has invoked the mandatory tamper- response mechanism. The object's usable content is destroyed, and a final lineage entry records the tamper event. This state is irreversible. Legal transitions include: * Pre-Object -> Manufactured (instantiation) * Manufactured -> Owned (activation or initial use) * Owned -> Consumed (consumption event) * Consumed -> Owned (remaining uses available) * Consumed -> Decayed (uses exhausted) * Owned -> Decayed (structural decay or subscription expiration) * Owned -> Transferred (ownership transfer) * Transferred -> Owned (new owner) * Decayed -> Archived (optional archival) * Owned -> Terminated (controlled termination) * Manufactured -> Terminated (controlled termination) * Any State -> Bitdumped (tamper-response) Illegal transitions include, but are not limited to: * Decayed -> Owned * Bitdumped -> Any State * Terminated -> Any Active State * Consumed -> Manufactured * Any State -> Pre-Object If an object encounters an attempted illegal transition, it MUST refuse the operation and record a lineage entry indicating the violation. If the attempted transition appears malicious or involves tampering, rollback, or spoofing, the object MUST invoke the mandatory tamper-response mechanism. The state machine specification ensures that SDLP-governed objects follow a predictable, enforceable lifecycle and that all transitions remain verifiable, authorized, and tamper-evident. 18. Lineage Entry Format (Formal Schema) The SDLP lineage entry format defines the canonical structure used to record state transitions, ownership changes, consumption events, and tamper responses. Each lineage entry is immutable once created and MUST be cryptographically signed by the object and any relevant authority. Lineage entries form a hash-chained sequence that provides a complete, tamper-evident history of the object's lifecycle. Each lineage entry consists of the following fields: * EntryID: A monotonically increasing integer assigned by the object. EntryID 0 is the instantiation entry. * PreviousHash: The cryptographic hash of the previous lineage entry. For EntryID 0, this field contains a null hash value. * Timestamp: A trusted timestamp indicating when the transition occurred. The timestamp MUST be derived from a trusted time source provided by the execution environment. * EventType: A string identifying the type of event that produced the transition. Valid event types include Instantiation, Consumption, Transfer, Decay, SubscriptionExpiration, PolicyUpdate, EnvironmentFailure, Termination, and TamperResponse. * PreviousState: The object's state prior to the transition, as defined in the SDLP state machine. * NewState: The object's state after the transition. * ActorID: The identifier of the entity responsible for the transition. This may be a CustomerID, DistributorID, or SDLP service identifier. * ActorSignature: A cryptographic signature produced by the actor responsible for the transition. This signature confirms that the actor authorized the event. * ObjectSignature: A cryptographic signature produced by the object using its private key. This signature confirms that the transition is internally valid and consistent with SDLP rules. * Metadata: Optional structured data associated with the event. This may include consumption counters, transfer details, policy versions, device identifiers, or environment validation results. The canonical serialization format for lineage entries MUST be deterministic. All fields MUST be encoded in a stable order, and whitespace, padding, and field delimiters MUST follow SDLP serialization rules. Any deviation from canonical encoding renders the entry invalid. The hash chain is constructed by computing the cryptographic hash of the serialized lineage entry and storing this value as the PreviousHash field of the next entry. Any modification to an entry, including changes to metadata, signatures, or timestamps, invalidates all subsequent entries in the chain. SDLP objects MUST validate lineage entries during every operation. Validation includes verifying signatures, checking hash continuity, confirming state transitions, and ensuring that the EventType is consistent with the object's current state. If any validation step fails, the object MUST refuse the operation and record a lineage entry indicating the failure. If the failure appears malicious or involves tampering, rollback, or spoofing, the object MUST invoke the mandatory tamper-response mechanism. The lineage entry format ensures that SDLP-governed objects maintain a complete, verifiable, and tamper-evident history of all lifecycle events, enabling distributed trust without reliance on centralized authorities. 19. Serialization and Canonical Encoding Rules The SDLP serialization and canonical encoding rules define how SDLP- governed objects represent their internal data structures, lineage entries, and state transitions in a deterministic and platform- independent manner. Canonical encoding ensures that all SDLP objects produce identical serialized output for identical data, regardless of device, operating system, or implementation language. Canonical encoding is required for all lineage entries, policy references, state transition records, and cryptographic inputs. Any deviation from canonical encoding invalidates the affected structure and MUST cause the object to reject the data and record a lineage entry indicating the failure. SDLP canonical encoding follows these principles: * Deterministic Field Order: All fields MUST appear in a fixed, predefined order. Field reordering is prohibited. * Explicit Field Names: All fields MUST be encoded with explicit names. Implicit or positional encoding is not permitted. * Stable Whitespace Rules: Whitespace MUST follow SDLP formatting rules. Additional spaces, tabs, or line breaks are prohibited. * UTF-8 Encoding: All textual fields MUST be encoded using UTF-8 without byte-order marks. * Fixed Numeric Formats: Integers MUST be encoded in base-10 without leading zeros. Timestamps MUST follow SDLP time format rules. * Canonical Boolean Encoding: Boolean values MUST be encoded as "true" or "false" in lowercase. * Canonical Hash Encoding: Hash values MUST be encoded as lowercase hexadecimal strings without separators. * Canonical Signature Encoding: Signatures MUST be encoded using base64url without padding. Lineage entries MUST be serialized using the canonical encoding rules before hashing or signing. The serialized form MUST include all fields, even when optional fields are empty. Empty fields MUST be encoded as empty strings rather than omitted. The canonical serialization process consists of the following steps: 1. Construct a structured representation of the lineage entry using all required fields. 2. Encode the structure using the canonical field order and encoding rules. 3. Serialize the encoded structure into a UTF-8 byte sequence. 4. Compute the cryptographic hash of the serialized byte sequence. 5. Sign the serialized byte sequence using the object's private key. Any modification to the serialized form, including whitespace changes or field reordering, results in a different hash value and invalidates the lineage chain. SDLP objects MUST reject any lineage entry whose serialized form does not match the expected canonical encoding. Canonical encoding ensures that SDLP-governed objects maintain deterministic, verifiable, and tamper-evident data structures across all platforms and environments, enabling reliable hash chaining, signature validation, and distributed trust. 20. Cryptographic Hashing and Signature Requirements The SDLP cryptographic hashing and signature requirements define the mandatory algorithms, key sizes, and validation rules used to ensure authenticity, integrity, and tamper-evidence throughout the object's lifecycle. All SDLP-governed objects MUST implement these algorithms to remain compliant with the SDLP trust model. SDLP uses cryptographic hashing to secure lineage entries, validate state transitions, and detect unauthorized modification. The following hashing requirements apply: * Hash Algorithm: SHA-256 or stronger. Weaker algorithms, including SHA-1 and MD5, are prohibited. * Hash Encoding: Hash values MUST be encoded as lowercase hexadecimal strings without separators. * Hash Scope: The hash MUST be computed over the canonical serialized form of the lineage entry. Any deviation from canonical encoding invalidates the hash. * Hash Chaining: Each lineage entry MUST include the hash of the previous entry. Any modification to an entry invalidates all subsequent entries. SDLP uses digital signatures to authenticate lineage entries, verify policy updates, authorize customer actions, and validate distributor authority. The following signature requirements apply: * Signature Algorithm: ECDSA using curve P-256 or Ed25519. RSA is permitted only with a minimum key size of 3072 bits. * Signature Encoding: Signatures MUST be encoded using base64url without padding. * Signature Scope: The signature MUST be computed over the canonical serialized form of the structure being signed. * Signature Validation: Objects MUST validate all signatures using the appropriate key class defined in the SDLP trust hierarchy. Key size requirements are as follows: * Root Trust Key: Minimum 4096-bit RSA or equivalent elliptic curve strength. * Distributor Authority Key: Minimum 3072-bit RSA or P-256/Ed25519. * Policy Authority Key: Minimum 3072-bit RSA or P-256/Ed25519. * Object Key: P-256 or Ed25519. * Customer Signature Key: P-256 or Ed25519. SDLP objects MUST reject any structure signed with an unauthorized, expired, or improperly sized key. If a signature appears malicious or inconsistent with the object's lineage, the object MUST invoke the mandatory tamper-response mechanism. Cryptographic randomness used for key generation, nonce creation, and lineage signing MUST be derived from a secure random number generator. Predictable or low-entropy randomness is prohibited. SDLP objects MUST NOT accept alternative algorithms, weakened parameters, or non-canonical encodings, even if provided by a trusted party. Any deviation from these requirements constitutes a violation of SDLP security guarantees. The cryptographic hashing and signature requirements ensure that SDLP-governed objects maintain strong, verifiable, and tamper-evident protections throughout their entire lifecycle. 21. Randomness, Nonces, and Entropy Requirements The SDLP randomness, nonce, and entropy requirements define how SDLP- governed objects generate unpredictable values for cryptographic operations, lineage signing, key generation, and state transitions. High-quality randomness is essential to prevent replay attacks, signature forgeries, predictable key material, and other forms of cryptographic compromise. SDLP objects MUST use a secure random number generator (RNG) that provides cryptographically strong entropy. The RNG MUST be resistant to prediction, bias, and external manipulation. Hardware-backed entropy sources are preferred when available, but software-based cryptographic RNGs are permitted if they meet SDLP entropy requirements. The following requirements apply to all randomness used by SDLP objects: * Entropy Source: The RNG MUST draw from a high-entropy source such as a hardware random generator, operating system entropy pool, or equivalent cryptographically secure mechanism. * Minimum Entropy: All random values used for key generation MUST contain at least 128 bits of entropy. Nonces MUST contain at least 96 bits of entropy. * RNG Isolation: The RNG MUST NOT rely on user input, timestamps, or predictable system values as primary entropy sources. * RNG Health Checks: The RNG MUST perform continuous health tests to detect bias, repetition, or failure. If the RNG fails a health check, the object MUST refuse to perform cryptographic operations and record a lineage entry indicating the failure. Nonces are required for lineage signing, policy acknowledgments, transfer events, and other operations where replay protection is necessary. SDLP nonces MUST meet the following requirements: * Uniqueness: Each nonce MUST be unique for the lifetime of the object. Reuse of a nonce is prohibited. * Unpredictability: Nonces MUST be generated using the secure RNG and MUST NOT be derived from timestamps, counters, or other predictable values. * Canonical Encoding: Nonces MUST be encoded using base64url without padding. * Replay Protection: Objects MUST reject any operation that reuses a previously observed nonce. Key generation for object keys, customer keys, and ephemeral signing keys MUST use the secure RNG and MUST NOT rely on deterministic or low-entropy sources. Predictable key material invalidates the object's trust guarantees and MUST be treated as a tamper event. If an SDLP object detects insufficient entropy, RNG malfunction, or nonce reuse, it MUST refuse the operation and record a lineage entry. If the condition appears malicious or indicative of tampering, the object MUST invoke the mandatory tamper-response mechanism. 22. Consumption Model and Decay Mechanics The SDLP consumption model defines how SDLP-governed objects are consumed, how usage is recorded, and how decay is applied over time. Consumption represents an authorized use of the object by the owning customer. Each consumption event MUST be recorded as a lineage entry and MUST follow the rules defined by the object's policies and lifecycle state. An object in the Owned state may be consumed if all of the following conditions are met: * The CustomerID is valid and matches the object's binding. * The device identity is authorized for the customer. * The execution environment meets SDLP trust requirements. * The object has not reached its decay threshold or expiration. * No policy prohibits consumption at the current time. Upon consumption, the object transitions to the Consumed state. If the object supports multiple uses, it may return to the Owned state after recording the consumption event and updating its decay counters. If the object has exhausted all permitted uses, it MUST transition to the Decayed state. Decay mechanics define how objects lose usability over time or through repeated consumption. SDLP supports three forms of decay: * Use-Based Decay: The object includes a counter that decrements with each consumption event. When the counter reaches zero, the object transitions to the Decayed state. * Time-Based Decay: The object includes an expiration timestamp or subscription period. When the expiration time is reached, the object transitions to the Decayed state. * Structural Decay: The object may include internal decay rules that trigger based on policy-defined conditions such as inactivity, environment failures, or policy updates. All decay events MUST be recorded as lineage entries. The lineage entry MUST include the decay type, the triggering condition, and the resulting state transition. Decayed objects retain lineage value but may not be consumed, transferred, or reactivated. A decayed object may transition to the Archived state if archival is permitted by policy. Decayed objects may not return to the Owned or Consumed states under any circumstances. If an object detects an attempt to bypass decay rules, reset decay counters, extend expiration without authorization, or falsify decay conditions, it MUST invoke the mandatory tamper-response mechanism. This results in an immediate cryptographic bitdump and a final lineage entry documenting the violation. The consumption model and decay mechanics ensure that SDLP-governed objects enforce usage limits, expiration rules, and lifecycle constraints in a predictable, verifiable, and tamper-evident manner. 23. Transfer and Ownership Change Model The SDLP transfer and ownership change model defines how ownership of an SDLP-governed object may be reassigned from one customer to another. Ownership transfer is a controlled lifecycle event that requires explicit authorization from the current owner and MUST be recorded as a lineage entry. Unauthorized transfers are prohibited and cannot be represented within the SDLP state machine. An object in the Owned state may be transferred if all of the following conditions are met: * The current owner provides a valid Customer Signature authorizing the transfer. * The receiving customer provides a valid CustomerID and Customer Signature. * The object is not in a Decayed, Terminated, or Bitdumped state. * No policy prohibits transfer for the object or product class. * The execution environment meets SDLP trust requirements for both parties. Ownership transfer consists of the following steps: 1. The current owner initiates the transfer request and signs the transfer authorization using their Customer Signature Key. 2. The receiving customer provides a CustomerID and signs the acceptance using their Customer Signature Key. 3. The object validates both signatures, verifies that the transfer is permitted by policy, and confirms that the object is in a transferable state. 4. The object generates a lineage entry documenting the transfer, including the previous CustomerID, the new CustomerID, and both customer signatures. 5. The object updates its internal binding to the new CustomerID and transitions to the Transferred state. 6. The object transitions from Transferred to Owned under the new customer. Unauthorized transfers are not possible within SDLP. Any attempt to reassign CustomerID without valid signatures from both parties MUST be rejected. If the object detects forged signatures, spoofed identities, or attempts to bypass the transfer process, it MUST invoke the mandatory tamper-response mechanism, resulting in an immediate cryptographic bitdump. Transfer does not reset lineage, decay counters, or consumption history. All historical entries remain intact and visible to the new owner. Transfer also does not modify distributor attributes, product identifiers, or object keys. If a transfer is revoked or fails validation, the object MUST remain bound to the original customer and record a lineage entry indicating the failure. No partial or incomplete transfer states are permitted. The transfer and ownership change model ensures that SDLP-governed objects maintain strict, verifiable, and tamper-evident ownership semantics that mirror the behavior of physical goods while operating within a secure digital medium. 24. Environment Validation and Trust Requirements The SDLP environment validation model defines how SDLP-governed objects evaluate the execution environment to determine whether it is safe, authentic, and compliant with SDLP trust requirements. The environment is considered untrusted by default. An SDLP object MUST validate the environment before performing any operation, including consumption, transfer, or state transition. Environment validation consists of the following components: * Platform Integrity: Verification that the platform has not been modified, rooted, jailbroken, or subjected to unauthorized instrumentation. * Debugger and Instrumentation Detection: Confirmation that no debugger, tracer, profiler, or instrumentation framework is attached to the process. * Virtualization and Emulation Detection: Verification that the object is not executing inside an unauthorized virtual machine, emulator, sandbox, or simulated environment. * Secure Storage Validation: Confirmation that cryptographic keys, lineage data, and policy references are stored in a secure and tamper-resistant manner. * Trusted Time Source: Validation that timestamps originate from a trusted and monotonic time source and have not been manipulated. * Device Identity Validation: Confirmation that the device identity matches a registered device for the owning customer. If any environment validation step fails, the object MUST refuse execution and record a lineage entry indicating the failure. The object MUST NOT proceed with consumption, transfer, or any other operation until the environment is restored to a trusted state. If the object detects active tampering, including debugger attachment, environment spoofing, virtualization masking, or attempts to falsify platform integrity, it MUST invoke the mandatory tamper-response mechanism. This results in an immediate cryptographic bitdump and a final lineage entry documenting the tamper event. Environment validation MUST occur at the following times: * At instantiation. * At each execution. * Before each consumption event. * Before each transfer event. * Before applying any policy update. * Before signing any lineage entry. Environment validation is mandatory and cannot be bypassed, disabled, or overridden by any policy, distributor attribute, or customer action. SDLP objects MUST treat any attempt to bypass environment validation as a malicious act. The environment validation and trust requirements ensure that SDLP- governed objects execute only within secure, authentic, and verifiable environments, preventing spoofing, tampering, and unauthorized manipulation of the object's lifecycle. 25. Policy Model and Enforcement Rules The SDLP policy model defines how policies are authored, signed, distributed, validated, and enforced by SDLP-governed objects. Policies describe the operational rules that govern consumption, transfer, decay, environment requirements, and lifecycle behavior. Policies are authoritative and MUST be cryptographically signed by a Policy Authority Key before an SDLP object may apply them. Policies are immutable once issued. Updates to a policy MUST be published as a new policy version with a new signature. SDLP objects MUST NOT accept modified, truncated, or re-encoded policies, even if the modifications appear benign. Each policy MUST include the following fields: * PolicyID: A unique identifier for the policy. * Version: A monotonically increasing version number. * Issuer: The identifier of the policy authority. * Scope: The product class or object class to which the policy applies. * Rules: A structured set of lifecycle rules governing consumption, transfer, decay, environment validation, and termination. * Signature: A cryptographic signature produced by the Policy Authority Key. SDLP objects MUST validate the following before applying a policy: * The policy signature is valid and produced by a trusted Policy Authority Key. * The policy version is equal to or greater than the currently applied version. * The policy scope matches the object's product class. * The policy is encoded using canonical serialization rules. * The policy has not expired or been revoked. If any validation step fails, the object MUST reject the policy and record a lineage entry indicating the failure. If the failure appears malicious or involves signature forgery, policy tampering, or re-encoding attacks, the object MUST invoke the mandatory tamper- response mechanism. Policy enforcement occurs at the following times: * At instantiation. * Before each consumption event. * Before each transfer event. * Before applying environment validation rules. * Before evaluating decay or expiration conditions. * Before signing any lineage entry. Policies may define the following rule types: * Consumption Rules: Define permitted uses, usage limits, and consumption conditions. * Transfer Rules: Define whether transfer is permitted and under what conditions. * Decay Rules: Define use-based, time-based, or structural decay thresholds. * Environment Rules: Define required platform integrity, device identity, and trust conditions. * Termination Rules: Define conditions under which the object MUST terminate or transition to the Archived state. SDLP objects MUST enforce all applicable policy rules without exception. Policies cannot be overridden by customer action, distributor action, or environment manipulation. Any attempt to bypass, disable, or modify policy enforcement MUST be treated as a malicious act. The policy model and enforcement rules ensure that SDLP-governed objects operate under consistent, verifiable, and tamper-evident lifecycle constraints, enabling secure and predictable behavior across all environments and use cases. 26. Tamper Detection and Mandatory Response Model The SDLP tamper detection and mandatory response model defines how SDLP-governed objects detect unauthorized modification, interference, or environmental manipulation, and how they MUST respond when such conditions are detected. Tamper detection is continuous, mandatory, and cannot be disabled or overridden by any customer, distributor, or environment. SDLP objects treat all external inputs, platforms, and environments as untrusted by default. The object MUST continuously validate its integrity, lineage, environment, and execution context. Any deviation from expected conditions MUST be treated as a potential tamper event. Tamper detection includes, but is not limited to, the following: * Debugger Detection: Identification of any debugger, tracer, profiler, or instrumentation tool attached to the process. * Binary Integrity Validation: Verification that the object's code, data, and lineage have not been modified, patched, or replaced. * Environment Spoofing Detection: Identification of attempts to falsify platform integrity, device identity, or trusted execution environment signals. * Virtualization and Emulation Detection: Identification of unauthorized virtual machines, emulators, or sandboxed execution environments. * Rollback Detection: Identification of attempts to restore previous lineage entries, reset decay counters, or revert state transitions. * Policy Tampering Detection: Identification of modified, re- encoded, or forged policies. * Signature Forgery Detection: Identification of invalid, mismatched, or maliciously constructed signatures. When a tamper condition is detected, the object MUST perform one of two mandatory responses: * Refusal Response: If the condition appears accidental, transient, or non-malicious, the object MUST refuse execution and record a lineage entry indicating the failure. The object MUST NOT proceed until the environment is restored to a trusted state. * Tamper-Response (Bitdump): If the condition appears malicious, intentional, or indicative of an attack, the object MUST invoke the mandatory tamper-response mechanism. This results in an immediate cryptographic bitdump, rendering the object's usable content permanently unrecoverable. A final lineage entry MUST be recorded documenting the tamper event. The following conditions require immediate bitdump without exception: * Debugger attachment. * Binary modification or patching. * Lineage rollback or manipulation. * Forged or mismatched signatures. * Unauthorized environment spoofing. * Unauthorized virtualization masking. * Attempts to bypass policy enforcement. * Attempts to bypass environment validation. * Attempts to alter CustomerID or object identity. The tamper-response mechanism is irreversible. Once invoked, the object transitions to the Bitdumped state and may not return to any active state. All cryptographic material associated with the object MUST be destroyed, and all operational capability MUST cease. SDLP objects MUST NOT provide warnings, prompts, or recovery options when a tamper event is detected. Any such behavior would create an attack surface and is prohibited. The tamper detection and mandatory response model ensures that SDLP- governed objects remain self-protecting, tamper-evident, and resistant to unauthorized manipulation throughout their entire lifecycle. This model provides the security foundation that enables SDLP objects to behave as physical products within a digital medium. 27. Termination, Archival, and End-of-Life Rules The SDLP termination, archival, and end-of-life rules define how an SDLP-governed object concludes its lifecycle. End-of-life events are controlled, verifiable, and irreversible. SDLP objects MUST follow these rules to ensure that lifecycle completion is tamper-evident and consistent across all environments. SDLP supports three end-of-life outcomes: * Termination: A controlled and authorized shutdown of the object's operational capability. * Archival: A preservation state in which the object becomes immutable and non-operational but retains full lineage for historical or audit purposes. * Bitdump: An irreversible destruction event triggered by tamper detection or malicious activity. Termination is a voluntary and authorized end-of-life event. An object may be terminated if: * The customer provides a valid Customer Signature authorizing termination. * The object is in the Manufactured or Owned state. * No policy prohibits termination for the product class. Upon termination, the object MUST: * Record a lineage entry documenting the termination event. * Destroy all operational cryptographic material. * Transition to the Terminated state. * Cease all operational capability permanently. Archival is a preservation event. An object may be archived if: * The object is in the Decayed state. * Archival is permitted by policy. * The customer authorizes archival with a valid signature. Archived objects MUST: * Record a lineage entry documenting the archival event. * Become immutable and non-operational. * Retain all lineage entries for audit and historical reference. * Remain in the Archived state permanently. Bitdump is a mandatory and irreversible destruction event triggered by tamper detection. Bitdump is not voluntary and cannot be initiated by the customer or distributor. When a bitdump occurs, the object MUST: * Record a final lineage entry documenting the tamper event. * Destroy all cryptographic keys, operational data, and internal state. * Transition to the Bitdumped state. * Become permanently unrecoverable. End-of-life transitions are strictly one-way. The following transitions are prohibited: * Terminated -> Any Active State * Archived -> Any Active State * Bitdumped -> Any State * Decayed -> Owned or Consumed * Any State -> Pre-Object SDLP objects MUST reject any attempt to reverse or bypass end-of-life transitions. If such an attempt is detected, the object MUST treat it as a tamper event and invoke the mandatory tamper-response mechanism. The termination, archival, and end-of-life rules ensure that SDLP- governed objects conclude their lifecycle in a controlled, verifiable, and tamper-evident manner, mirroring the irreversible finality of physical products within a secure digital medium. 28. Distributor Responsibilities and Manufacturing Rules The SDLP distributor model defines how SDLP-governed objects are manufactured, instantiated, signed, and released into the ecosystem. Distributors are responsible for creating objects that comply with SDLP lifecycle, lineage, and policy requirements. Distributors serve as the manufacturing authority for digital products across a secure digital medium. A distributor MUST maintain a Distributor Authority Key used to sign manufactured objects, product metadata, and initial lineage entries. The Distributor Authority Key MUST meet SDLP cryptographic requirements and MUST be stored in a secure, tamper-resistant environment. Compromise of a Distributor Authority Key invalidates all objects signed with that key. Manufacturing an SDLP object consists of the following steps: 1. Assign a unique ProductID and DownloadID. 2. Bind the object to a DistributorID. 3. Generate an Object Key using a secure RNG. 4. Construct the initial lineage entry (EntryID 0). 5. Apply the initial policy set for the product class. 6. Canonically serialize the object and lineage. 7. Sign the object using the Distributor Authority Key. 8. Deliver the object to the customer or distribution channel. The initial lineage entry MUST include: * EntryID 0 * PreviousHash set to the null hash value * Timestamp of instantiation * EventType set to Instantiation * PreviousState set to Pre-Object * NewState set to Manufactured * ActorID set to the DistributorID * ActorSignature produced by the distributor * ObjectSignature produced by the object Distributors MUST ensure that all manufactured objects: * Are encoded using canonical serialization rules. * Include valid and current policies. * Contain no debug code, test harnesses, or development artifacts. * Contain no alternate execution paths or privileged interfaces. * Are free of back doors, hidden commands, or override mechanisms. * Are capable of performing environment validation and tamper detection immediately upon instantiation. Distributors MUST NOT: * Modify an object after instantiation. * Re-sign an object without generating a new lineage entry. * Issue policies that weaken security guarantees. * Provide customers with tools to bypass SDLP enforcement. * Embed mechanisms that disable tamper-response. If a distributor discovers that an object was manufactured with incorrect metadata, invalid signatures, or compromised keys, the distributor MUST revoke the affected objects and publish a revocation notice. SDLP objects MUST treat revocation as a terminal condition and transition to the Terminated state. Distributors may publish updated policies, but may not modify or replace existing lineage entries. All updates MUST be versioned, signed, and validated by SDLP objects before application. The distributor responsibilities and manufacturing rules ensure that SDLP-governed objects enter the ecosystem in a secure, verifiable, and tamper-evident state, establishing a trustworthy foundation for the object's entire lifecycle. 29. Customer Responsibilities and Authorized Actions The SDLP customer model defines what actions a customer may perform with an SDLP-governed object and how the object interprets, predicts, and responds to customer behavior. SDLP does not enforce behavior in the traditional sense. Instead, SDLP anticipates all possible actions a customer may attempt and defines deterministic outcomes based on the object's lifecycle physics. Customers may perform any action that is authorized by the End User License Agreement (EULA) and permitted by the applicable policy set. Authorized actions include consumption, transfer, archival, termination, and any other lifecycle event explicitly supported by the object's state machine. SDLP objects do not judge intent, morality, or motivation. The object evaluates only the action taken and responds according to immutable lifecycle rules. Actions that are permitted by policy proceed normally. Actions that violate policy or SDLP physics are refused. Actions that attempt to bypass, subvert, or falsify SDLP physics trigger mandatory tamper-response. Customers cannot perform actions that are morally or ethically wrong within the context of SDLP's lifecycle model without encountering the appropriate consequences. SDLP does not attempt to interpret morality directly; instead, SDLP defines a set of lifecycle laws that make harmful, destructive, or unauthorized actions physically impossible to execute. SDLP anticipates customer behavior by modeling all possible actions an object may encounter. The object does not rely on external enforcement, platform controls, or trust assumptions. Instead, the object applies predictive lifecycle physics to determine whether an action is: * Allowed: The action is authorized by the EULA and permitted by policy. The object proceeds normally. * Refused: The action is not permitted by policy or violates a lifecycle constraint. The object records a lineage entry and refuses execution. * Tamper: The action attempts to bypass SDLP physics, falsify identity, modify lineage, or subvert environment validation. The object invokes mandatory tamper-response and transitions to the Bitdumped state. Customers are responsible for: * Maintaining control of their Customer Signature Keys. * Ensuring that their devices meet environment validation requirements. * Using SDLP objects in accordance with the EULA and applicable policies. * Avoiding actions that would trigger tamper-response. Customers are not responsible for: * Enforcing SDLP rules. * Detecting tampering. * Maintaining lineage integrity. * Preventing unauthorized modification. These responsibilities belong to the object itself. SDLP objects MUST NOT allow customers to disable, bypass, or weaken lifecycle physics. Any attempt to do so MUST be treated as a tamper event. SDLP objects MUST NOT provide privileged interfaces, override mechanisms, or alternate execution paths that would allow customers to circumvent lifecycle rules. The customer responsibilities and authorized actions model ensures that SDLP-governed objects remain predictable, self-governing, and resistant to misuse. By replacing enforcement with predictive lifecycle physics, SDLP enables customers to use digital products responsibly while preventing harmful or unauthorized actions from becoming representable within the system. 30. Ecosystem Trust Model and Interoperability Rules The SDLP ecosystem trust model defines how SDLP-governed objects, distributors, customers, and policies coexist within a unified, tamper-evident, and self-governing digital environment. SDLP does not rely on centralized enforcement, platform guarantees, or external trust assumptions. Instead, SDLP establishes a distributed trust fabric based on cryptographic identity, lineage integrity, and predictive lifecycle physics. The SDLP ecosystem consists of four primary actors: * Distributors: Entities that manufacture and sign SDLP objects. * Customers: End users who own and interact with SDLP objects. * Policy Authorities: Entities that issue and sign lifecycle policies. * SDLP Objects: Self-governing digital products that enforce their own lifecycle physics. Trust within the ecosystem is established through the following mechanisms: * Distributor Authority Keys: Used to sign manufactured objects and initial lineage entries. * Policy Authority Keys: Used to sign policies and policy updates. * Customer Signature Keys: Used to authorize consumption, transfer, termination, and archival. * Object Keys: Used by each object to sign lineage entries and validate internal state transitions. SDLP objects MUST validate all signatures, policies, and lineage entries before accepting them. Objects MUST reject any element that fails validation, appears tampered, or violates canonical encoding rules. Objects MUST treat forged signatures, invalid policies, or manipulated lineage as tamper events. Interoperability between SDLP objects requires: * Consistent canonical serialization across all implementations. * Shared cryptographic primitives and signature formats. * Uniform interpretation of lifecycle states and transitions. * Policy compatibility across product classes. * Predictive lifecycle physics that behave identically across all environments. SDLP objects MUST NOT rely on platform-specific features, proprietary APIs, or environment-dependent behavior. All lifecycle physics MUST be deterministic, portable, and reproducible across any compliant implementation. The SDLP ecosystem anticipates all possible interactions between actors and defines deterministic outcomes for each. SDLP does not enforce trust; it predicts behavior and applies lifecycle physics to ensure that unauthorized, harmful, or impossible actions cannot be represented within the system. Ecosystem-wide trust is maintained through: * Immutable lineage chains. * Cryptographic signatures. * Policy versioning and validation. * Tamper detection and mandatory response. * One-way lifecycle transitions. * Predictive modeling of all customer and distributor actions. SDLP objects MUST interoperate without requiring mutual trust. Each object independently validates all inputs and rejects anything that violates SDLP physics. No object may rely on another object's integrity, environment, or behavior. The ecosystem trust model ensures that SDLP-governed objects, distributors, customers, and policies operate within a unified, self-governing, and tamper-evident digital environment. By replacing enforcement with predictive lifecycle physics, SDLP establishes a secure and interoperable foundation for digital products across a digital medium. 31. Canonical Serialization and Encoding Rules The SDLP canonical serialization model defines the exact encoding rules that all SDLP-governed objects, lineage entries, and policies MUST follow. Canonical serialization ensures that SDLP objects behave identically across all compliant implementations and prevents ambiguity, re-encoding attacks, and signature invalidation. SDLP objects MUST use a deterministic, byte-for-byte canonical encoding format. Any deviation from canonical encoding MUST be treated as a tamper condition. Objects MUST reject non-canonical encodings, even if the semantic content appears equivalent. Canonical serialization applies to: * Object metadata * Lineage entries * Policies * Signatures * State transition records * Distributor and customer identifiers The canonical encoding rules are as follows: * Field Order: All fields MUST appear in a fixed, predefined order. Reordering, omission, or insertion of fields is prohibited. * Field Encoding: All fields MUST be encoded using their canonical type representation (e.g., integers as fixed-width big-endian, strings as UTF-8, hashes as raw bytes). * Length Prefixing: Variable-length fields MUST include a canonical length prefix encoded as a fixed-width integer. * No Optional Fields: Optional or nullable fields are prohibited. All fields MUST be present and encoded, even if empty. * No Alternate Representations: Objects MUST NOT accept alternate encodings, compressed formats, or semantically equivalent representations. * No Floating-Point Values: Floating-point types are prohibited due to non-deterministic representation across platforms. * No Platform-Dependent Encoding: Encodings MUST NOT depend on CPU architecture, endianness, locale, or operating system. * Signature Coverage: All canonical fields MUST be included in the signature payload. Excluding fields from the signature is prohibited. * Hash Stability: Hashes MUST be computed over the canonical byte representation only. Re-encoding MUST produce identical hashes. SDLP objects MUST validate canonical encoding at the following times: * At instantiation * Before applying a policy * Before accepting a lineage entry * Before signing a lineage entry * Before performing any state transition * Before executing any lifecycle operation If an object encounters a non-canonical encoding, it MUST: * Reject the input * Record a lineage entry indicating the failure * Treat repeated or malicious attempts as tamper events Canonical serialization ensures that SDLP objects remain portable, deterministic, and tamper-evident across all environments. By enforcing strict byte-level encoding rules, SDLP prevents re-encoding attacks, signature mismatches, and cross-platform inconsistencies, establishing a universal and predictable digital physics model. 32. Hashing, Signatures, and Cryptographic Requirements The SDLP cryptographic model defines the hashing algorithms, signature formats, and key requirements that govern the integrity, authenticity, and lifecycle physics of SDLP-governed objects. All cryptographic operations MUST be deterministic, reproducible, and resistant to tampering, re-encoding, and rollback. SDLP uses four categories of cryptographic keys: * Distributor Authority Keys: Used to sign manufactured objects and initial lineage entries. * Policy Authority Keys: Used to sign policies and policy updates. * Customer Signature Keys: Used to authorize consumption, transfer, termination, and archival. * Object Keys: Generated at instantiation and used to sign lineage entries and validate internal state transitions. All keys MUST meet SDLP cryptographic strength requirements and MUST be generated using a secure, unpredictable, and verifiable source of entropy. Weak, predictable, or reused keys are prohibited. SDLP objects MUST use a canonical hashing algorithm for all integrity checks. Hashes MUST be computed over the canonical byte representation of the object, lineage entry, or policy. Re-encoding MUST NOT change the hash value. Any mismatch between expected and computed hashes MUST be treated as a tamper condition. Hashing requirements: * Hashes MUST be computed using a cryptographically secure, collision- resistant algorithm. * Hashes MUST be computed over the entire canonical payload. * Hashes MUST be stored as raw bytes, not encoded strings. * Hashes MUST be included in signature payloads. * Hashes MUST be validated before every state transition. Signature requirements: * All signatures MUST be deterministic and reproducible. * Signatures MUST cover all canonical fields, including hashes, timestamps, state transitions, and identifiers. * Signatures MUST be validated before accepting any lineage entry, policy, or customer authorization. * Signatures MUST be rejected if they are malformed, mismatched, re-encoded, or produced by an untrusted key. * Signature forgery MUST be treated as an immediate tamper event. SDLP objects MUST validate cryptographic material at the following times: * At instantiation * Before applying a policy * Before accepting a lineage entry * Before signing a lineage entry * Before performing any lifecycle operation * Before executing any state transition Cryptographic failures MUST result in one of two outcomes: * Refusal: For accidental or non-malicious failures, the object MUST refuse execution and record a lineage entry. * Tamper-Response: For malicious or intentional failures, including signature forgery, hash manipulation, or key spoofing, the object MUST invoke mandatory bitdump. SDLP objects MUST NOT rely on platform-provided cryptographic libraries unless they meet SDLP determinism and reproducibility requirements. Platform-dependent behavior, non-deterministic signatures, or locale-dependent encodings are prohibited. The hashing, signature, and cryptographic requirements ensure that SDLP-governed objects maintain immutable lineage, verifiable identity, and tamper-evident lifecycle physics. These requirements form the mathematical foundation that enables SDLP objects to behave as self-governing digital products across a secure digital medium. 33. State Machine Definition and Transition Table The SDLP lifecycle state machine defines all valid states and transitions for SDLP-governed objects. The state machine is deterministic, predictive, and immutable. SDLP objects MUST follow the state machine exactly as defined. Any deviation, rollback, unauthorized transition, or attempt to enter an undefined state MUST be treated as a tamper event. SDLP defines the following lifecycle states: * Pre-Object: The conceptual state before instantiation. * Manufactured: The object has been created and signed by the distributor. * Owned: The object is bound to a customer and ready for use. * Consumed: The object has undergone a consumption event. * Transferred: The object is in the process of ownership change. * Decayed: The object has reached a use-based or time-based decay threshold. * Archived: The object is preserved in a non-operational state. * Terminated: The object has been voluntarily ended by the customer. * Bitdumped: The object has been destroyed due to tamper-response. The following table defines all valid state transitions: +--------------+----------------+-------------------------------------+ | From State | To State | Conditions | +--------------+----------------+-------------------------------------+ | Pre-Object | Manufactured | Distributor instantiation | | Manufactured | Owned | CustomerID binding | | Owned | Consumed | Valid consumption event | | Owned | Transferred | Valid transfer authorization | | Owned | Decayed | Decay threshold reached | | Owned | Terminated | Customer termination authorization | | Consumed | Owned | Allowed if policy permits reuse | | Consumed | Decayed | Decay threshold reached | | Transferred | Owned | Transfer completion | | Transferred | Decayed | Decay threshold reached | | Decayed | Archived | Customer archival authorization | | Decayed | Terminated | Customer termination authorization | | Any State | Bitdumped | Tamper-response triggered | +--------------+----------------+-------------------------------------+ The following transitions are strictly prohibited: * Any State ? Pre-Object * Terminated ? Any Active State * Archived ? Any Active State * Bitdumped ? Any State * Decayed ? Manufactured * Decayed ? Pre-Object * Consumed ? Manufactured * Transferred ? Manufactured * Any State ? Undefined State SDLP objects MUST validate the following before performing any state transition: * The transition is explicitly permitted by the state machine. * The transition is authorized by policy. * All required signatures are valid. * The environment meets trust requirements. * The object is in a canonical, untampered state. * The lineage entry for the transition is valid and complete. State transitions MUST be recorded as lineage entries containing: * EntryID * PreviousHash * Timestamp * EventType * PreviousState * NewState * ActorID * ActorSignature * ObjectSignature SDLP objects MUST NOT allow: * Rollback to a previous state * Skipping required states * Parallel or forked state paths * Partial or incomplete transitions * Transitions without lineage entries * Transitions without valid signatures Any attempt to perform an unauthorized transition, bypass the state machine, or falsify a state change MUST be treated as a tamper event and MUST trigger mandatory bitdump. The SDLP state machine ensures that all SDLP-governed objects follow a predictable, tamper-evident, and physically consistent lifecycle. By defining all valid states and transitions, SDLP establishes the deterministic physics that govern digital products across a secure digital medium. 34. Lineage Validation and Continuity Rules The SDLP lineage validation model defines how SDLP-governed objects verify the integrity, continuity, and authenticity of their lineage chain before performing any lifecycle operation. Lineage validation is mandatory, deterministic, and cannot be bypassed or overridden by any customer, distributor, or environment. SDLP objects treat lineage as the authoritative record of all lifecycle events. Before accepting any state transition, policy update, or customer authorization, the object MUST validate the complete lineage chain from EntryID 0 through the most recent entry. Lineage validation consists of the following checks: * Hash Continuity: Each entry's PreviousHash MUST match the canonical hash of the preceding entry. Any mismatch indicates tampering, rollback, or lineage manipulation. * Signature Validation: All ActorSignatures and ObjectSignatures MUST be valid, canonical, and produced by authorized keys. Invalid or mismatched signatures MUST be treated as tampering. * State Transition Validity: The PreviousState and NewState fields MUST correspond to a legal transition defined in the SDLP state machine. Undefined or prohibited transitions MUST be rejected. * Timestamp Validation: Timestamps MUST be monotonic and derived from a trusted time source. Non-monotonic timestamps MUST be treated as a tamper condition. * Canonical Encoding: Each lineage entry MUST follow SDLP canonical serialization rules. Re-encoded, truncated, or alternate representations are prohibited. * EventType Consistency: The EventType MUST correspond to the transition being performed and MUST match the object's lifecycle context. * Actor Authorization: The ActorID MUST correspond to an entity authorized to perform the event, including customers, distributors, or SDLP authorities. If any lineage validation step fails, the object MUST refuse the operation and record a lineage entry indicating the failure. If the failure appears malicious, including rollback attempts, forged signatures, or manipulated hashes, the object MUST invoke the mandatory tamper-response mechanism. SDLP objects MUST validate lineage at the following times: * At instantiation * Before accepting any state transition * Before applying a policy update * Before performing consumption or transfer * Before signing a new lineage entry * Before executing any lifecycle operation Lineage validation is mandatory and irreversible. SDLP objects MUST not accept truncated, forked, parallel, or partially reconstructed lineage chains. Any attempt to modify, reorder, or remove lineage entries MUST be treated as a tamper event. The lineage validation and continuity rules ensure that SDLP-governed objects maintain a complete, immutable, and tamper-evident record of all lifecycle events, enabling deterministic enforcement of SDLP physics across all environments. 35. Object Identity, IDs, and Binding Rules The SDLP identity model defines the identifiers, bindings, and cryptographic anchors that establish the unique identity of an SDLP- governed object. Identity is immutable, deterministic, and MUST be verifiable across all compliant implementations. SDLP objects MUST reject any attempt to alter, spoof, or reassign identity fields. SDLP defines the following identity components: * DistributorID: Identifies the distributor that manufactured the object. Bound at instantiation and immutable. * ProductID: Identifies the product class. Assigned by the distributor and immutable. * DownloadID: Identifies the specific distribution instance of the object. Immutable. * CustomerID: Identifies the customer to whom the object is bound. Assigned during ownership binding and immutable thereafter. * ObjectKey: A cryptographic keypair generated at instantiation and used to sign lineage entries and validate internal state. * PolicyAuthorityID: Identifies the authority that issued the applicable policy set. Identity fields MUST be encoded using canonical serialization rules. Re-encoding, truncation, or alternate representations are prohibited. Identity fields MUST be included in all signature payloads. SDLP objects MUST validate identity at the following times: * At instantiation * Before applying a policy * Before accepting a lineage entry * Before performing any lifecycle operation * Before executing any state transition * Before accepting a transfer Identity binding rules: * DistributorID, ProductID, and DownloadID MUST be bound at instantiation and MUST never change. * CustomerID MUST be bound during the OwnershipBinding event and MUST never change thereafter. * ObjectKey MUST be generated at instantiation and MUST remain associated with the object for its entire lifecycle. * PolicyAuthorityID MUST match the authority that signed the applicable policy version. SDLP objects MUST reject: * Any attempt to modify identity fields * Any attempt to spoof or falsify identity * Any attempt to bind multiple CustomerIDs * Any attempt to reassign DistributorID or ProductID * Any attempt to replace or regenerate the ObjectKey * Any lineage entry with mismatched identity fields Identity violations MUST be treated as tamper events and MUST trigger mandatory bitdump. Identity chaining: * Identity fields MUST be included in EntryID 0 (Instantiation). * Identity fields MUST remain consistent across all lineage entries. * Identity fields MUST be included in all signature payloads. * Identity fields MUST be validated before computing PreviousHash. SDLP objects MUST NOT rely on platform identity, device identifiers, or environment-provided identity signals. Identity MUST be derived solely from SDLP-defined fields and cryptographic material. The object identity and binding rules ensure that SDLP-governed objects maintain a stable, immutable, and verifiable identity throughout their entire lifecycle. By binding identity to cryptographic anchors and lineage, SDLP prevents spoofing, duplication, and unauthorized reassignment, enabling secure and predictable digital physics. 36. Transfer Protocol and Ownership Change Rules The SDLP transfer protocol defines the authorized, verifiable, and tamper-evident process by which ownership of an SDLP-governed object may change from one customer to another. Transfer is a lifecycle event, not a duplication or replication. SDLP objects MUST ensure that ownership change is deterministic, cryptographically validated, and consistent with SDLP lifecycle physics. Transfers MUST follow a three-stage protocol: 1. TransferAuthorization: The current owner authorizes the transfer. 2. TransferAcceptance: The receiving customer accepts the transfer. 3. TransferCompletion: The object binds to the new CustomerID. All three stages MUST be represented as lineage entries. Missing, partial, or out-of-order entries are prohibited and MUST be treated as tamper conditions. TransferAuthorization requires: * A valid Customer Signature from the current owner. * A policy that permits transfer for the product class. * A canonical lineage entry documenting the authorization. * Validation that the object is in the Owned state. TransferAcceptance requires: * A valid Customer Signature from the receiving customer. * Validation that the receiving CustomerID is distinct from the current owner. * A canonical lineage entry documenting acceptance. TransferCompletion requires: * Validation of both prior entries. * Binding the object to the new CustomerID. * A canonical lineage entry documenting the completion. * Transitioning the object to the Owned state under the new owner. SDLP objects MUST validate the following before completing a transfer: * All signatures are valid and produced by trusted keys. * The transfer is permitted by policy. * The object is in a valid state for transfer. * The lineage chain is intact and canonical. * No tampering, rollback, or spoofing has occurred. SDLP objects MUST reject: * Transfers without proper authorization. * Transfers missing acceptance or completion entries. * Transfers that attempt to bypass the three-stage protocol. * Transfers involving spoofed or invalid CustomerIDs. * Transfers that attempt to modify identity fields. * Transfers that attempt to reassign DistributorID or ProductID. Any attempt to falsify a transfer, forge signatures, or bypass the protocol MUST be treated as a tamper event and MUST trigger mandatory bitdump. Transfer physics: * Transfer is a one-way, atomic lifecycle event. * Transfer does not duplicate or replicate the object. * Transfer does not modify lineage history. * Transfer does not reset decay or consumption counters. * Transfer does not alter identity fields except CustomerID. * Transfer cannot occur from Decayed, Archived, Terminated, or Bitdumped states. SDLP objects MUST NOT allow: * Parallel transfers * Partial transfers * Transfers without lineage entries * Transfers without valid signatures * Transfers that skip required stages * Transfers that attempt to revert to a previous owner The transfer protocol ensures that SDLP-governed objects change ownership in a secure, predictable, and tamper-evident manner. By modeling transfer as a lifecycle event governed by cryptographic physics, SDLP enables digital products to behave like physical products across a secure digital medium. 37. Environment Validation and Platform Trust Requirements The SDLP environment validation model defines how SDLP-governed objects evaluate the platform, device, and execution environment before performing any lifecycle operation. SDLP objects treat all environments as untrusted by default. Environment validation is mandatory, continuous, and cannot be disabled or bypassed. SDLP objects MUST validate the environment at the following times: * At instantiation * At startup * Before performing any lifecycle operation * Before executing any state transition * Before accepting a lineage entry * Before applying a policy * Continuously during execution Environment validation includes, but is not limited to: * Platform Integrity: Verification that the platform has not been modified, rooted, jailbroken, or compromised. * Device Identity: Verification that the device identity is stable, canonical, and not spoofed or masked. * Trusted Execution Signals: Verification of secure enclave or hardware-backed trust indicators when available. * Debugger Detection: Identification of any debugger, tracer, profiler, or instrumentation tool attached to the process. * Virtualization Detection: Identification of unauthorized virtual machines, emulators, or sandboxed environments. * Environment Spoofing Detection: Identification of attempts to falsify platform signals, device identifiers, or trust indicators. * Memory Integrity: Verification that the process memory has not been modified, injected, or tampered with. * Binary Integrity: Verification that the executable code and data match the expected canonical hash. Environment validation outcomes: * Allowed: The environment meets all trust requirements. The object proceeds normally. * Refused: The environment fails validation in a non-malicious or accidental manner. The object MUST refuse execution and record a lineage entry documenting the failure. * Tamper: The environment exhibits malicious, intentional, or deceptive characteristics. The object MUST invoke mandatory tamper-response and transition to the Bitdumped state. The following conditions require immediate bitdump without exception: * Debugger attachment * Binary modification or patching * Environment spoofing or falsified trust signals * Unauthorized virtualization masking * Memory injection or code manipulation * Attempts to bypass environment validation * Attempts to disable or interfere with validation routines SDLP objects MUST NOT rely on: * Platform-provided trust guarantees * Operating system security claims * Device identifiers that can be spoofed * Cloud-based validation services * External enforcement mechanisms SDLP objects MUST rely solely on: * Canonical encoding * Cryptographic identity * Lineage integrity * Predictive lifecycle physics * Internal environment validation routines Environment validation MUST be deterministic and reproducible across all compliant implementations. Platform-dependent behavior, undefined trust signals, or non-deterministic validation routines are prohibited. The environment validation and platform trust requirements ensure that SDLP-governed objects operate only within trusted, verifiable, and tamper-evident environments. By treating all platforms as untrusted by default and applying predictive lifecycle physics, SDLP prevents unauthorized execution, manipulation, and environmental deception across a secure digital medium. 38. Policy Structure, Versioning, and Enforcement Physics The SDLP policy model defines how lifecycle policies are structured, versioned, validated, and applied by SDLP-governed objects. Policies do not function as external enforcement mechanisms. Instead, policies define the lifecycle physics that the object MUST obey. SDLP objects interpret policy as part of their immutable operational laws. Policies MUST be: * Canonically encoded * Versioned * Signed by a Policy Authority Key * Immutable once published * Validated before application * Included in all signature payloads SDLP defines the following policy components: * PolicyID: A unique identifier for the policy. * PolicyVersion: A monotonically increasing version number. * PolicyAuthorityID: The authority that issued the policy. * LifecycleRules: Rules governing consumption, transfer, decay, archival, termination, and other lifecycle events. * EnvironmentRules: Requirements for environment validation. * CryptographicRules: Requirements for hashing, signatures, and key strength. * TransferRules: Requirements for ownership change. * DecayRules: Conditions under which the object enters the Decayed state. * EndOfLifeRules: Conditions for archival, termination, and bitdump. * Metadata: Additional canonical fields required by the product class. Policy versioning requirements: * Policy versions MUST be strictly increasing. * Policies MUST never be modified after publication. * Policy updates MUST be published as new versions. * SDLP objects MUST validate the signature of each policy version. * SDLP objects MUST reject policies with invalid or missing signatures. * SDLP objects MUST reject policies that violate canonical encoding. Policy application rules: * Policies MUST be validated before application. * Policies MUST be applied atomically. * Policies MUST be recorded as lineage entries. * Policies MUST NOT override identity fields. * Policies MUST NOT weaken cryptographic requirements. * Policies MUST NOT disable tamper-response. * Policies MUST NOT introduce undefined lifecycle states. SDLP objects MUST treat the following as tamper conditions: * Policies with forged signatures * Policies with mismatched PolicyAuthorityID * Policies that attempt to downgrade version numbers * Policies that attempt to bypass lifecycle physics * Policies that attempt to disable environment validation * Policies that attempt to alter identity fields * Policies that attempt to redefine canonical encoding Enforcement physics: * SDLP does not enforce policy externally. * SDLP objects interpret policy as part of their internal physics. * Allowed actions proceed normally. * Disallowed actions are refused. * Impossible actions trigger tamper-response. Policy physics MUST be deterministic and reproducible across all compliant implementations. Platform-dependent behavior, ambiguous interpretation, or non-deterministic policy evaluation is prohibited. The policy structure, versioning, and enforcement physics ensure that SDLP-governed objects operate under consistent, predictable, and tamper-evident lifecycle laws. By treating policy as part of the object's internal physics rather than external enforcement, SDLP establishes a secure and self-governing digital environment. 39. Security Considerations SDLP is a security architecture. All sections of this document are security-relevant. The structural definitions, object model, identifiers, lineage primitives, policy structures, environment model, and lifecycle framework described in this document form the foundation of SDLP's security guarantees. Implementations MUST ensure that all cryptographic operations, environment validation steps, and lifecycle transitions are performed exactly as specified. Deviations from the structural model may result in security vulnerabilities, including unauthorized object recovery, lineage corruption, or bypass of policy enforcement. Additional security properties, including decay physics, tamper physics, destruction rules, and reproduction constraints, will be defined in a future revision of this document. 40. IANA Considerations This document has no IANA actions. 41. Acknowledgments The author acknowledges the contributions of reviewers, implementers, and members of the SDLP community whose feedback helped refine the architecture and clarify the structural model. 42. Changelog draft-norton-sdlp-sec-arch-00 * Initial version of the SDLP Security Architecture. * Includes structural definitions, object model, identifiers, lineage primitives, policy structures, environment model, and lifecycle framework. * SDLP Digital Physics Layer (Sections 39-54) will be introduced in draft-norton-sdlp-sec-arch-01. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, May 2017. Author's Address M. Norton Independent El Mirage United States Email: mark433norton@gmail.com